Ondrej Sabo

The appellant appealed an order finding that the civil courts had jurisdiction over the respondent's claims of sexual assault by a priest and negligence by the appellant.

The appellant argued the motion judge breached natural justice by relying on an academic article and case law not raised by the parties.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the motion judge's reference to an academic article criticizing prior case law did not breach natural justice, as it did not involve relying on facts outside the record.

The Court upheld the finding that the dispute was not purely ecclesiastical in nature and subject to canon law.

Furthermore, the Court found no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's exercise of discretion under the Van Breda framework.

The moving parties brought a motion to quash the responding parties' appeal of a Superior Court order confirming an assessment officer's certificate.

The assessment officer had reduced the responding parties' legal accounts, resulting in a further payment of $25,546.14 required from the moving parties.

The Court of Appeal held that the appeal route for a solicitor and client costs assessment is determined by the amount of the single payment ordered by the Superior Court judge.

Because the single payment ordered was less than $50,000, the appeal lay to the Divisional Court.

The motion to quash was allowed and the appeal was transferred to the Divisional Court.

The sole beneficiary of an estate sought a motion for partial distribution of trust funds held by the estate trustee prior to reaching the age of 25 specified in the will.

The beneficiary invoked the rule in Saunders v. Vautier to argue entitlement to funds.

The estate trustee resisted distribution, citing pending litigation regarding the improper sale of estate property and the need to hold funds for potential legal costs.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while the beneficiary could invoke Saunders v. Vautier, the estate trustee's discretion to withhold funds pending resolution of the litigation and for a reasonable holdback for legal costs was not unreasonably exercised.

The applicants sought an order appointing section 3 counsel for the respondent, Joan Horneman, under the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992, due to her alleged incapacity to instruct counsel.

The court dismissed the motion, finding it lacked jurisdiction because Ms. Horneman already had legal representation.

The court further held that even if jurisdiction existed, appointing section 3 counsel would be inappropriate given Ms. Horneman's undisputed incapacity to instruct counsel, as section 3 counsel cannot act without instructions and their communications are privileged, making it difficult to assess the reliability of any information about the person's wishes.

The decision emphasized the distinction between the role of section 3 counsel and a litigation guardian.

The appellant real estate broker appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision suspending his registration for three months.

The suspension was based on false statements in registration applications and workplace misconduct.

The appellant argued he was denied procedural fairness because the notice of proposal did not include the workplace misconduct allegations.

The Divisional Court agreed, finding the LAT improperly relied on unparticularized evidence of workplace misconduct to support its finding that the appellant would not carry on business with integrity and honesty.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted for a new hearing.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an order of the lower court.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

As neither party filed costs submissions, no costs were awarded.

The defendant Estate Trustee brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's action against the Estate, arguing it was an abuse of process because it duplicated claims already raised in an ongoing application challenging the validity of the deceased's will.

The plaintiff had commenced the separate action to include claims of negligence and breach of fiduciary duty against the solicitor who drafted the will.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while the claims against the Estate were duplicative, the plaintiff was not a vexatious litigant and the multiplicity of proceedings could be remedied by an order to try the action together with the trial of issues in the application.

The defendants moved for security for costs under Rule 56.01(1)(d) in an action brought by the plaintiff alleging an improvident sale of a commercial property under power of sale.

The plaintiff corporation had no assets in Ontario, but its sole shareholder was not impecunious.

The court found that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a 'good chance of success' on the merits to avoid posting security.

The court ordered the plaintiff to post $60,000 in security for costs in installments.

The defendant, John Hogan, brought a motion to set aside a default judgment obtained by the plaintiff, Halton Electric Co. Limited, in a construction lien action.

Hogan argued procedural irregularity due to a faxed Notice of Intent to Defend going astray, and also sought discretionary relief.

The court found no procedural irregularity but exercised its discretion to set aside the default judgment, finding a plausible excuse for the default, an arguable defence on the merits (particularly regarding personal liability under s. 13(1) of the Construction Lien Act), and no significant prejudice to the plaintiff.

The court declined to impose conditions for setting aside the judgment.

This appeal concerns the applicable scale of costs when a municipality unsuccessfully appeals an expropriation matter to the courts.

The Ontario Municipal Board ordered compensation to the property owner.

The municipality appealed to the Divisional Court, which dismissed the appeal but awarded only partial indemnity costs of $7,500 rather than full indemnity costs of $23,586.84.

The Divisional Court declined to apply section 32(1) of the Expropriations Act, ruling that ordinary court costs rules applied.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and held that the principle reflected in section 32(1) should apply to court proceedings, entitling the successful respondent to full indemnity costs.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's motion for specific performance regarding a commercial property, the defendant sought costs.

