LAW SOCIETY TRIBUNAL

HEARING DIVISION

Date: May 14, 2026

Tribunal File No.: 26H-006

BETWEEN:

Law Society of Ontario

Applicant

• and -

Clinton Harrison Culic

Respondent

Before: Pam Hrick (chair), Gisele Chretien, Brigitte Pilon

Heard: February 9, 2026, by videoconference

Appearances:

Sean Dewart and Megan Phyper, for the applicant

Respondent, self-represented

Summary:

CULIC – Motion for Interlocutory Suspension or Practice Restriction – Interim Interlocutory Suspension – Following the hearing of the evidence, the panel received the parties’ closing submissions in writing – The panel found reasonable grounds to believe there was a significant risk of harm to members of the public or to the public interest in the administration of justice if the Lawyer was permitted to practise law without restrictions pending the disposition of the main motion with the exception of an upcoming trial for which he was retained. The Lawyer’s licence was restricted to allow him to act in the upcoming civil matter only.

The Lawyer borrowed money from his client in breach of the Rules of Professional Conduct – There was evidence that he misled his client’s bank and his client’s daughter, who was the alternate power of attorney for property – The panel found reasonable grounds to believe that the Lawyer may have misappropriated funds, which would result in a presumptive revocation if proven – The Lawyer’s licence was suspended on an interlocutory basis.

REASONS FOR DECISION

OVERVIEW

1Pam Hrick (for the panel):–The Law Society brought a motion for an interlocutory suspension of Clinton Harrison Culic’s licence to practise law. At the hearing of the motion, after both parties’ evidence was completed, we determined it would be appropriate for closing submissions to proceed in writing. In this context, the Law Society requested that we suspend Mr. Culic’s licence on an interim interlocutory basis, pending our decision on the full interlocutory motion.

2At the conclusion of the hearing, we determined that the test for making an interim interlocutory order was met. We ordered that restrictions be placed on Mr. Culic’s licence until the disposition of the main motion, prohibiting him from practising law except in relation to acting as counsel in a specific matter to be heard the following week.

3After considering the written submissions we received, we granted the Law Society’s request for an interlocutory suspension by way of order dated March 3, 2026.

4Our reasons for granting both orders are set out below.

BACKGROUND

5At the hearing, the Law Society relied primarily on the affidavit of investigation counsel Daniel Fiorini, who also provided oral evidence and was cross-examined by Mr. Culic. Mr. Culic provided affidavits sworn by himself and Hughena Brennan (who is the CEO of Mr. Culic’s law firm), both of whom also provided oral evidence and were cross-examined by the Law Society.

6Mr. Culic is 72 years old and has been licensed to practise law in Ontario since 1979. He currently practises in the Kingston area under the firm name Veritasa Law Office.

7The Law Society has three active investigations into Mr. Culic’s alleged misconduct. These investigations relate to numerous allegations, including that he may have:

a. misappropriated and/or misapplied trust monies or monies imposed with a trust;

b. had improper business or financial relations with his client; and,

c. engaged in conduct that tends to bring discredit upon the legal profession.

Complaint

8The Law Society’s focus at the hearing was almost exclusively on one investigation into Mr. Culic’s alleged misconduct while acting as power of attorney for an incapacitated client, Robert Thomas Owers. Given that the Law Society relied exclusively on evidence related to this investigation at the hearing, we address only that investigation in our reasons.

9This investigation was initiated following a complaint to the Law Society from a lawyer licensee representing Mr. Owers’ daughter, Kelly Sullivan. The complaint alleged that Mr. Culic may have misappropriated or misapplied trust funds while acting as Mr. Owers’ attorney for property.

10Mr. Culic first acted for Mr. Owers and his wife many years ago, and appears to have come to know the family well in the time since then.

11On December 6, 2018, Mr. Owers executed a power of attorney appointing Mr. Culic as his attorney for personal property in the event he became incapacitated. Ms. Sullivan was appointed the alternate attorney for property.

12On November 28, 2023, Mr. Owers’ treating physician provided a letter assessing that Mr. Owers, who resides at a long-term care facility, no longer had the capacity to manage his own finances.

13At that point, Mr. Culic took various steps to manage Mr. Owers’ affairs, exercising the power of attorney for property. He assumed control of Mr. Owers’ Royal Bank of Canada (RBC) accounts, sold his home and a nearby vacant lot, and deposited the proceeds from these sales ($374,012.21) into his trust account. Mr. Culic also made arrangements for periodic payments to Mr. Owers’ son, Rob, who appears to struggle significantly as a result of a brain injury sustained in a car accident and who has frequent interactions with the justice system.

