LAW SOCIETY TRIBUNAL

HEARING DIVISION

Date: March 26, 2026 Tribunal File No.: 25H-133

BETWEEN:

Law Society of Ontario Applicant

• and -

Natalia Denchik Respondent

Before: Barbara J. Murchie (chair), Gisele Chretien, Lubomir Poliacik

Heard: November 7, 2025, and January 19-20, 2026, by videoconference

Appearances: Apiramy Suntharalingam, for the applicant Peter Brauti and Mikaela Kucharczuk, for the respondent

Summary: DENCHIK – Motion for Interlocutory Suspension or Practice Restrictions – The Law Society received complaints from the Lawyer’s family law clients, opposing counsel, and ex-spouses of her clients – The Lawyer admitted to some of the allegations and denied others – The panel found that the Law Society presented strong evidence that the Lawyer failed to meet the requisite standards of professionalism and competence – The panel held it had reasonable grounds to conclude that her conduct presents a significant risk of harm to the public or public interest in the administration of justice – The panel requested submissions from the parties on an order of supervision.

REASONS FOR DECISION ON A MOTION FOR INTERLOCUTORY SUSPENSION OR RESTRICTIONS

1Barbara J. Murchie (for the panel):– The issues before us are whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the lawyer’s conduct presents a significant risk of harm to members of the public or the public interest in the administration of justice and, if so, whether Ms. Denchik should be suspended or restrictions should be ordered to protect the public and the public interest.

2The Law Society presented strong evidence that Ms. Denchik failed to meet the requisite standards of professionalism and competence, which provides us reasonable grounds to conclude that her conduct presents a significant risk of harm to the public or public interest in the administration of justice. Most concerning were two allegations that Ms. Denchik disclosed confidential client information that, in at least two of the cases, was used to significantly prejudice her clients’ interests.

3We have concluded that to protect the public and the public interest in the administration of justice, Ms. Denchik’s licence to practise law must be subject to restrictions pending a hearing on the merits.

BACKGROUND

4Ms. Denchik was called to the bar in Ontario in 2005. She is a sole practitioner whose primary practice is family law. She testified that about 70% of her clients are on legal aid.

5Prior to her call in Ontario, Ms. Denchik went to law school in Belarus and practised for eight years as an in-house lawyer for a large international company in Minsk.

6Ms. Denchik has no discipline history. The complaints relate to events starting in March 2020. The first investigation was launched in January 2024. On September 15, 2025, the Law Society served notice of this motion for an interlocutory suspension returnable October 14, 2025.

7On September 30, 2025, Ms. Denchik entered into a supervision agreement with Alexei Goudimenko to mitigate any risk to her clients. Pursuant to the agreement, she pays Mr. Goudimenko his hourly rate to review client materials (redacted to protect client confidentiality) before they are submitted to opposing counsel or the court. At all times, Ms. Denchik retains the choice to refer materials and to take advice given.

8The Law Society filed its motion materials on October 3, 2025. On October 6, 2025, at the respondent’s request, the Tribunal Chair adjourned the motion to November 7, 2025. On October 14, 2025, he denied the Law Society’s request for an interim interlocutory suspension.

9In his reasons for denying the Law Society request and on the evidence before him at the time,¹ the Chair concluded that while there were reasonable grounds to believe there was a significant risk of harm to members of the public or the public interest in the administration of justice, there was no significant risk of harm occurring over the next three weeks to justify the order sought.

10On October 23, 2025, Legal Aid Ontario (LAO) suspended Ms. Denchik from the legal aid roster because of these proceedings. As a result, Ms. Denchik lost 58 clients, representing about 60% of her practice. On October 27, 2025, LAO granted Ms. Denchik exceptional authorization to act on three matters with court dates before the end of October.

11On November 7, 2025, this motion hearing commenced but was not completed. The Law Society again requested an interim interlocutory order as a term of the adjournment to January 20, 2026. Based on the evidence before us, which was largely untested and which included Ms. Denchik’s affidavit explaining some of her actions and admitting and/or taking responsibility for others, we could not conclude that there were reasonable grounds for believing there was a significant risk of harm to the public or the public interest in the administration of justice occurring over the period of 10 weeks to justify the order sought.

12The hearing concluded on January 20, 2026. The Law Society evidence was given by the investigator, Renae Oliphant, based on interviews with the complainants and relevant participants. In response, Ms. Denchik testified and led evidence from Mr. Goudimenko and her student, Connor Boswell.

