LeBel

The respondents were charged with sexual assault based on allegations by three children.

The charges were stayed by the appellant Crown prosecutor, and the children later recanted.

The respondents sued the prosecutor for malicious prosecution.

The trial judge and Court of Appeal found the prosecutor liable, concluding his lack of subjective belief in the probable guilt of the respondents was sufficient to ground a finding of malice.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and dismissed the action, holding that malice requires proof of an improper purpose.

A prosecutor's lack of subjective belief in reasonable and probable cause does not equate to malice and does not dispense with the requirement to prove an improper purpose.

The appellant, a U.S. corporation, submitted a bid for a military procurement contract.

When another bidder was awarded the contract, the appellant filed a complaint with the Canadian International Trade Tribunal (CITT) alleging violations of the Agreement on Internal Trade (AIT).

The CITT ruled the appellant had standing, but the Federal Court of Appeal quashed the ruling.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that non-Canadian suppliers do not have standing before the CITT to bring a complaint under the AIT, as the AIT is a domestic free trade agreement and its procurement provisions apply only to Canadian suppliers.

Several businesses went bankrupt while holding unremitted federal and provincial sales tax (GST and QST).

The federal and provincial tax authorities claimed ownership of these amounts, arguing they were held in a deemed trust and did not form part of the bankrupts' estates.

The trustees in bankruptcy and secured creditors argued that under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, the Crown ranks only as an ordinary unsecured creditor.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeals, holding that the 1992 amendments to the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act rendered the statutory deemed trusts ineffective upon bankruptcy.

Consequently, the tax authorities are ordinary creditors, and the unremitted tax amounts remain part of the bankrupts' estates subject to the priority scheme of the bankruptcy legislation.

The respondent, a bookkeeper, made voluntary cash advances to her employer, a law firm experiencing financial difficulties.

The law firm also provided limited legal services to the respondent.

When the firm went bankrupt, the respondent sued for negligence, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty.

The trial judge dismissed the claims, but the Court of Appeal found an ad hoc fiduciary duty based on a power-dependency relationship.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that an ad hoc fiduciary duty requires an undertaking by the fiduciary to act in the best interests of the other party, which was absent here.

The Court also found no breach of duty arising from the limited solicitor-client relationship.

The Quebec legislature amended the Charter of the French language to disregard periods of attendance at unsubsidized English-language private schools and instruction received pursuant to special authorizations when determining eligibility for publicly funded English-language instruction.

The respondents challenged these amendments.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that paragraphs 2 and 3 of s. 73 of the Charter of the French language infringe the minority language educational rights guaranteed by s. 23(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Court found that the absolute prohibition on considering such instruction creates a fictitious educational pathway, preventing the required global qualitative assessment.

The infringement was not justified under s. 1 of the Charter, as the measures were not minimally impairing.

The appeals and cross-appeals were dismissed, and the provisions were declared unconstitutional, with the declaration suspended for one year.

The United States sought the extradition of the respondent on a charge of first degree murder.

The extradition judge committed the respondent for second degree murder, finding insufficient evidence of planning and deliberation for first degree murder under Canadian law.

The Minister of Justice subsequently ordered the respondent's surrender for the American offence of first degree murder.

The Court of Appeal quashed the surrender order, applying the 'misalignment test' to find it unreasonable to surrender the respondent for first degree murder without evidence of premeditation at the committal hearing.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the Minister's surrender order, holding that the 'misalignment test' is incompatible with the conduct-based approach to double criminality, the principle of comity, and the role of the extradition judge.

The accused was charged with multiple counts arising from two separate sexual assaults committed against different complainants approximately one month apart.

The trial judge denied the accused's pre-trial application to sever the counts.

The accused was convicted on all charges, and the Court of Appeal upheld the convictions.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge failed to properly balance the relevant factors for severance.

The Court held that the significant risk of prejudice to the accused, including the dangers of credibility cross-pollination and prohibited propensity reasoning, clearly outweighed any minimal benefits to the administration of justice in trying the counts together.

The appellant applied for authorization to institute a class action against the municipality, alleging that property tax increases exceeded the statutory 5% ceiling.

He sought a declaration that the tax by-laws were inconsistent with the municipal charter and a refund of the overpayments.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the lower courts' refusal to authorize the class action, finding that the facts alleged did not justify the conclusions sought, as a simple declaration of inconsistency without quashing the by-laws could not legally ground a claim for a tax refund.

The appellants sought authorization to institute class actions to quash municipal by-laws imposing property and business taxes and to obtain a refund of taxes paid.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeals, holding that a class action is not an appropriate procedure for seeking to quash a municipal by-law.

The Court found that a declaration of nullity would apply to all ratepayers, making a class action unnecessary, and that the conclusions sought regarding tax refunds were unenforceable as they would require a recalculation of taxes rather than an immediate right to a refund.

The appellant shot and killed a police officer during a struggle following a domestic dispute.

At trial, he admitted to the shooting but claimed it was accidental and lacked the intent for murder.