The loan agreement

14On November 5, 2024, a $200,000 loan agreement was executed between Mr. Owers as the lender, and Veritasa Law Office as the borrower, with Mr. Culic as the “co-signer”. Mr. Culic signed the agreement for all three parties. It was a demand loan, meaning that upon demand, the borrower would have to repay the lender within six months. The Law Society suggested that signing the agreement for all three parties was an irreconcilable conflict of interest. Mr. Culic disagreed.

15The loan was an interest-only loan. In cross-examination, Mr. Culic agreed it went into default when he missed the first interest payment on April 1, 2025, and that no security was provided to the lender.

16Mr. Culic pointed to s 37 of the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992, SO 1992, c. 30 to suggest he had authority to make a loan to himself from Mr. Owers’ funds. Section 37 allows an attorney for property to make loans from an incapable person’s property to the incapable person’s friends in certain circumstances. However, in cross-examination, Mr. Culic admitted that he borrowed money from Mr. Owers knowing that Rule 3.4-28.1 of the Rules of Professional Conduct prohibited him from borrowing from a client, except in circumstances that did not apply here. He acknowledged he knew what the rule said, disagreed with the underlying policy rationale, and therefore ignored it.

17Mr. Culic used these funds to pay for renovations to his own home and as a line of credit. He says he was acting in good faith at all times. In order to finance the renovations, he knew he would have to take out a personal loan at a high interest rate because of his poor credit rating. By borrowing Mr. Owers’ funds, he was paying a high interest rate to his friend and client. At all times, he says, enough money remained in Mr. Owers’ accounts to ensure he was well cared for.

18Five months after executing the loan agreement, Mr. Culic emailed Ms. Sullivan on April 15, 2025 to say he had “awesome news”: he had invested $200,000 of Mr. Owers’ money in a loan facility with an annual interest rate of 12%. He also wrote that “the loan facility is secured by a collateral second mortgage…well beyond $200k.” At the hearing, Mr. Culic admitted that his representation that there was a “collateral second mortgage” was not true when he wrote it. He said he did not disclose to Ms. Sullivan that he was the borrower, as he thought it was not her business. The loan was also unsecured, though Mr. Culic took the position that a loan agreement constituted security.

19In a June 29, 2025 email to Ms. Sullivan, Mr. Culic also described the collateral second mortgage as having a “hair-trigger” clause that “automatically registers it at the first sniff of broad…or narrow…economic uncertainty.” In cross-examination, Mr. Culic agreed that there was no such thing as a mortgage that automatically registers, but that he would be monitoring to see if the circumstances requiring registration arose.

Communications with RBC

20Between July 18 and August 5, 2025, Mr. Culic exchanged emails with an RBC employee seeking to withdraw money from Mr. Owers’ RBC account. He told the employee he was seeking to do so to make a $150,000 loan to a borrower at a 12% interest rate for the primary purpose of renovating the borrower’s residence.

21The bank’s legal department asked for justification for the loan, and how it would comply with the Substitute Decisions Act. RBC also asked for the identity of the borrower. Mr. Culic refused to reveal that he was the borrower. At one point, he agreed to reveal the borrower’s identity to Ms. Sullivan on the condition that she not reveal it to anyone else.

22At this point, Mr. Culic wrote to Ms. Sullivan suggesting he had “had it with RBC” and that they should move Mr. Owers’ money to another institution.

Disclosure of borrower and use of Owers’ funds

23On August 18, 2025, Mr. Culic disclosed to Ms. Sullivan for the first time that he was the borrower of the 2024 loan. At that time, he also advised he was seeking a further $150,000 loan.

24In September 2025, Mr. Culic provided details to Ms. Sullivan about the use of the net proceeds from the sale of Mr. Owers’ properties, which totalled $374,012.21. Of this, Mr. Culic had paid $253,075.46 to himself or his firm. Mr. Culic had repaid $50,000. He explained that the trust ledger entries showed funds advanced to him personally for renovations, payments of accounts for legal services, loan advances to fund the overhead of his practice, and entries in cash to pay contractors doing renovations who were not prepared to provide invoices. He acknowledged in cross-examination that the terms of the cash payments involve a fraud on the treasury, though he stated there was little choice but to pay in this manner in a small town.

