Philip Wright

The accused, an OPP officer, pleaded guilty to breach of trust for showing preferential treatment to a specific tow truck operator when dispatching tows for stunt driving impounds.

The Crown sought a suspended sentence, while the accused sought a conditional discharge.

The court emphasized the need for general deterrence and denunciation given the accused's position of trust and the deliberate nature of the offence.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with one year of probation, finding that a discharge would be contrary to the public interest.

This endorsement addresses two applications for leave to intervene in a criminal appeal from conviction, brought by the Canadian Police Association, Toronto Police Association, and Police Association of Ontario.

The underlying appeal concerns a police officer convicted of criminal negligence causing death and failing to provide necessaries of life to an intoxicated individual.

The court granted intervener status, finding that the associations had a substantial interest and could offer useful perspectives on legal issues such as the standard of care for police officers, the relevance of mistake of fact in objective liability offences, and the need for expert evidence on professional standards, provided they confined their submissions to legal arguments and avoided the merits of the appeal.

The plaintiff sought leave to register a certificate of pending litigation (CPL) on a property based on an alleged joint venture agreement.

The defendants opposed, claiming the agreement was fabricated and signatures were forged, and brought a cross-motion to discharge a caution the plaintiff had registered on title.

The court found a triable issue regarding the plaintiff's interest in the land and that the equities, including the uniqueness of the property, favoured granting the CPL.

However, the court granted the cross-motion to discharge the caution because it had been registered indefinitely in violation of the Land Titles Act requirements.

The appellant appealed a Hearing Officer's decision dismissing charges of Discreditable Conduct against two police officers.

The charges arose from the officers' failure to administer a breath test to a driver involved in a fatal motor vehicle accident, despite the driver admitting to consuming one beer five hours earlier.

The Commission found that the Hearing Officer reasonably assessed the officers' credibility and correctly applied the objective test for Discreditable Conduct.

The Commission confirmed the Hearing Officer's conclusion that the officers' actions, while based on an incorrect understanding of their authority, were not likely to bring discredit upon the reputation of the police service.

The appellant appealed a Hearing Officer's decision to stay Police Services Act misconduct proceedings against two police officers for abuse of process due to delay.

The proceedings arose from an incident over eight years prior, and the Hearing Officer found the delay, largely attributable to the prosecution, was inexcusable and caused significant prejudice to the officers.

The Ontario Civilian Police Commission applied the reasonableness standard of review and found that the Hearing Officer properly applied the Blencoe test for abuse of process.

The Commission concluded the Hearing Officer's decision was reasonable and dismissed the appeal.

The moving party, Jay Patry Enterprises Inc., brought a motion seeking documentary disclosure from MPAC in a property assessment appeal.

MPAC agreed to produce some documents but argued that it was statutorily prohibited from disclosing third-party rent rolls and income/expense information without consent or a Board order.

The Board ordered the disclosure of the relevant third-party financial information, subject to the execution of a confidentiality and non-disclosure agreement restricting access to the moving party's lawyers and consultants.

The Board denied the request for documents related to fair market rent adjustments that MPAC no longer relied upon, except for four properties used for corroboration.

The appellant appealed the omitted assessments of two newly constructed commercial condominiums for the 2016 taxation year.

MPAC assessed the units at $324,000 and $330,000 based on a January 1, 2012 valuation day.

The Assessment Review Board found that MPAC failed to meet its statutory burden under s. 40(17) of the Assessment Act to prove the correctness of the current value, as its sales evidence was either not comparable or too far removed in time, and its path to value relied on arbitrary component adjustments.

Because the appellant also provided no evidence of current value, and there was no previous uncontested assessment to revert to (as the units were newly created), the Board held that the appropriate remedy was to set the assessments at zero.

The omitted assessments for both units were reduced to $0.

The proposed appellant sought leave to appeal a Hearing Officer's decision staying Police Services Act misconduct charges against two officers due to delay.

The Hearing Officer had found the delay amounted to an abuse of process under the Blencoe framework.

The Commission granted leave to appeal, finding that the matter raised issues of significant importance to the policing profession and the community, particularly regarding the role of a public complainant's interests in a Blencoe analysis and the impact of parallel criminal proceedings on administrative delay.

The proposed appellant sought leave to appeal a Hearing Officer's decision staying Police Services Act charges against the respondent officers.