The trial judge instructed the jury on the Crown's theory, mentioning the appellant's failure to check on the officer before threatening suicide.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred by suggesting the jury could infer intent from post-offence conduct.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the jury charge, read as a whole, did not contain an error of law.

The Court further held that even if an error existed, the curative proviso would apply as no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred.

The United States sought the extradition of the respondent for telemarketing fraud.

In support of the committal application, the requesting state submitted a record of the case containing a summary of evidence gathered in both the US and Canada.

The respondent objected to the Canadian-gathered evidence as inadmissible hearsay under s. 32(2) of the Extradition Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that ss. 32(2) and 33(1) provide a modified approach to the hearsay rule in the extradition context, allowing Canadian-gathered evidence to be presented in summary form provided its contents would otherwise be admissible under Canadian law.

The appeal was allowed and the committal and surrender orders were restored.

The CRTC ordered telecommunications carriers to create deferral accounts from urban residential telephone service revenues.

It later directed that these funds be used to improve accessibility for persons with disabilities, expand broadband coverage, and distribute remaining amounts to subscribers as credits.

Bell Canada, TELUS, and consumer groups appealed the CRTC's authority to make these allocations.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeals, holding that the CRTC's creation and use of the deferral accounts was a reasonable exercise of its rate-setting authority under the Telecommunications Act, which requires it to balance the interests of consumers, carriers, and competitors while implementing national telecommunications policy objectives.

The accused was charged with importing cocaine.

Shortly before trial, the Crown disclosed evidence from two alleged accomplices.

The trial judge excluded the evidence under s. 24(1) of the Charter due to late disclosure.

The Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that exclusion of evidence under s. 24(1) is only appropriate where late disclosure renders the trial process unfair and cannot be remedied by an adjournment and disclosure order, or where exclusion is necessary to maintain the integrity of the justice system.

The appellant was driving a rented SUV when he was pulled over by a police officer who mistakenly believed the vehicle required a front licence plate.

Despite realizing his error, the officer continued the detention, discovered the appellant's licence was suspended, arrested him, and searched the vehicle, finding 35 kg of cocaine.

The trial judge found breaches of ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter but admitted the evidence under s. 24(2).

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, applying the revised s. 24(2) framework from R. v. Grant.

The Court held that the police conduct was a brazen and flagrant disregard for Charter rights, aggravated by misleading testimony, and that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The evidence was excluded and an acquittal entered.

The appellant was charged with impaired driving and driving 'over 80'.

The arresting officer observed erratic driving and physical signs of impairment, and made a breathalyzer demand.

The trial judge excluded the breath samples under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding the officer lacked objective reasonable grounds for the demand, and acquitted the appellant.

The summary conviction appeal court upheld the acquittal, but the Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appellant's appeal, holding that the application of the legal standard of reasonable and probable grounds to the facts is a question of law, and that the officer had ample objective evidence to support his subjective belief of impairment.

The appellant transit authorities refused to post the respondents' political advertisements on the sides of their buses, citing policies that permitted commercial but not political advertising.

The respondents challenged the policies under s. 2(b) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the transit authorities are government entities subject to the Charter.

The Court found that the sides of buses are public places where expressive activity is protected, and the policies infringed the respondents' freedom of expression.

The infringement was not justified under s. 1 of the Charter because the blanket ban on political advertising did not minimally impair the right.

The policies were declared of no force or effect under s. 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.

The employer, Camvrac, defaulted on a line of credit with the Caisse.

The Caisse exercised its right of compensation on Camvrac's term deposit pursuant to an agreement.

The Crown sought to collect unremitted source deductions from the proceeds of the term deposit, arguing that the compensation agreement created a 'security interest' under s. 224(1.3) of the Income Tax Act, making the property subject to a deemed trust in favour of the Crown.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the agreement did create a security interest, and the proceeds of the term deposit were subject to the Crown's deemed trust.

The accused were convicted of first degree murder and manslaughter following a shooting related to a drug debt.

The Crown's case relied heavily on circumstantial evidence and an out-of-court statement made by the deceased shortly before his death expressing fear of one of the accused.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial based on errors in the trial judge's jury instructions regarding circumstantial evidence, reasonable doubt, and the limiting instruction for the hearsay statement.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the convictions, finding that the jury instructions on the burden of proof were adequate when read as a whole and that the deceased's statement was properly admitted under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule to establish his fear and rebut the defence's theory of alternative suspects.

The accused was convicted of second degree murder following a third trial.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge erred by failing to provide a limiting instruction on the use of prior consistent statements admitted during the re-examination of a key Crown witness.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction.

The Court held that while the prior consistent statements were improperly admitted, the error was harmless and the curative proviso applied.

Furthermore, because the statements had no probative value and did not bolster the witness's reliability, no limiting instruction was required.

The respondent was convicted of producing and possessing marihuana for the purpose of trafficking after a grow operation was found in his home.

The trial judge ordered full forfeiture of the home and a 10-month conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal varied the order to partial forfeiture of half the house.

The Crown appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that partial forfeiture is permissible under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and that forfeiture orders should be approached independently of the broader sentencing inquiry.