25Ms. Sullivan retained counsel, who wrote to Mr. Culic demanding he resign as Mr. Owers’ power of attorney. In a November 4, 2025 email, Mr. Culic said he would resign voluntarily “if we can all agree to proceed without animosity as quietly and discretely as possible”. The Law Society suggested this was because Mr. Culic had realized he’d been self-dealing as a fiduciary; Mr. Culic testified that this discretion was called for because of the risk to his reputation. In the email, Mr. Culic also requested that the resignation “not be done precipitously or recklessly. For example, the only way the repayment would be put at risk is if I was forced to sell my property in its present mid-renovation condition. I need about $700K net to clear off the first mortgage and [Mr. Owers’] second. I need only about $120K to finish the renos…”.

26Ms. Sullivan’s counsel subsequently brought a motion for interlocutory relief, which was heard on December 3, 2025. An order was issued enjoining Mr. Culic from dealing further with Mr. Owers’ property, requiring him to pay any funds held in trust for Mr. Owers to Ms. Sullivan’s counsel in trust, and requiring him to make further disclosure as requested by Ms. Sullivan: Sullivan v Culic et al, 2026 ONSC 23. In cross-examination, Mr. Culic acknowledged that he had not kept proper records that he could provide to Ms. Sullivan in accordance with the Superior Court’s order. On December 10, 2025, he wired $8,138.20 to Ms. Sullivan’s counsel’s trust account.

27Overall, the Law Society alleges that Mr. Culic may have misappropriated approximately $256,000 from Mr. Owers.

THE REQUEST FOR AN INTERIM INTERLOCUTORY SUSPENSION

28Mr. Culic experienced some challenges participating in the hearing, primarily due to an underlying health issue. As a result, after the close of evidence, the parties agreed to proceed with closing submissions in writing.

29In this context, the Law Society requested that the hearing panel suspend Mr. Culic’s licence on an interim interlocutory basis, pending our decision on the interlocutory motion. Both parties made brief submissions on this request.

Applicable principles

30The principles applicable to requests for an interim interlocutory suspension are broadly the same as those applicable to requests for an interlocutory suspension. Requests for interim orders generally arise in the context of a request to adjourn the hearing of a motion for an interlocutory suspension: for example, Law Society of Ontario v Denchik, 2025 ONLSTH 166; Law Society of Ontario v Deokaran, 2021 ONLSTH 135; Law Society of Ontario v Klair, 2024 ONLSTH 52. They are typically granted as a condition of adjourning such a hearing.

31Our authority to make an interlocutory order suspending or placing restrictions on a licensee’s licence is found in s 49.27(2) of the Law Society Act, RSO 1990, c. L.8:

The Hearing Division may only make an interlocutory order suspending a licensee’s licence or restricting the manner in which a licensee may practise law or provide legal services if there are reasonable grounds for believing that there is a significant risk of harm to members of the public, or to the public interest in the administration of justice, if the order is not made.

32The test for an interlocutory order requires a threshold inquiry as to whether there are reasonable grounds to believe there is a significant risk of the harms described in s 49.27(2). “Reasonable grounds” means “an objective basis for the belief which is based on compelling and credible information.”: Law Society of Ontario v Fathi, 2021 ONLSTH 75 at para 27, citing Law Society of Upper Canada v McGee, 2011 ONLSHP 70 at para 38. The strength of the evidence supporting the alleged misconduct is a factor for us to consider in determining whether this threshold is met: Law Society of Upper Canada v Ejidike, 2016 ONLSTH 69 at para 69.

33Only if this threshold is met does the panel have discretion to make an interlocutory order. We must determine the least restrictive order, if any, that is likely to reduce the identified risk: Law Society of Upper Canada v. Marusic, 2016 ONLSTA 22 at para 42. This means that if restrictions will suffice to effectively address the identified risk of harm, restrictions must be ordered rather than suspension.

34In Denchik, the Tribunal noted at para 6 that since “interim orders are a type of interlocutory order, it follows that interim orders may not be made unless the threshold established by s 49.27(2) of the Act is met.” Where the threshold is met, a panel must take into account, when exercising its discretion to make an interim order, that such an order will address a much shorter period of risk than is considered for an interlocutory order: Denchik at para 8.

