Phillip L. Sanford

York University applied for a declaration that four student residence buildings on its campus, built and operated by a private developer, remained exempt from municipal property tax under section 18 of the York University Act, 1965.

The Municipal Property Assessment Corporation argued the buildings lost their exemption because they were used and occupied by the private developer for profit.

The Superior Court of Justice granted the application, finding that the buildings were used and occupied for the legislated purposes of the university, despite the involvement of a private developer, and therefore remained exempt from taxation.

The Landlord sought leave to appeal an arbitration award concerning the rent reset for a 99-year ground lease, and alternatively, to set aside the award for excess of jurisdiction.

The arbitration tribunal had valued the "Demised Premises" at $63.3 million, while the Landlord argued for $95 million.

The court granted leave to appeal but dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the Majority's interpretation of the lease or its valuation mandate.

The court also dismissed the application to set aside the award, holding that the Landlord's arguments were an attempt to re-litigate the merits under the guise of a jurisdictional challenge.

Parc-IX Limited applied to set aside an arbitral award, arguing the arbitrator exceeded jurisdiction by failing to consider legal regulations (Rental Replacement Unit policy) affecting property valuation under a ground lease.

Manufacturers Life Insurance Company cross-applied to enforce the award.

The court dismissed Parc-IX's application, finding the arbitrator did consider the regulations but determined they did not apply on the facts, acting within jurisdiction.

The application to set aside the costs award was also dismissed, affirming that costs are determined on the facts of each case.

The applicant landlord sought a declaration regarding the interpretation of a rent re-set clause in a 99-year commercial ground lease.

The clause required the property to be valued 'as if it were unimproved'.

The landlord argued this meant the land should be valued as if it were unencumbered and available for freehold condominium development.

The respondent tenant argued the valuation must account for legal restrictions preventing such development.

The court held that the landlord was issue estopped from re-litigating the interpretation decided in a 1990 arbitration.

Alternatively, the court found that the correct interpretation of the lease required the valuation to account for the legal encumbrances restricting the tenant's ability to develop the property.

The Municipal Property Assessment Corporation (MPAC) brought a motion to stay a 16-day hearing before the Assessment Review Board pending an application for judicial review.

MPAC argued the Board improperly intervened by allowing the complainants to re-open their case.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that MPAC failed to raise a serious argument that exceptional circumstances justified interlocutory judicial review before the administrative process concluded.

The court also found no irreparable harm and that the balance of convenience favoured proceeding with the scheduled hearing.

The applicant sought leave to appeal an Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) decision dismissing its appeal against the City of Ottawa's Official Plan Amendment (OPA 77) without a hearing.

The applicant argued the OMB erred by reviewing evidence on the motion to dismiss, akin to a summary judgment motion, rather than assuming the facts in the notice of appeal were true.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave, finding the OMB's procedure was reasonable and necessary to screen out appeals with no chance of success.

The court also found no error in the OMB's conclusion that the applicant's environmental and storm water management concerns could not form a land use planning basis to refuse OPA 77 at this stage.

The appellants challenged the municipal tax assessments of several bank tower properties in downtown Toronto.

The Assessment Review Board initially ruled that the phrase 'fee simple, if unencumbered' in the Assessment Act required the properties to be valued as if they were vacant.

The Divisional Court overturned this, holding that the standard of review was correctness and that the Board erred in law.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Divisional Court's interpretation, confirming that income-producing properties should be assessed using market rents and a normal vacancy rate, rather than assuming they are entirely vacant.

The appeal was allowed only to the limited extent of returning the matter to the same panel of the Board rather than a new one.

The corporate appellants owned a commercial property that was severed in 2000.

In 2001, amendments to the Municipal Act imposed a new taxation scheme on 'eligible properties', including those that were subdivided or subject to a severance.

The appellants sought a declaration that the amendments did not apply retrospectively to their 2000 severance, arguing they had vested rights to the previous favourable tax treatment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the definition of 'eligible property' operates retrospectively to ensure tax fairness and that the appellants had no vested right to the continuance of the previous tax scheme.

The appellant appealed a decision regarding the interpretation of a commercial lease clause concerning the allocation of property taxes.

The lease gave the respondent discretion to use working papers if deemed sufficient.

The application judge found the respondent's decision not to use the working papers was reasonable and consistent with the lease.

The Court of Appeal agreed, noting that working papers are not intended to apply to individual premises and their unreliability is a legitimate consideration.

The appeal was dismissed.

Following a successful appeal regarding the interpretation of 'fee simple, if unencumbered' for property assessment purposes, the appellants (Municipal Property Assessment Corporation and the City of Toronto) sought costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The respondents argued the claimed fees were excessive and that the appellants should have coordinated their submissions.

The court found the issues complex, the amounts at stake substantial, and no unnecessary overlap in arguments.

