Le Dain

The appellant, a federal inmate, was placed in a special handling unit after being charged with the murder of a fellow inmate.

Despite his subsequent acquittal, he remained in segregation and his request to transfer to a medium-security institution was denied.

He applied to the provincial superior court for a writ of habeas corpus.

The lower courts dismissed the application, holding that the Federal Court had exclusive jurisdiction over the matter.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, ruling that provincial superior courts have jurisdiction to issue habeas corpus to determine the validity of a distinct form of confinement in a federal penitentiary, notwithstanding the Federal Court's concurrent certiorari jurisdiction.

The appellant was convicted of careless driving and appealed his sentence.

The provincial court judge declined jurisdiction to hear the appeal, questioning whether the Provincial Court (Criminal Division) was an independent tribunal under s. 11(d) of the Charter.

The Ontario Court of Appeal held that the court was independent.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, establishing the essential conditions of judicial independence: security of tenure, financial security, and institutional independence.

The Court concluded that Ontario provincial court judges met these requirements and constituted an independent tribunal.

The appellant appealed her conviction for possession of counterfeit money, arguing that an intention to use the counterfeit money as currency was a required element of the offence.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the majority of the Court of Appeal that intention to use the counterfeit money as currency is not an element of the offence under section 408 of the Criminal Code.

The Lieutenant-Governor in Council of British Columbia referred a question to the Court of Appeal regarding whether s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act, which created an absolute liability offence for driving with a suspended license and imposed a mandatory term of imprisonment, was consistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Court of Appeal found the provision inconsistent with s. 7 of the Charter.

On appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada held that a law that has the potential to convict a person who has not done anything wrong offends the principles of fundamental justice.

The Court concluded that combining absolute liability with mandatory imprisonment violates a person's right to liberty under s. 7 of the Charter and could not be saved under s. 1.

The appellant, a federal public servant, was discharged after engaging in a sustained and highly visible public campaign criticizing major government policies, including metric conversion and the Charter of Rights.

He grieved his discharge, but an adjudicator upheld it, finding his conduct impaired his ability to perform his duties and violated his duty of loyalty.

The Federal Court of Appeal dismissed his application for judicial review.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that while public servants have some freedom of speech, it is not absolute and must be balanced against the need for an impartial and effective public service.

The Court found the adjudicator did not err in inferring impairment of effectiveness from the extreme nature of the appellant's public criticisms.

An application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was dismissed.

The accused was convicted of five offences, including rape, arising from a single incident.

At trial, the Crown improperly split its case by calling reply evidence to contradict the complainant's testimony regarding the accused's physical mobility and to introduce a new statement allegedly made by the accused.

This forced the accused to testify a second time and subjected him to cross-examination on collateral issues.

The Court of Appeal found error but applied the curative proviso in s. 613(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code to uphold the rape conviction, while quashing the other convictions under the Kienapple principle.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeals, holding that the Crown's improper splitting of its case caused a substantial wrong that could not be cured by the proviso.

A new trial was ordered on all five counts.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder but successfully appealed, resulting in an order for a new trial.

At the second trial, the Crown introduced the appellant's testimony from the first trial as part of its case-in-chief.

The appellant objected, arguing this violated his right against self-incrimination under s. 13 of the Charter.

The trial judge and Court of Appeal allowed the evidence, holding that a retrial was not 'any other proceedings'.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that s. 13 precludes the Crown from using an accused's previous testimony as part of its case in a retrial, as a retrial constitutes 'any other proceedings' and allowing such evidence would indirectly compel the accused to testify.

The appellant, a registered Micmac Indian, was convicted under the Nova Scotia Lands and Forests Act for possession of a rifle and shotgun cartridges.

He argued that the Treaty of 1752 and s. 88 of the Indian Act provided immunity from prosecution.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Treaty of 1752 was validly created, had not been terminated, and constituted a 'treaty' under s. 88 of the Indian Act.

The Court found that the treaty right to hunt included the incidental right to possess a firearm and ammunition safely.

As provincial legislation cannot restrict native treaty rights under s. 88, the appellant was exempt from prosecution.

The appeal was allowed and acquittals entered.

The appellant was convicted of conspiracy to traffic and trafficking in PCP.

