Raj Dhir

The appellant employer was charged under the Occupational Health and Safety Act after an employee was injured by a reversing truck unit that did not have an attached trailer.

The trial judge acquitted the employer, finding the truck was not 'material handling equipment' under s. 56 of the Industrial Establishments Regulation.

The summary conviction appeal court overturned the acquittal.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal restored the acquittal, holding that s. 56 applies only to vehicles that constitute material handling equipment, and not to road vehicles that are not actually or typically used to handle materials.

The appellant, an Evangelical Christian organization operating community living residences, appealed a Human Rights Tribunal decision finding it discriminated against a support worker on the basis of sexual orientation.

The Tribunal had held the organization could not rely on the religious exemption in s. 24(1)(a) of the Human Rights Code because it served the broader public rather than primarily serving its own religious group.

The Divisional Court found the Tribunal erred in its interpretation of s. 24(1)(a) by failing to consider the organization's subjective religious purpose in providing charitable services.

However, the Court upheld the Tribunal's conclusion that the prohibition on same-sex relationships was not a bona fide occupational qualification for a support worker, as the role did not involve religious proselytization.

The Court also upheld the finding of a poisoned work environment but narrowed the systemic remedies ordered by the Tribunal.

The complainant, who had bipolar disorder, was hired as a software program tester.

Shortly after starting, he disclosed his condition to his supervisor and began exhibiting pre-manic symptoms.

The employer terminated him ten days into his employment, claiming he misrepresented his ability to perform the job.

The Human Rights Tribunal found the employer discriminated against the complainant and failed its procedural and substantive duties to accommodate his disability, awarding damages and public interest remedies.

The Divisional Court upheld the Tribunal's findings on discrimination, accommodation, and damages, but modified some of the public interest remedies.

The appellants sought a new hearing before a differently constituted Human Rights Tribunal, arguing a lack of procedural fairness.

The Divisional Court found conflicting evidence regarding attempts at service, a suspicion of evasion, and a failure to use available translation services.

Concluding that procedural fairness was not achieved on the record, the court ordered a new hearing before a differently constituted Tribunal and made no order as to costs.

The appellants appealed a Human Rights Tribunal decision finding they sexually harassed an employee and retaliated against her and her stepfather for making a human rights complaint.

The Divisional Court upheld the Tribunal's findings of liability, concluding that the admission of similar fact evidence was reasonable and the Tribunal's reasons, though sparse, met the minimum standard to support the findings of discrimination.

However, the Court found the Tribunal's reasons inadequate to support the compensation and public interest remedies ordered.

The Court substituted its own awards, reducing the special damages and mental anguish awards for both complainants, and set aside the public interest orders.

The applicants sought judicial review of the Ontario Human Rights Commission's decision to refer two students' complaints of racial discrimination to the Human Rights Tribunal.

The applicants argued that the Commission breached procedural fairness by relying on an undisclosed expert report and that the investigator's summary of the report created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Commission's disclosure met the duty of fairness for its gatekeeping function and that the decision was not patently unreasonable or tainted by bias.

The applicant, who has moderate hearing loss, applied to be a firefighter but failed the hearing test without his hearing aid.

The City of Toronto declined to hire him after an expert audiologist concluded he could not safely perform the duties even with a hearing aid.

The applicant filed a human rights complaint, which the Ontario Human Rights Commission declined to refer to the Tribunal, finding the hearing standard was a bona fide occupational requirement and the applicant had been individually assessed.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applicant's application for judicial review, holding that the Commission's decision was not patently unreasonable.

Following a successful appeal, the appellants sought costs of $42,000 and $15,000 to $22,500 respectively.

The respondents argued the claims were excessive.

The Divisional Court considered the complexity of the Human Rights Code issues and the unusual circumstance of the Tribunal accidentally losing the record, which increased preparation time.

However, noting the similarity of interests between the two appellants and the principle that costs must be fair and reasonable to the losing party, the court awarded costs on a partial indemnity scale of $10,000 to each appellant.

Following the dismissal of the applicant's application for judicial review of an Ontario Human Rights Commission decision, the court determined the issue of costs.

The respondents sought costs, while the applicant argued that a costs award would impose a significant burden.

Applying the principles of fairness and reasonableness, the court fixed costs at $3,500 for the Commission and $3,500 for the Hospital and doctor, payable by the applicant.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Ontario Human Rights Commission's decision not to deal with her discrimination complaint against her former employer.

The Commission had exercised its discretion under section 34 of the Human Rights Code to dismiss the complaint because it was filed more than six months after the events giving rise to it, and the delay was not incurred in good faith.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no breach of procedural fairness and concluding that the Commission's exercise of discretion was not patently unreasonable.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Ontario Human Rights Commission's decision not to refer her complaint to a Board of Inquiry.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Commission's decision was not patently unreasonable and was supported by the evidence.

The Court also rejected the applicant's argument that the Commission was bound by a prior finding of the Board of Referees under the Employment Insurance Act, noting the issues were entirely different.