Neil Colville-Reeves

At the start of a motion for a Mareva injunction, a journalist requested permission to record the proceeding with his own audio recording device pursuant to s. 136(2)(b) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court denied the request, finding that while the Consolidated Provincial Practice Direction permits media to use electronic devices for notetaking, this is subject to the presiding judge's discretion under the Act.

Because an official court reporter was present to provide a complete and accurate recording, the court held there was no need for a second recording by the media.

The plaintiffs, owners of a comic book store and a hobby shop, sued the defendant contractors for damages after a water main ruptured during construction, flooding their basements and destroying inventory.

The court found that the plaintiffs could not sue under the contract between the municipality and the defendants, as the exception to privity of contract only operates defensively.

However, the court found the defendants liable in negligence for failing to use alternate backfill or delay compaction when undermining the old, fragile water main.

The court awarded damages of $125,000 to the comic book store and $88,850.50 to the hobby shop, preferring the defendants' expert valuation of the destroyed comic books as random overstock.

The defendant R.B. & R. Cartage Inc. ("RB&R") brought a motion to dismiss the action for delay and for the plaintiffs' failure to comply with a 2018 court order.

The action arose from an oil spill in 2004.

The court found that the plaintiffs were not in breach of the order to set the action down for trial, as a trial record had already been filed.

While the plaintiffs failed to serve expert reports or bring a productions motion, these defaults did not warrant dismissal.

Applying the test for dismissal for delay under Rule 24.01, the court determined that the delay was not intentional and that the plaintiffs rebutted the presumption of prejudice, as relevant medical evidence was available and liability had been admitted.

The motion to dismiss was denied, and the plaintiffs were directed to file an amended trial record to proceed to trial.

Two consolidated appeals concerning the standard of review applicable to insurance arbitral decisions resolving priority disputes under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule (SABS).

The first appeal involved a claimant listed as an excluded driver on his parents' policy who was injured as a passenger in another vehicle.

The second involved a claimant similarly listed as an excluded driver who was injured while driving an uninsured motorcycle.

The central issue was whether excluded drivers could qualify as "insured persons" under the SABS definition and thus trigger priority coverage under their parents' policies.

The Court of Appeal held that the appropriate standard of review for such arbitral decisions is reasonableness, not correctness, and that arbitrators' interpretations of the SABS and insurance policies within their specialized expertise warrant deference.

Following earlier rulings where the plaintiff was substantially successful on a motion, the court determined the quantum of costs.

The plaintiff sought partial indemnity costs of $7,134.94, while the defendant argued each party should bear their own costs or that the hours claimed were excessive due to overlap with a co-defendant.

The court found the plaintiff's claimed hourly rate and time spent to be reasonable, noting the aggressive approach taken by the defendant.

The court awarded the plaintiff $7,134.94 in costs, to be set off against amounts owed under the mortgage.

Matthew B, an excluded driver under his parents' Dominion policy, was injured while driving an uninsured motorcycle.

Belairdirect, insurer of the other vehicle, sought to establish priority for accident benefits.

An arbitrator found Matthew B to be an "insured person" under Dominion's policy but felt bound by a prior Superior Court decision (Dominion v. State Farm) to rule in favour of Belairdirect.

Belairdirect appealed.

The Superior Court, applying a reasonableness standard of review to the arbitrator's underlying analysis, found the arbitrator's initial conclusion that Matthew B was an "insured person" under the Dominion policy to be reasonable.

The court overturned the arbitrator's final decision, holding that Dominion has first priority to respond to Matthew B's accident benefits claim.

Following a summary judgment ruling enforcing a settlement agreement, the parties disputed the calculation of property taxes and the applicable interest rate on the outstanding amount.

The court held that 'property tax' includes water and garbage charges.

The court further held that the original mortgage contract interest rate of 6.45% applies to the outstanding settlement amount, rather than the Courts of Justice Act rates, as the settlement compromised claims under the mortgage but did not intend to provide an interest-free period upon default.

The plaintiff's house was severely damaged by fire shortly after he entered into a settlement agreement with his mortgagee.

The mortgagee had previously placed fire insurance on the property and charged the premiums to the plaintiff.

Following the fire, the mortgagee refused to process an insurance claim, arguing it suffered no direct loss until it took possession and realized on its security.

The defendants brought summary judgment motions to dismiss the plaintiff's claim for damages.

The court dismissed the mortgagee's motion, finding it had a duty of good faith to process the claim and the plaintiff had standing to enforce this obligation.

The court granted the mortgagee's counterclaim for possession and enforcement of the settlement agreement, directing a process to resolve the outstanding insurance and valuation issues.

The applicant, having successfully obtained a declaration that the respondent insurer had a duty to defend, sought costs of the application on a substantial indemnity basis.

The applicant argued that the respondent's position was contrary to established law and that the respondent caused undue delay.

The court found that while there were some delays, they did not warrant substantial indemnity costs.

Costs were awarded to the applicant on a partial indemnity scale in the amount of $18,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The applicant construction contractor sought a declaration that an insurer owed it a duty to defend as an additional insured under a project‑specific commercial general liability policy issued to a subcontractor.

The underlying action involved a pedestrian trip‑and‑fall allegedly caused by a sunken paver installed during a streetcar island construction project.

The insurer argued the policy only applied to liability arising from the subcontractor’s operations and that the pleadings did not allege such liability.

The court held that the pleadings contained undifferentiated negligence allegations against all defendants and could potentially attribute liability to the subcontractor’s work.

Applying established duty‑to‑defend principles, the court found that any ambiguity must be resolved in favour of the insured and concluded the insurer had a duty to defend.