Neil Colville-Reeves

The appellants appealed an order validating unsigned 2024 draft wills under s. 21.1 of the Succession Law Reform Act.

The deceased had executed a will in 2018 and improperly executed wills in 2022, before having new drafts prepared in 2024 that remained unsigned at his death.

The Court of Appeal admitted the 2018 will as fresh evidence, set aside the validation of the 2024 drafts because they did not reflect final testamentary intentions, and remitted the issue of the 2022 wills' validity to the Superior Court for fact-finding.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal of Canguard Group Limited and others from a partial summary judgment order declaring a mortgage on the respondent’s property void as a fraudulent conveyance.

The court found no error in the motion judge’s reliance on the evidentiary record, including affidavits, and held that the appellant’s failure to respond or provide discovery justified summary judgment.

The court also rejected arguments regarding the scope of the order and the appropriateness of partial summary judgment.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the appeal of Herbert and Jacqueline Watkins, setting aside the order dismissing their action and the associated costs order.

The motion judge had dismissed the action for failure to appoint counsel or deliver a notice of intent to act in person under r. 15.04(8) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and for delay under r. 24.01.

The Court of Appeal found that the removal order for the appellants' counsel was not effective, as it was not properly served, and that the motion judge erred in relying on r. 15.04(8).

The finding of inordinate and inexcusable delay was also found to be unreasonable due to confusion over representation.

Costs of the appeal were awarded to the appellants.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario granted an extension of time to appeal an order validating two technically deficient wills under s. 21.1(1) of the Succession Law Reform Act.

The moving parties, who had not opposed the application at first instance, explained their delay and raised serious issues about the testamentary intentions of the deceased and the application judge’s process.

The court found no undue prejudice to the responding party and dismissed a cross-motion for security for costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed motions by Canguard Group Limited and 11039342 Canada Inc. for a stay of orders expunging their mortgages, pending their appeals of those orders.

The motions judge found the grounds of appeal weak, no irreparable harm (especially with a no-transfer term imposed on the property owner), and the balance of convenience favoured denying the stay.

The underlying orders were based on findings that the mortgages were fraudulent and no funds were advanced.

The appellant appealed orders striking out two applications, arguing they failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action, were improperly commenced, and that the motion judge demonstrated a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusions on all grounds.

The plaintiff sought summary judgment to void the sale and mortgage transactions of two properties (Bradford and Caledon) previously owned by the plaintiff and sold under power of sale by the defendant Roy D'Mello and his companies.

The court found numerous "badges of fraud" and a strong prima facie case of sham or fraudulent transactions due to lack of documentation, questionable dealings, and evasive testimony from various defendants and related parties.

The court granted partial summary judgment, declaring the current ownership and mortgages on both properties void and directing the Registrar of Land Titles to restore the plaintiff as owner and discharge the fraudulent mortgages.

This motion concerned the approval of a settlement for a minor plaintiff, Peter Asimakis, who was exposed to fuel oil vapours as a child.

The Public Guardian and Trustee, acting as Peter's litigation guardian, sought court approval for a $10,000 settlement with the sole remaining defendant, R.B. & R. Cartage Inc. The court granted the motion, finding the settlement to be reasonable, fair, and in the minor's best interests, considering the protracted litigation, disproportionate legal costs, and a legal opinion on damages.

The plaintiff, Acteon Inc., sought to enforce a judgment from the Commercial Court of Bordeaux, France, against the defendants, Verona Medical Group Inc. (operating under various names including Dent-X Canada), and to stay the defendants' counterclaim.

The French judgment arose from an unpaid balance for medical and dental equipment.

The court granted the plaintiff's motion for recognition and enforcement of the French summary judgment, finding it final and enforceable despite a pending appeal of a related merits proceeding in France.

The court also determined that all named defendants constituted a single legal entity, Verona Medical Group Inc., and were therefore liable.

The execution of the enforcement order was stayed until the earlier of the French appeal decision or January 15, 2024, to address potential discrepancies in the judgment amount.

The defendants' counterclaim was also stayed to prevent inconsistent results and multiplicity of proceedings.

This endorsement addresses multiple motions in a protracted five-year-old action involving alleged fraudulent mortgage enforcement and power of sale transactions.

The court first dealt with a recusal motion brought by the defendant, Mr. D'Mello, alleging conflict of interest and bias against the presiding judge.

The recusal motion was dismissed, with the court finding no evidence of bias and noting Mr. D'Mello's history of unsubstantiated bias claims and attempts to delay proceedings.

The court then largely granted the plaintiff's disclosure motion, ordering Mr. D'Mello and his corporations to provide answers to undertakings and refusals, and produce corporate and trust account records relevant to the alleged fraudulent transactions and piercing of the corporate veil.

Mr. D'Mello's cross-motion for disclosure was dismissed due to lack of supporting evidence and the plaintiff's prior responses.

The applicant, Roy D'Mello, brought two applications characterized by the court as an unrelenting campaign of stonewalling and delay, weaponizing the Rules of Civil Procedure, and constituting collateral attacks on prior judicial decisions.

The respondent, Chris Jamie Sapusak, brought motions to dismiss these applications.

The court incorporated its earlier reasons for dismissing similar applications against other respondents.

