Richard M. Bogoroch

The plaintiffs brought a motion seeking reconsideration and amendment of a prior endorsement that approved a minor's settlement in a tort action.

The motion sought to clarify or correct findings regarding the settlement quantum, structured settlements for minors, and the enforceability of contingency fee and referral fee agreements.

The court dismissed the motion for reconsideration, except for a minor accidental slip, reaffirming the narrow scope for judicial reconsideration of decisions before formal judgment entry, emphasizing that such motions are generally not a substitute for appeal.

The applicant, a person under disability, sought court approval for a full and final settlement of his statutory accident benefits claim, pursuant to Rule 7.08(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court approved the proposed settlement of $450,000, which included a structured component, finding it to be in the best interests of the applicant.

The decision also provided important clarification on the practice of pre-funding structured settlements in escrow, affirming that this process is appropriate and necessary to secure precise payment schedules and does not usurp the court's jurisdiction, as funds remain subject to withdrawal or amendment until final approval.

The minor plaintiff was struck by a vehicle while crossing the road after collecting mail.

A settlement of $400,000 was reached at mediation.

The litigation guardian brought a motion for court approval of the settlement, legal fees under a contingency fee agreement, and a referral fee.

The court approved the settlement amount for the minor plaintiff but found the contingency fee agreement and referral fee agreement unenforceable due to non-compliance with statutory and Law Society requirements.

Legal fees were reduced and approved on a quantum meruit basis.

The plaintiff, a person under disability following a severe motor vehicle accident, sought court approval of a $487,500 tort settlement and associated legal fees under Rule 7.08.

The court approved the settlement amount, noting it was on the low end of reasonable but acceptable given the outstanding accident benefits claim.

However, the court rejected the proposed legal fees based on a 30% contingency agreement, finding them unreasonable given the lack of liability risk and early settlement.

The court reduced the fees to slightly above docketed time and ordered a portion of the funds to be structured with a case manager appointed to oversee the plaintiff's treatment plan.

The decision also provides a comprehensive checklist for counsel filing Rule 7.08 applications.

The respondent's husband died during a follow-up angiogram as part of a clinical trial.

The respondent sued the principal investigator, Dr. Strauss, for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty.

The jury found breach of standard of care but no causation in negligence.

The trial judge found breach of an ad hoc fiduciary duty and awarded damages, stating causation was removed from the analysis in the fiduciary context.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred by not examining causation in the fiduciary context.

The Court found no causal link between the alleged fiduciary breach and the loss, relying on the jury's finding on causation in the negligence claim, as the claims were based on substantially the same conduct.

The action was dismissed.

The plaintiff, Karen Stirrett, sought damages for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty against three defendant doctors following the death of her spouse, David Stirrett, after an angiogram performed as part of the STREAM medical research study.

A jury found Dr. Strauss negligent but that his negligence was not causative of the death.

The court, sitting without a jury for the equitable claim, found that Dr. Strauss, as the principal investigator, owed and breached a fiduciary duty to David Stirrett by failing to disclose critical changes to the study protocol, funding, and participant numbers, which would have influenced David Stirrett's informed consent.

The court held that causation is not a requirement for recovery in breach of fiduciary duty.

Judgment was awarded in favour of the plaintiff against Dr. Strauss, while the actions against Dr. Cheema and Dr. Sheth were dismissed.

Family members brought a medical negligence action after a hospital patient died from viral myocarditis shortly after presenting to the emergency department.

A civil jury found two treating physicians liable and awarded $600,000 in damages.

On appeal, the physicians argued the trial judge made multiple procedural and instructional errors, including permitting further discovery at trial, limiting expert evidence, improperly charging the jury on standard of care and causation, misphrasing the causation question, misdirecting the jury on agreement requirements, and refusing to poll the jury.

The Court of Appeal held that most alleged errors were unfounded and that the causation wording error in the verdict questions caused no substantial wrong because the jury was repeatedly instructed on the correct “but for” test.

The appeal was dismissed.

Following a medical negligence trial in which the plaintiffs were unsuccessful in establishing a causal connection between breaches of the standard of care and a patient’s death following a caesarean section, the defendant hospital sought costs of $272,000.

The plaintiffs included the deceased’s spouse and minor children represented by a litigation guardian.

Although the plaintiffs had declined a settlement offer and the defendants had succeeded at trial, the court exercised its discretion under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act to deny a costs award.

Considering the plaintiffs’ circumstances, the public nature of the defendant institution, and broader access to justice concerns, the court held that imposing the full costs sought would be inequitable.

The plaintiffs brought a medical malpractice action following the death of a mother from postpartum hemorrhage and disseminated intravascular coagulation (DIC) hours after a caesarean section.

The plaintiffs alleged that the nurses, anaesthesiologist, and obstetricians breached the standard of care by failing to recognize and treat the bleeding earlier.

The court found that while the anaesthesiologist breached the standard of care by delaying notification to the obstetricians of the patient's deteriorating condition, this delay did not cause the patient's death.

The court concluded that even if the decision to operate had been made earlier, the patient would still have developed DIC and the fatal blockage would not have been prevented.

The action was dismissed without costs.