35In Law Society of Upper Canada v Bogue, 2017 ONLSTH 119, the Tribunal discussed the proper approach to interim interlocutory suspensions requested as a condition of the licensee’s request for an adjournment. The Tribunal wrote at para 22:

An interim interlocutory suspension can have a significant impact on the licensee. In addition to the inability to practise or provide legal services, the order is published, clients must be notified, signage and phone messages must be changed and sole practitioners must close down their offices, among other things. The effects on a practice, even if the order is subsequently reversed, may be significant.

36Bogue and Denchik were decided in the context of the licensee not yet having the opportunity to present evidence to respond to the Law Society’s case for an interlocutory order. That is not the case here. Still, we have taken into consideration the impact of an interim order on Mr. Culic in the broader context of what is necessary to ensure the protection of the public and the administration of justice.

The parties’ submissions

37The Law Society asked that we not make any credibility findings or findings of good or bad faith for the purposes of its request for an interim interlocutory suspension. It referred the panel to several pieces of evidence that it says support making this order, including:

1. Mr. Culic provided inconsistent advice to Ms. Sullivan about whether or not the loan at issue was secured by a second collateral mortgage, including characterizing it as a mortgage that automatically registers itself, when he admitted in his evidence that this was unknown in law.

2. Mr. Culic concealed from RBC and, until very late in the day, Ms. Sullivan that he was the borrower in question.

3. Mr. Culic signed the loan agreement for both the borrower and the lender, negotiating the terms with himself. Whether he could not or would not see this as an irreconcilable conflict of interest is great cause for concern.

4. The loan went into default on April 1, 2025 and nothing was done about the default, notwithstanding that the loan agreement provides for the registration of security in the event of default.

5. The security has never been registered to this day.

6. Mr. Culic admitted in cross-examination to knowingly breaching the Rules of Professional Conduct, which prohibit borrowing money from a client other than an institutional lender.

38Mr. Culic submitted that an interim suspension was unnecessary and that if there was any real concern, a restriction on his licence prohibiting him from practising estate law would suffice. He was unsure the Rules of Professional Conduct even applied to the situation he encountered as Mr. Owers’ Power of Attorney, given that the Substitute Decisions Act permits loans to friends under certain conditions. He submitted Mr. Owers would have approved of his actions if Mr. Owers were competent. He pointed to the Tribunal’s comments in Bogue about considering the impacts of an interim order on the licensee’s practice, particularly when dealing with short periods of time.

39Mr. Culic advised that he was scheduled to start a civil trial on February 17, which was confirmed by an email from the Brockville Superior Court Trial Coordinator that Mr. Culic provided the Tribunal. He submitted that his clients in this matter would be disadvantaged if he were prohibited from acting for them so close to trial. We accept that if forced to retain new counsel at this stage, this would almost certainly result in an adjournment of the trial.

40Upon learning of this trial, the Law Society modified its position and suggested that Mr. Culic be permitted to complete that matter and otherwise be subject to a complete suspension.

Analysis

41We are satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe there is a significant risk of harm to members of the public or to the public interest in the administration of justice if Mr. Culic is permitted to practise law without restrictions pending the disposition of the main motion.

42While we make no credibility findings or findings that Mr. Culic was acting in good or bad faith, the evidence of alleged misconduct is strong. In particular, Mr. Culic admitted knowingly breaching the Rules of Professional Conduct by borrowing money from Mr. Owers. The fact that Mr. Owers is a vulnerable client over whose property Mr. Culic was exercising power of attorney is particularly concerning. The terms of the loan agreement, or misrepresentation thereof, also inform our conclusion that the threshold test for issuing an interim interlocutory order is met.

43On the issue of what the appropriate order, if any, would be to address the identified risk, we have taken into consideration that an interim order would be in place only for a short period. Though we acknowledge that even a short order would have an impact on Mr. Culic, we are persuaded that an interim order is required to protect the public and the public interest in the administration of justice.

44The least restrictive order to meet this objective is the imposition of restrictions on Mr. Culic’s licence, permitting him to act as counsel only on the upcoming matter he has identified.

45For these reasons, we ordered that the following restrictions be placed on Mr. Culic’s licence to practise law until the disposition of the main motion: Mr. Culic is prohibited from practising law except in relation to acting as counsel in the trial of Whittaker v Shannon, set down to be heard in Brockville beginning February 17, 2026.

THE REQUEST FOR AN INTERLOCUTORY SUSPENSION

The parties’ submissions

46Following the hearing in the matter, we received written submissions from the parties on the issue of whether we should order an interlocutory suspension.

