Leo A. Kinahan

The Crown appealed the trial judge's decision to grant a directed verdict of acquittal on charges of aggravated assault and obstruction of justice.

The respondent was accused of pushing the complainant down exterior stairs at a bar.

The trial judge found that the Crown had not met its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt based on circumstantial evidence from security camera footage that did not capture the critical moment.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in applying the test for directed verdict by weighing inferences rather than determining whether any evidence existed upon which a reasonable jury could convict.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittals were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference of a 10-year-old child.

The Crown alleged that the accused touched the victim's breasts while tickling her in his bedroom and again at the top of the stairs, warned her not to tell anyone, and touched her buttocks.

The accused admitted to physical contact but denied sexual assault.

The court found that the Crown proved the physical and mental elements of sexual assault beyond a reasonable doubt based on the victim's credible testimony, the accused's admissions and contradictions, and the circumstances of the touching.

However, the court found a reasonable doubt as to whether the accused's subjective motivation was for a sexual purpose, acquitting on the sexual interference charge.

The offender, Mitchell Irwin, pleaded guilty to dangerous driving causing death, failing to stop, and failing to comply with a recognizance.

The Crown and defence presented a joint submission for a four-year and fourteen-day term of imprisonment, which the court accepted.

The primary contested issue was the length of the driving prohibition.

Considering aggravating factors such as excessive speed, aggressive driving, prior infractions, and leaving the scene to dispose of evidence, alongside mitigating factors including youth, prior good character, and remorse, the court imposed a total sentence comprising the agreed imprisonment, a 6-year driving prohibition (effective 8 years), a DNA order, a no-contact order, and a 10-year weapons prohibition.

The applicant, a police officer charged with trafficking oxycodone, applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging a breach of his s. 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay from the date of the charges to the hearing of the application was approximately 45 months.

The court applied the Morin framework and found that the majority of the delay was attributable to the applicant's actions, including changing counsel multiple times, and waiver by defence counsel.

The court concluded that the remaining institutional and Crown delay fell within acceptable guidelines and dismissed the application.

The appellant appealed the imposition of a peace bond following an acquittal on a charge of breach of recognizance.

The trial judge imposed the peace bond without giving notice that such an order was being contemplated and without allowing the accused to make submissions or call evidence on whether it should be imposed.

The appeal court held that imposing a peace bond without affording the accused an opportunity to be heard breached principles of natural justice and procedural fairness.

The court also found there was no evidentiary basis for the peace bond, as the trial judge relied on speculation and irrelevant considerations rather than evidence establishing a risk of future breach of the peace.

The peace bond was quashed.

The applicant, a police officer, sought judicial review of a decision by the Police Governing Authority granting an extension of time to serve a Notice of Hearing for disciplinary action.

The applicant was not given notice of the request for an extension and had no opportunity to make submissions.

The Divisional Court held that this failure breached minimal requirements of procedural fairness, rendering the decision fundamentally flawed and justifying intervention despite the interlocutory nature of the ruling.

The court quashed the decision and ordered the applicant's salary to be paid for the period of his suspension.

The accused was charged with sexual assault of his step-daughter when she was between 12 and 15 years of age, with the alleged offences occurring over a three-and-a-half-year period ending May 31, 2007.

The complainant testified that the accused came into her bedroom on multiple occasions and touched her breasts and attempted to touch her pubic area while she was in bed.

The accused denied all allegations, claiming he only entered her room to wake her for school.

The trial involved significant credibility issues, including the complainant's initial false denial to police, inconsistencies in her evidence regarding peripheral details, and the accused's admission of making an inappropriate sexual comment to the complainant.

The court found the complainant generally credible but harbored concerns about certain aspects of her evidence.

The accused's evidence was also found troubling, particularly regarding his admission of listening to the complainant's phone call and his implausible explanation regarding an alleged accidental breast contact.

Despite finding the complainant more believable than the accused, the court determined that the Crown had not proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt due to reliability concerns with the complainant's evidence and reasonable doubt arising from the accused's testimony.

A police officer with 24 years of exemplary service pleaded guilty to assault after kicking and stepping on a restrained, intoxicated prisoner in custody.

The Crown sought a suspended sentence to denounce the conduct, while the defence sought a conditional discharge.

The court imposed a conditional discharge with 12 months probation and 100 hours of community service, finding that while the assault was a gross breach of trust requiring denunciation, the minimal violence, absence of injury, momentary loss of control, and officer's exemplary record made a discharge appropriate in the circumstances.

The accused brought a motion to determine the admissibility of the complainant's personal diaries for use in cross-examination.

The defence sought to cross-examine the complainant on four issues: the absence of any mention of alleged sexual abuse in the diaries, limited references to money, the complainant's relationship with her biological father, and her relationship with her mother.

The court applied the test from R. v. Shearing and R. v. Seaboyer, balancing the probative value of the evidence against the prejudicial effect and privacy interests of the complainant.

The court permitted limited cross-examination on the absence of entries relating to sexual abuse and money, but prohibited cross-examination on entries relating to the complainant's relationship with her mother, finding that the prejudicial effect substantially outweighed any probative value.

Three police constables from the Barrie Police Service were charged with assault causing bodily harm following their arrest of a civilian, Michael Ullman, at his residence on July 5, 2009.