He appealed on the grounds that the trial judge erred in not declaring a mistrial after the Crown referred to alleged prior acts, in not deleting references to his criminal past from wiretap recordings, and that the wiretap authorization was invalid due to an overly broad 'basket clause'.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's instructions to the jury cured any prejudice from the Crown's comments or the recordings.

Furthermore, the Court held that the invalid 'basket clause' in the wiretap authorization could be severed from the valid portions, rendering the intercepted communications admissible.

The appellant appealed from a judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal which allowed the Crown's appeal from the acquittal of the accused on a charge of fraud.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the conclusion and reasons of the Court of Appeal for Ontario regarding the admissibility of computer-produced bank statements under the Canada Evidence Act.

The appellant operated a sex boutique and was convicted of possessing obscene articles for the purpose of sale under s. 159(2)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The police seized various sex stimulators displayed in the store, which had a 'For Adults Only' sign on the door.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the articles were 'publications' because their character was made public by the store's signs and display.

The Court also affirmed that the target audience is irrelevant in determining obscenity, and that the lower courts properly applied the community standard of tolerance.

The appellant appealed his convictions for attempted murder and rape, as well as his designation as a dangerous offender and sentence of indeterminate detention.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal from conviction, finding the verdict was not unreasonable based on the identification evidence.

The Court also found no error in the dangerous offender proceedings and dismissed the appeal from sentence.

The appellant was convicted of gross indecency.

At trial, the Crown conducted an improper and unfairly prejudicial cross-examination regarding the appellant's previous sexual conduct, and the trial judge misdirected the jury on the alibi defence.

The Court of Appeal found these errors but applied the proviso in s. 613(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code to uphold the conviction due to strong circumstantial evidence.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's failure to limit the cross-examination was an error of mixed law and fact, not an error of law alone, and therefore the proviso could not be applied.

The unfair prejudice resulted in a miscarriage of justice.

The appellant operated a telephone sales 'boiler room' in Toronto, fraudulently inducing United States residents to purchase worthless shares in Central American mining companies.

The victims sent their money to Central America, and the appellant brought a portion of the proceeds back to Canada.

The appellant challenged his committal for trial on the basis that the essential element of the fraud (the deprivation) occurred outside Canada.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, establishing that Canadian courts have jurisdiction over transnational offences if there is a 'real and substantial link' between the offence and Canada, which was satisfied by the scheme being devised and operated in Toronto.

The appellant police officer and a fellow officer were involved in an altercation with a pedestrian who subsequently died from his injuries.

The fellow officer was convicted of manslaughter, while the appellant was acquitted.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial for the appellant, finding the trial judge misdirected the jury on the justified use of force and the mental element for aiding and abetting manslaughter.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the acquittal, holding that the trial judge's instructions were adequate given the appellant's distinct position regarding the power of arrest and that the jury was properly instructed on the required mental element.

The appellants appealed their rape convictions arising from a joint judge-alone trial, arguing that the Crown's overly aggressive and improper cross-examination of one accused required a new trial.

The court held that, even assuming jurisdiction based on a dissent over prejudice, the majority below made no error in finding the cross-examination did not prejudice the accused.

The trial judge's convictions rested on credibility findings and supporting evidence rather than on the impugned cross-examination.

The appeal was therefore dismissed, and no miscarriage of justice was found.

The appellant, a former bank manager in the Bahamas, was called as a Crown witness in a Canadian income tax prosecution.

He refused to testify about specific bank customers and transactions, arguing that doing so would subject him to criminal prosecution under Bahamian bank secrecy laws and violate his rights under section 7 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the appellant was a compellable witness and that section 7 of the Charter did not apply, as any deprivation of liberty would result from the operation of foreign law, not Canadian law.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant applied for subdivision approval, which was denied by the municipal council because the land was considered flood-prone.

The council refused to consider any proposals to remedy the flooding problem.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while flooding was a proper consideration, the council erred by failing to consider the scope of the problem and possible solutions.

The failure to take into account a highly relevant consideration meant the council did not exercise its discretion according to law.

The appeal was allowed and the council was ordered to reconsider the application.

An application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was granted.

However, the appeal was subsequently abandoned due to the death of the appellant.