Applying Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court fixed costs at $70,500 for fees and counsel fees for each appellant, plus their respective disbursements.

The Municipal Property Assessment Corporation and the City of Toronto appealed an interim decision of the Assessment Review Board regarding the property tax assessments of several large office complexes.

The Board had accepted the property owners' argument that the properties should be valued as if vacant, treating all leases as encumbrances under the definition of 'current value' and 'fee simple, if unencumbered' in the Assessment Act.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the Board's interpretation was incorrect in law.

The Court found that a leasehold interest is an interest in land for assessment purposes, and the whole of the land must be assessed by valuing the totality of interests, including the value of leases in place, rather than just the owner's interest.

The applicants, Municipal Property Assessment Corporation and the City of Toronto, brought motions for leave to appeal an interim decision of the Assessment Review Board concerning the property tax assessments of several large office complexes.

The central issue was the Board's interpretation of 'current value' and 'fee simple, if unencumbered' under the Assessment Act, which led the Board to value the properties as if vacant and untenanted.

The Divisional Court found there was reason to doubt the correctness of the Board's interpretation, noting it may be inconsistent with the statutory scheme and prior case law.

Leave to appeal was granted.

The appellants appealed a decision finding that their land, which was severed in 2000, constituted 'eligible property' for the 2001 taxation year under the Municipal Act.

The appellants argued that the relevant statutory definition, which came into force on January 1, 2001, should only apply to severances occurring after that date.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the application of the definition to a 2000 severance was implicit by the necessary operation of the municipal tax regime, as 2001 was the first year taxes could be determined on the newly severed parcels.

The appellant tenant appealed a Superior Court decision that set aside an arbitration award regarding the allocation of property tax shortfalls.

The landlord had sought to recover a tax shortfall from some, but not all, eligible tenants under the Municipal Act.

The Court of Appeal held that the landlord was not exercising a statutory power of decision, but rather acting within the permissive statutory framework that allowed, but did not require, the recovery of shortfalls from all eligible tenants.

The appeal was dismissed, affirming the landlord's right to allocate the shortfall as it did.

Commercial property owners appealed the dismissal of their application to quash a municipal by-law that granted tax relief to residential property owners.

The appellants argued the by-law was ultra vires, conflicted with provincial legislation, and constituted illegal rebates rather than grants.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the municipality had broad powers under the Municipal Act, 2001 to issue grants for municipal purposes, the by-law did not conflict with provincial legislation as dual compliance was possible, and the payments were properly characterized as grants.

A stated case was brought before the Divisional Court regarding whether a municipality's Property Negotiator/Appraiser had the authority to file assessment complaints without prior specific authorization from the Municipal Council.

The Court held that while the act of filing the complaint was purely administrative and authorized by by-law, the decision to pursue the appeal required authorization or ratification by Council within a reasonable time.

Because the Council's resolution attempted to delegate the decision-making power rather than ratify the administrative action, the Court found the process deficient and concluded there were no valid complaints before the Assessment Review Board.

The applicant sought leave to appeal a decision of the Assessment Review Board that reduced the current value assessments of a zinc mine for the 1998, 1999, and 2000 taxation years.

The mine had suspended operations in late 1998 and was closed by 2000.

The applicant argued the Board made errors of law regarding the valuation method, economic obsolescence, and reliance on expert evidence.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the Board's decision was not patently unreasonable and the applicant failed to show good reason to doubt the correctness of the decision on a question of law.

The appellants, anchor tenants in shopping centres, challenged the constitutionality of shortfall recovery provisions in the Municipal Act.

These provisions allowed commercial landlords to recoup property tax shortfalls from tenants.

The appellants argued this constituted indirect taxation, which is ultra vires the Province under section 92(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the provisions merely regulate the pre-existing transferability of a true land tax, which remains a valid direct tax.

The appellants challenged a Divisional Court decision that held development lands zoned for industrial and commercial use could not receive farm land assessment treatment because agricultural use was illegal under the zoning by-laws.

The Court of Appeal held that s. 19(3) of the Assessment Act focuses on actual use of the land as a factual matter, not on zoning legality, and that the ordinary meaning of the provision should govern absent compelling contrary indicators.

The court found no basis to read the word “lawfully” into the statute, noted the legislative scheme and policy favoured continued agricultural production, and concluded the Ontario Municipal Board reasonably found the lands were farm lands used only for farm purposes.

The appeal was allowed, the Divisional Court order was set aside, and the Board's order was restored.

The appellant appealed a decision regarding its business tax assessment.

The issue was whether leasing photocopiers constituted the sale of a 'service' under s. 7(1)(e) of the Ontario Assessment Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada agreed with the dissenting reasons in the Court of Appeal, holding that 'services' must bear its ordinary meaning as the product of the work of the person supplying it.

The appeal was allowed, and the appellant was found assessable under the catch-all provision in s. 7(1)(j) rather than s. 7(1)(e).