The Crown alleged the officers entered the home without permission, without exigent circumstances, and used excessive force during the arrest, resulting in a broken arm.

The defendants claimed they were invited into the home, had reasonable grounds to believe firearms were present (exigent circumstances), and used only necessary force to subdue an actively resisting suspect.

The trial focused on whether the entry was lawful and whether the force used was reasonable.

The appellant, a detective constable, appealed a finding of guilt for insubordination after leaving his loaded service firearm unsecured on his desk.

He argued that he did not receive proper notice of the chief's complaint under the Police Services Act and sought to introduce new evidence regarding a past misconduct conviction of the main witness.

The Ontario Civilian Police Commission denied the motion to introduce new evidence, finding it did not meet the Palmer test.

The Commission dismissed the appeal, concluding that the hearing officer reasonably found that proper notice was given during the informal resolution process and that the evidence clearly supported the finding that the appellant failed to secure his firearm.

The applicant sought bail pending appeal following convictions for sexual exploitation and sexual assault against a minor and a custodial sentence of five months.

The court considered the criteria under s. 679(3) of the Criminal Code, including whether the appeal was frivolous, whether the applicant would surrender into custody, and whether detention was necessary in the public interest.

The Crown conceded the second and third criteria but argued the appeal lacked merit.

After reviewing the four proposed grounds of appeal concerning character evidence, alleged misapprehension of GPS evidence, DNA contamination issues, and reliance on a transcript of a police statement, the court concluded none demonstrated arguable merit.

The applicant failed to establish that the appeal was not frivolous and the bail application was dismissed.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal decision that upheld her conviction for refusing to provide a breath sample.

The Court of Appeal refused leave, finding that the trial judge had compelling reasons to reject the appellant's evidence, the appeal judge's reasons were sufficient under the Sheppard test, and the proposed fresh evidence could not have affected the verdict.

The applicant police officer sought judicial review of the Commissioner's decision to extend the time for serving a notice of hearing for disciplinary proceedings.

The Divisional Court quashed the application as premature, holding that the Commissioner's decision was interlocutory and administrative in nature.

The court emphasized the general principle against fragmenting administrative proceedings and noted that the applicant could raise any issues of prejudice or delay before the hearing adjudicator.

The appellant police officer appealed a finding of guilt and a penalty of a 3-day suspension for neglect of duty.

The charge arose after the officer allegedly told a subpoenaed witness in a careless driving trial that he did not need to stay, resulting in the charge being dismissed.

The appellant argued the Hearing Officer misapprehended evidence and erred in assessing witness credibility.

The Ontario Civilian Police Commission dismissed the appeal, finding that the Hearing Officer's credibility assessments and factual findings were reasonable, supported by the evidence, and not void of evidentiary foundation.

The penalty was also upheld as appropriate.

The appellant police officer appealed a disciplinary conviction and penalty for neglect of duty.

The officer had been found guilty of failing to ensure a subpoenaed witness remained at court to testify in a careless driving prosecution, resulting in the charge being dismissed.

On appeal, the officer argued the Hearing Officer misapprehended the evidence and erred in assessing the credibility of the witness over the conflicting testimony of a court officer and the Crown Prosecutor.

The Ontario Civilian Police Commission dismissed the appeal, finding that the Hearing Officer's credibility assessments and factual findings were reasonable and not void of evidentiary foundation.

The penalty of a 3-day suspension without pay was also upheld.

The appellant police officer appealed a decision of the Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services, which upheld a Hearing Officer's finding that he was guilty of unlawful or unnecessary exercise of authority.

The charges arose after the appellant arrested an individual for public intoxication and failing to identify himself, resulting in an altercation.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Commission reasonably concluded the Hearing Officer's decision was supported by the evidence, despite deficiencies in the Hearing Officer's reasons regarding credibility findings.

The appellant appealed a disciplinary hearing decision that found a police officer not guilty of breach of confidence.

Before the written decision was released, the officer retired from the Ontario Provincial Police.

The retired officer brought a motion challenging the Commission's jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

The Commission granted the motion, finding that under the Police Services Act, it only has jurisdiction over active police officers.

Because the officer had retired, he was no longer a police officer as defined by the Act, and the Commission therefore lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

The appellant sought to appeal a disciplinary hearing decision that found the respondent police officer not guilty of breach of confidence.

Prior to the release of the written decision, the respondent retired from the Ontario Provincial Police.

The respondent brought a motion challenging the Commission's jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

The Commission granted the motion, finding that under the Police Services Act, it only has jurisdiction over active police officers, and therefore lacks authority to hear an appeal concerning a retired officer.

The appellant police officer appealed a hearing officer's decision dismissing his motion to quash a disciplinary charge for delay.

The appellant had subsequently pled guilty to the charge and served the penalty.

The Commission held that the appeal was not moot, but that the appellant had waived his right to appeal by pleading guilty without reserving his right to challenge jurisdiction.

In the alternative, the Commission found that the six-month limitation period under s. 69(18) of the Police Services Act commenced when investigators obtained independent witness statements, providing a sufficient body of factual information to create a reasonable belief of misconduct.

As the Notice of Hearing was served within six months of that date, the appeal was dismissed.