47The Law Society submits that there is strong evidence that Mr. Culic misappropriated trust funds from a client who lacks capacity, and that he misled both the client’s daughter and RBC about this misappropriation. He has no insight into his misconduct, and there are serious concerns about his trustworthiness and integrity. In submitting that an interlocutory suspension is required, the Law Society relied primarily on the same evidence highlighted in support of its request for an interim order. It says this evidence provides reasonable grounds for believing that there exists a significant risk of harm to members of the public or the public interest in the administration of justice. Revocation is the presumptive penalty for misappropriation, absent exceptional circumstances: Law Society of Ontario v Conroy, 2025 ONLSTH 49 at para 29. This suggests an interlocutory suspension, as opposed to restrictions, is the appropriate regulatory response.

48In his written submissions, Mr. Culic “fully admit[s] to being in breach of the prohibition against borrowing money from a client.” By reference to his factum previously filed in advance of the hearing, he denies any misappropriation of funds. He says that all of his actions taken as Mr. Owers’ attorney for property were lawful, prudent, in good faith, and in Mr. Owers’ best interests. He submits that the Substitute Decisions Act permitted him to loan Mr. Owers’ funds to himself as his attorney for property. The funds borrowed were not needed for Mr. Owers’ care and were intended to be repaid with interest. He notes that he has voluntarily resigned as attorney for property and says he has acted with integrity throughout.

49Mr. Culic’s written submissions conclude with the statement that “I hereby formally tender my resignation as a licensee of the LSO” and a request to be forwarded the necessary paperwork to give effect to this resignation.

Analysis

50After receiving the submissions, we issued an order dated March 3, 2026, immediately suspending Mr. Culic’s licence on an interlocutory basis.

51As a preliminary matter, the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to accept Mr. Culic’s “resignation”. The Law Society’s By-Law 4 (Licensing) governs the process for a licensee to follow to surrender their licence. As such, we will not address this issue.

52For the reasons set out above, we are satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe there is a significant risk of harm to members of the public, or to the public interest in the administration of justice, if an interlocutory order is not made.

53Having found we have the authority to make an order, we conclude that nothing less than a suspension will adequately protect the public.

54In Ejidike, at para 68, the panel noted that it would be unreasonable to impose an interlocutory order that is more onerous than the sanction for the alleged misconduct could realistically be. Relying on Ejidike, the panel in Law Society of Ontario v Denchik, 2026 ONLSTH 61 stated, at para 87: “the strength of the evidence supporting the misconduct is a factor to consider and balance in determining whether a suspension or restrictions are appropriate”.

55Mr. Culic has admitted breaching the Rules of Professional Conduct. There is evidence that he misled Ms. Sullivan and RBC about his status as the actual and proposed borrower of Mr. Owers’ money, as well as evidence of material inaccuracies around the terms of the loan agreement. There are also reasonable grounds to believe that Mr. Culic may have misappropriated a significant amount of client funds and used them for his own purposes, including renovations to his home. These are very serious matters.

56This Tribunal has defined misappropriation as “knowing unauthorized use of client property by a lawyer or paralegal for their own purposes, on the basis that knowledge may be actual knowledge, willful blindness or recklessness”: Law Society of Ontario v Wilkins, 2021 ONLSTA 15 at para 82. As noted in Conroy, the presumptive penalty for misappropriation is licence revocation. An interlocutory suspension, even if lengthy, is unlikely to be more severe than the likely penalty order if misconduct is proven. In these circumstances, we are not satisfied that restrictions would be sufficient to protect the public.

57As such, we ordered the suspension of Mr. Culic’s licence to practise law effective immediately.

ORDER

58For these reasons, we made the following orders with respect to Mr. Culic’s licence:

• Order dated February 9, 2026:

1. Commencing immediately, the following restrictions are placed on the respondent’s licence on an interim interlocutory basis:

a. The respondent is prohibited from practising law except in relation to acting as counsel in the trial of Whittaker v. Shannon – CV-24-75, set down to be heard beginning on February 17, 2026.

2. This order shall be in effect until the disposition of the Law Society’s motion for an interlocutory suspension.

• Order dated March 3, 2026:

1. Commencing immediately, the respondent’s licence is suspended on an interlocutory basis.

2. Mr. Culic shall comply fully with the terms of the Law Society’s Guidelines for Lawyers Who Are Suspended or Who Have Given an Undertaking Not to Practise while suspended pursuant to this order.

3. The costs of this motion are reserved to the panel presiding at the hearing of any application to which the motion relates.