Megan Phyper

The third party brought a motion to set aside a noting in default.

The third party had previously obtained a waiver or extension of time to deliver a defence from the defendant's former counsel.

The defendant's new counsel noted the third party in default without providing any notice or requesting the defence.

The court found this constituted sharp practice and a breach of professional obligations.

The motion was granted, the noting in default was set aside, and the defendant was ordered to pay substantial indemnity costs of $9,600.

The moving party sought review of a motion judge's order dismissing her request for an extension of time to cross-appeal a Divisional Court decision that had upheld the Law Society of Ontario's invalidation of her barrister examination result as procedurally fair and reasonable.

The moving party had been among candidates whose exam results were voided following an investigation into widespread cheating.

The panel held that the motion judge made no error in finding the proposed appeal lacked merit, as the procedural protections sought were ancillary to a right to a hearing that this court had previously held was not required, and candidates receiving a lesser sanction could not be accorded greater procedural fairness than those who faced more serious sanctions.

The motion was dismissed with no costs awarded.

The moving party, a construction company, sought to transfer its appeal of a lien action dismissal order from the Court of Appeal to the Divisional Court pursuant to s. 110 of the Courts of Justice Act, or alternatively an extension of time to perfect the appeal.

The motion judge found that conflicting precedents — TRS Components and Arcamm — created genuine uncertainty over whether the appeal route under s. 71 of the Construction Act lay to the Divisional Court or the Court of Appeal.

Unable to conclude the appeal was filed in the wrong court, the motion judge declined the transfer.

The extension of time was granted given that both parties had operated under the shared mistaken assumption that the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction, which was attributable to the competing jurisprudence rather than inadvertence.

The applicant sought to vary an interlocutory injunction previously granted on April 4, 2025, which restrained a blockade at the entrance of its premises at 2801 Howard Avenue.

The applicant sought to expand the injunction to include multiple additional addresses and a public street.

The respondents argued that the variation required the applicant to meet the full test for a civil injunction, including the stringent requirements under section 102 of the Courts of Justice Act for labour disputes.

The court found that the context had fundamentally changed from the original April order, as the parties were now engaged in a labour dispute following a lockout.

The court granted the motion in part, expanding the injunction to include the entrance at 305 Charles Street but rejecting the broader expansion sought.

The court found that the respondents had unlawfully obstructed two entrances for unreasonably lengthy periods but did not find evidence of other unlawful picketing or risk of physical harm.

The court dismissed a motion for partial summary judgment brought by the defendants, Gowling WLG (Canada) LLP and its partners, in a professional negligence action arising from advice and services provided in connection with an employee stock trust and a 2012 financing transaction.

The court found that the case involved complex factual disputes, credibility issues, and conflicting expert evidence regarding the scope of the defendants’ retainer and standard of care.

The court held that summary judgment was inappropriate given the need for a full trial to resolve these issues, and also noted the risk of inconsistent findings due to parallel actions involving related parties and issues.

The court considered a motion by the Defendants for leave to late-serve an expert report on the standard of care in a real estate negligence action.

The report was served after the pre-trial conference, and the Third Parties opposed its admission.

The court applied the test under Rule 53.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, considering whether there was a reasonable explanation for the delay, whether prejudice would result, and whether the trial would be unduly delayed.

The court found the explanation of solicitor’s inadvertence to be at the low end of reasonable, but accepted it.

The court concluded that any prejudice could be managed by costs or adjournment, and that the trial would not be unduly delayed.

Leave was granted to admit the report, subject to strict terms to protect the Third Parties.

The appellant, a condominium unit owner, sued the lawyers who represented the condominium corporation in prior litigation, alleging fraud, perjury, negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty.

The motion judge struck the claim under Rule 21.01(1)(b) as disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that statements made by solicitors in the course of litigation are protected by absolute privilege, there is no civil cause of action for perjury, and solicitors owe no duty of care to opposing parties.

The moving party sought leave to appeal the decision of Sutherland J. dated June 11, 2024.

The Divisional Court denied the motion for leave to appeal.

Costs were fixed at $1,000 all-inclusive to the responding parties who appeared, with the amount reduced due to the failure to file a cost outline.

The Estate Trustee of T.O. brought a motion to amend a notice of appeal to add two corporations, The Ridgeway Education Rec Centre Ltd. and 2012023 Ontario Limited, as respondents.

The original appeal, initiated by T.O. before his death, sought repayment of loans from these corporations, but the notice of appeal inadvertently named only D.O. as the respondent.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion, applying the five-factor test for amending a notice of appeal after perfection.

The court found that the appellant had the requisite intention to appeal against the corporations, the delay was due to counsel's inadvertence and promptly addressed, there was no relevant prejudice to the respondents (who shared counsel and were aware of the claim), the appeal had arguable merit regarding the Limitations Act, and the justice of the case favored determining the matter on its merits.

The plaintiff retained the defendant lawyers for a human rights application but later terminated the retainer.

The defendants sought unpaid legal fees through arbitration as required by the retainer agreement.

The plaintiff commenced a civil action seeking a declaration that the arbitration clause was invalid, damages for malpractice, and a fee assessment.

The defendants moved to stay the action under s. 7 of the Arbitration Act, 1991.

The court granted the stay, finding that the dispute fell within the scope of the valid arbitration agreement and that the arbitrator had jurisdiction to determine threshold issues of validity.

The moving defendants sought to dismiss or stay the action because the plaintiff failed to immediately disclose a settlement agreement reached with a co-defendant.

The court found that the settlement did not fundamentally change the litigation landscape, as it was a simple release without costs and did not involve the settling defendant switching sides or cooperating with the plaintiff.

Furthermore, the moving defendants had not asserted cross-claims against the settling defendant before the limitation period expired.

The motion was dismissed.