The plaintiff's motion was denied because it failed to disclose the purchase of an adequate replacement property.

The court found the plaintiff's non-disclosure inappropriate and awarded costs to the defendant on a substantial indemnity basis.

The court reduced the defendant's counsel's hourly rate from $700 to $350, fixing total costs at $32,238.35.

The City appealed an Ontario Municipal Board decision awarding the respondent disturbance damages, executive time, and costs arising from a trespass that occurred four years prior to the formal expropriation of a portion of the respondent's property.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding it was reasonable for the Board to conclude there was a causal nexus between the trespass and the expropriation.

The Court also upheld the Board's discretionary awards for executive time and pre-expropriation costs.

The defendants brought motions for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's negligent misrepresentation claim arising from a real estate appraisal.

The plaintiff had relied on the appraisal to advance a second mortgage, but later discovered the property was worth significantly less.

The court granted the summary judgment motions, finding that the plaintiff's claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, as he knew or ought to have known he had suffered a loss more than two years before commencing the action.

The appellants, Family and Children’s Services Niagara and Heidi Payne, sought leave to appeal an order dismissing their motion to strike the respondents' claims.

The original motion argued no reasonable cause of action and no duty of care owed by FACS to the parents.

The court dismissed the leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions and no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision, which appropriately distinguished the facts from precedents where parents were under investigation or children were in care.

The court emphasized the high threshold for granting leave to appeal and the caution required in striking claims.

The defendants brought a motion to set aside a Mareva Injunction and a possession order obtained ex parte by the plaintiff.

The court set aside the Mareva Injunction but upheld the possession order.

In this costs endorsement, the court found the defendants were the more successful party, noting the plaintiff's ex parte motion was over-reaching and failed to respect natural justice.

However, the court declined to award substantial indemnity costs because the defendants had failed to deliver up the purchased assets.

The defendants were awarded partial indemnity costs of $13,826.88.

The appellants, estate trustees, appealed a motion judge's order that they bear their own costs of an estate litigation settlement.

The appellants argued they were entitled to indemnification from the estate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while estate trustees are generally entitled to indemnification for reasonably incurred legal costs, the appellants' dilatory and self-interested conduct in failing to make timely disclosure disentitled them to recovery from the estate.

A property developer sued a municipal fire department and its officials alleging negligence and misfeasance in public office after inspectors issued fire safety inspection orders requiring upgrades to fire alarm audibility levels in residential buildings.

The orders were based on an Office of the Fire Marshal guideline recommending a 60 dBA audibility level, though that standard was not prescribed by statute or regulation.

The plaintiff argued the inspectors exceeded their statutory authority under the Fire Protection and Prevention Act and enforced a non‑binding guideline as if it were law.

The court held the inspectors acted in good faith, relied on guidance from the Office of the Fire Marshal, and believed they had authority to address potential fire safety risks.

The plaintiff failed to prove deliberate unlawful conduct or knowledge of lack of authority required for misfeasance, and negligence was also not established.

On Rule 21 motions, the court considered whether parents and a sibling could maintain negligence claims arising from a child protection and police investigation into allegations that one child sexually assaulted another.

The court held it was not plain and obvious that the parents’ negligence claim against the child protection agency failed, distinguishing authorities that concerned children in care and emphasizing the absence of an adversarial child protection proceeding, the lack of conflicting statutory duties on the pleaded facts, and the absence of an alternative remedy.

The court also held that bad faith was sufficiently pleaded against the child protection worker to avoid statutory immunity under s. 15(6) of the Child and Family Services Act.

However, the court struck the claims by the parents and sibling against the police defendants, finding no sufficiently close and direct relationship at the proximity stage of the Anns analysis.

The applicants and respondents, siblings, settled an estate litigation matter regarding their mother's estate and the respondents' actions as attorneys for property and estate trustees.

The settlement left the issue of costs to be determined by the court.

Both the applicants and the respondents sought their costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The court found that the commencement of the application was reasonable and that the respondents had failed to adequately address the applicants' reasonable questions early on.

However, given the divided success in the settlement, the court ordered that each party bear their own costs.

The plaintiff accepted an offer to settle her wrongful dismissal and mental distress claim for $15,000 plus costs to be assessed or agreed.

The parties could not agree on costs.

The defendants argued no costs should be payable because the settlement amount fell within the Simplified Procedure threshold.

The court rejected this argument, noting the offer expressly provided for costs and the action was reasonably brought under the ordinary procedure given the complexity of the mental distress claims.

The court assessed the plaintiff's partial indemnity costs, reducing the claimed amount for unnecessary steps and disbursements, and awarded $9,716.50 in fees and $2,003.80 in disbursements, plus $500 for the costs of the assessment.