The court found D'Mello's applications disclosed no reasonable cause of action, could not succeed, were frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, and were not authorized under Rule 14.05 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The motions to dismiss D'Mello's applications were granted without leave to amend.

The plaintiff, an elderly homeowner, brought a motion to continue a Mareva injunction against her contractor, hold the proceeds of the sale of her home in court, and set aside a default judgment obtained by a mortgagee.

She alleged that the defendants conspired to defraud her by charging exorbitant amounts for a home renovation funded by unconscionable high-interest mortgages.

The court found a strong prima facie case of fraud based on the significant discrepancy between the quoted cost and the amount paid for the renovations.

The court continued the Mareva injunction until the contractor posted $500,000 in security, ordered the sale proceeds to remain in court, and set aside the default judgment, allowing the plaintiff to defend the mortgage action on the merits.

At the start of a motion for a Mareva injunction, a journalist requested permission to record the proceeding with his own audio recording device pursuant to s. 136(2)(b) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court denied the request, finding that while the Consolidated Provincial Practice Direction permits media to use electronic devices for notetaking, this is subject to the presiding judge's discretion under the Act.

Because an official court reporter was present to provide a complete and accurate recording, the court held there was no need for a second recording by the media.

The plaintiffs, owners of a comic book store and a hobby shop, sued the defendant contractors for damages after a water main ruptured during construction, flooding their basements and destroying inventory.

The court found that the plaintiffs could not sue under the contract between the municipality and the defendants, as the exception to privity of contract only operates defensively.

However, the court found the defendants liable in negligence for failing to use alternate backfill or delay compaction when undermining the old, fragile water main.

The court awarded damages of $125,000 to the comic book store and $88,850.50 to the hobby shop, preferring the defendants' expert valuation of the destroyed comic books as random overstock.

The defendant R.B. & R. Cartage Inc. ("RB&R") brought a motion to dismiss the action for delay and for the plaintiffs' failure to comply with a 2018 court order.

The action arose from an oil spill in 2004.

The court found that the plaintiffs were not in breach of the order to set the action down for trial, as a trial record had already been filed.

While the plaintiffs failed to serve expert reports or bring a productions motion, these defaults did not warrant dismissal.

Applying the test for dismissal for delay under Rule 24.01, the court determined that the delay was not intentional and that the plaintiffs rebutted the presumption of prejudice, as relevant medical evidence was available and liability had been admitted.

The motion to dismiss was denied, and the plaintiffs were directed to file an amended trial record to proceed to trial.

Two consolidated appeals concerning the standard of review applicable to insurance arbitral decisions resolving priority disputes under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule (SABS).

The first appeal involved a claimant listed as an excluded driver on his parents' policy who was injured as a passenger in another vehicle.

The second involved a claimant similarly listed as an excluded driver who was injured while driving an uninsured motorcycle.

The central issue was whether excluded drivers could qualify as "insured persons" under the SABS definition and thus trigger priority coverage under their parents' policies.

The Court of Appeal held that the appropriate standard of review for such arbitral decisions is reasonableness, not correctness, and that arbitrators' interpretations of the SABS and insurance policies within their specialized expertise warrant deference.

Following earlier rulings where the plaintiff was substantially successful on a motion, the court determined the quantum of costs.

The plaintiff sought partial indemnity costs of $7,134.94, while the defendant argued each party should bear their own costs or that the hours claimed were excessive due to overlap with a co-defendant.

The court found the plaintiff's claimed hourly rate and time spent to be reasonable, noting the aggressive approach taken by the defendant.

The court awarded the plaintiff $7,134.94 in costs, to be set off against amounts owed under the mortgage.

Matthew B, an excluded driver under his parents' Dominion policy, was injured while driving an uninsured motorcycle.

Belairdirect, insurer of the other vehicle, sought to establish priority for accident benefits.

An arbitrator found Matthew B to be an "insured person" under Dominion's policy but felt bound by a prior Superior Court decision (Dominion v. State Farm) to rule in favour of Belairdirect.

Belairdirect appealed.

The Superior Court, applying a reasonableness standard of review to the arbitrator's underlying analysis, found the arbitrator's initial conclusion that Matthew B was an "insured person" under the Dominion policy to be reasonable.

The court overturned the arbitrator's final decision, holding that Dominion has first priority to respond to Matthew B's accident benefits claim.

Following a summary judgment ruling enforcing a settlement agreement, the parties disputed the calculation of property taxes and the applicable interest rate on the outstanding amount.

The court held that 'property tax' includes water and garbage charges.

The court further held that the original mortgage contract interest rate of 6.45% applies to the outstanding settlement amount, rather than the Courts of Justice Act rates, as the settlement compromised claims under the mortgage but did not intend to provide an interest-free period upon default.

The plaintiff's house was severely damaged by fire shortly after he entered into a settlement agreement with his mortgagee.

The mortgagee had previously placed fire insurance on the property and charged the premiums to the plaintiff.

Following the fire, the mortgagee refused to process an insurance claim, arguing it suffered no direct loss until it took possession and realized on its security.

The defendants brought summary judgment motions to dismiss the plaintiff's claim for damages.

The court dismissed the mortgagee's motion, finding it had a duty of good faith to process the claim and the plaintiff had standing to enforce this obligation.

The court granted the mortgagee's counterclaim for possession and enforcement of the settlement agreement, directing a process to resolve the outstanding insurance and valuation issues.