Hilary A. Brown

The applicant, a non-profit environmental education centre, sought a declaration that its property was exempt from municipal taxation under section 3(1)5 of the Assessment Act as an 'educational seminary of learning'.

The respondent assessment corporation opposed the application, arguing the centre lacked a structured curriculum, regular students, and formal instructors.

The Superior Court of Justice granted the application, finding that the primary purpose of the centre, determined objectively, was educational.

The court held that a flexible approach to the definition of a 'seminary of learning' was appropriate, and the centre's workshops, symposiums, and experiential learning programs sufficiently constituted a focused educational agenda.

The applicant, a community development corporation, brought an application for a declaration that it is a 'local board' under the Municipal Affairs Act and therefore exempt from municipal property taxation under s. 3(1)(9) of the Assessment Act.

The court applied principles of statutory interpretation, including ejusdem generis, and found that the applicant did not meet the definition of a local board.

The application was dismissed.

The defendants brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's claims for conspiracy to injure and intentional interference with economic relations.

The plaintiff, former CEO of a company in receivership, alleged the defendants conspired to breach contracts to harm him personally.

The court struck the conspiracy claim because it failed to explain how the corporate defendant would agree to act against its own interests.

The court also struck the intentional interference claim because a prior release agreement meant the third-party company had no actionable civil wrong against the defendants.

Both claims were struck with leave to amend.

The applicant property owner sought a declaration that a 'right of first refusal to purchase' granted to the respondent upon the sale of the property was void due to frustration.

The applicant argued that the withdrawal of an adjacent landowner from a planned land assembly rendered the development project impossible.

The court determined that the right was an option to purchase creating an interest in land, not a mere right of first refusal.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the withdrawal of the adjacent landowner was a foreseen event provided for in the parties' agreements and did not render the provision of the commercial space impossible.

The court also held that the right did not violate the rule against perpetuities.