The respondent officers brought a motion to dismiss the request for leave to appeal, arguing the Commission lacked jurisdiction because the proposed appellant failed to serve the Solicitor General and the Independent Police Review Director within the 30-day statutory period.

The Commission dismissed the motion, finding that under section 87 of the Police Services Act and the Commission's rules, service on statutory interveners is not required until after leave to appeal has been granted.

The appellant appealed his convictions on four counts relating to operating an electrical contracting business without a valid license and failing to file inspection applications.

The trial proceeded in the appellant's absence.

The appeal court found that the trial judge erred in law by admitting: (1) statements made by the appellant to an investigator without a voir dire on voluntariness and whether the investigator was a person in authority; (2) business records from the Electrical Safety Association without compliance with hearsay exceptions; and (3) evidence regarding identification was properly admitted.

The court allowed the appeal, set aside the convictions, and ordered a new trial with the appellant required to appear in person.

The court also commented critically on the sentencing decision, noting the trial judge imposed imprisonment beyond what the Crown requested without proper justification or notice to the absent defendant.

A sentencing appeal concerning whether a justice of the peace has jurisdiction to pierce the corporate veil and hold a sole shareholder and directing mind personally liable for corporate fines.

The defendant corporation pleaded guilty to three charges under the Electricity Act arising from unsafe electrical work that resulted in a death.

The trial judge imposed fines of $430,000 but declined to pierce the corporate veil, finding she lacked jurisdiction.

The Crown appealed, arguing the defendant had improperly transferred corporate assets to himself and a new corporation to shield them from liability.

The appellate court found that justices of the peace do possess implied jurisdiction to pierce the corporate veil in appropriate circumstances and that the test was satisfied on these facts.

The appellant, a police officer, appealed findings of guilt for discreditable conduct and insubordination arising from an incident where he allegedly attended a police disciplinary hearing under the influence of alcohol and refused an order to take a breath test.

The Hearing Officer's decision was premised on the finding that the appellant was on duty at the time.

The Commission found that the evidence did not reasonably support the conclusion that the appellant was on duty, as he had been granted an 'Association day' and was not explicitly ordered to return to work.

The Commission revoked the findings of guilt and ordered a new hearing.

The prosecuting authority applied for an extension of time to appeal a sentencing decision following regulatory convictions against a corporate electrical contractor arising from a fatal electrical installation incident.

The proposed appeal challenged the sentencing court’s refusal to pierce the corporate veil to impose consequences on the directing mind and a newly incorporated entity allegedly created after charges were laid.

Applying the established factors for granting an extension of time to appeal, the court found a bona fide intention to appeal within the appeal period, a reasonable explanation for the delay related to transcript preparation and service difficulties, and arguable merit to the proposed grounds.

The court held that it was not frivolous to argue that a provincial offences court might possess implied jurisdiction to pierce the corporate veil in appropriate circumstances.

The extension of time to file the notice of appeal was therefore granted.

The Electrical Safety Authority sought an extension of time to file an appeal of a sentencing decision by Justice of the Peace Moses.

The ESA's notice of appeal was filed outside the statutory appeal period.

The central issue was whether the trial court had jurisdiction to pierce the corporate veil to impose consequences on the company's principal and his new enterprise, given that the company's negligent electrical work resulted in the death of an elderly man.

The court granted the extension, finding that the ESA demonstrated a bona fide intention to appeal, acted diligently in pursuing the appeal, and that the proposed appeal had sufficient arguable merit.

The plaintiff brought an action against 39 defendants, including lawyers, police officers, and private investigators, seeking $20 million in damages for various torts including abuse of process, negligent investigation, and conspiracy.

The defendants moved to strike the claim.

The court found the action was a collateral attack on previous court orders finding the plaintiff in contempt of court.

The court dismissed the action in its entirety as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, and alternatively struck the claim for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

Substantial costs were awarded to the defendants.

The plaintiff appealed a master's order striking portions of his statement of claim that referenced information and documents arising from a police public complaint investigation.

The defendants cross‑appealed the refusal to strike additional paragraphs and the decision not to award costs.

The court held that sections 83 and 95 of the Police Services Act render information and documents generated through the public complaints process privileged and inadmissible in civil proceedings.

The master correctly applied the statutory confidentiality provisions and relevant authority in striking the impugned allegations while allowing certain contextual paragraphs to remain.

Both the appeal and cross‑appeal were dismissed.