EVIDENCE OF MISCONDUCT

13The Law Society relied on ten complaints, all in family law matters, seven from clients, one from opposing counsel, and two from ex-spouses of her clients. The Law Society identified 27 counts of possible misconduct. The most serious misconduct which Ms. Denchik admitted was:

• Acting in a conflict of interest by representing CV in the matrimonial case where she had earlier represented both spouses on the sale of their home.
• Disclosing confidential client information in her motion to be removed as CV’s lawyer.
• Disclosing confidential client information in her motion to be removed as NFT’s lawyer and in her motion materials for an assessment.
• Disclosing confidential client information to former opposing counsel, after being discharged by her former client, JB.
• In acting for NS, improperly threatening a Law Society complaint to encourage settlement.

14Ms. Denchik has taken steps to address her admitted deficiencies. She hired Mr. Goudimenko. He testified that as of January 20, 2026, she has contacted him 41 times to review 28 files. On November 4, 2025, she attended a LawPRO course on conflicts of interest. She has also been counselled by her lawyer in this application on client confidentiality and other issues.

15Some of the complaints, for instance spelling and grammar mistakes; being late for a case conference; and failing to bring a motion for a restraining order when the husband was already under a criminal release which had a broader effect, were of minimal or limited significance. Most complaints were competence-related and are to a greater or lesser extent resisted by Ms. Denchik. Some complaints may be a question of best practices rather than misconduct.

16There is sufficient evidence to suggest that at least some will likely be proven. Typically, these are best decided in a conduct hearing, where either the facts are admitted or direct evidence is called and credibility assessments are made. A summary of the key complaints follows.

CV and JS complaints

17The Law Society investigator said the investigation provided a reasonable suspicion that Ms. Denchik had acted in a conflict of interest, failed to act with honour and integrity, failed to provide competent legal service, and failed to properly account.

18CV complained that Ms. Denchik acted in a conflict of interest in 2022 by representing her in her matrimonial dispute with her ex-husband (RD) when Ms. Denchik had earlier acted for both parties in the sale of their matrimonial home, and given independent legal advice (ILA) to CV on the separation agreement they signed.

19On February 23, 2021, both CV and RD advised Ms. Denchik that they would be retaining her to act on the sale of their matrimonial home, which was closing on March 24, 2021. They signed the retainer on March 24, 2021. However, on March 23, 2021, CV also retained Ms. Denchik to provide her with independent legal advice (ILA) on the separation agreement with her husband.

20Several months after the sale closed, RD refused to consent to the release of CV’s share of the matrimonial home proceeds. Ms. Denchik attempted to secure RD’s consent to the payment. Then, in October 2022, Ms. Denchik represented CV in commencing a court application seeking to set aside specific provisions of the separation agreement on which she had given ILA. The application also sought spousal support and other relief. CV maintained that she signed the separation agreement under duress and did not understand what she signed.

21In May 2023, the judge at a case conference raised concerns about the potential conflict of interest. Ms. Denchik brought a motion to be removed from the record. On July 25, 2023, she was formally removed as CV’s counsel. In her motion materials to be removed as CV’s counsel, Ms. Denchik advised that CV had been providing “very confusing and inconsistent instructions” and was emotionally overwhelmed.

22Jake Sandler was opposing counsel in the CV matter. He complained that despite his objection, Ms. Denchik repeatedly corresponded directly with his client, RD. He also complained that in a December 2022 communication again seeking release of the matrimonial proceeds, Ms. Denchik said that she had yet to file a Law Society complaint against Mr. Sandler for unreasonable behaviour and for his refusal to encourage RD to sign the consent.

23Ms. Denchik advised CV there was no conflict as RD had verbally waived any conflict claim on her representing CV. She now acknowledges that she should have removed herself from the record earlier.

24Ms. Denchik denies any failure to account. She filed the documents required to assess her account as CV owed her over $35,000. At the assessment Ms. Denchik’s account was reduced and CV was ordered to pay her $12,496.90.

25There is strong evidence, and Ms. Denchik has admitted, that she acted in a conflict of interest in acting for CV against RD and breached her client’s confidentiality in her motion materials. There is also strong evidence that she failed to competently serve her client in both circumstances, but not that she acted without integrity or failed to account.

MC complaint

26On March 20, 2020, MC retained Ms. Denchik. The Law Society investigator said that the investigation provided a reasonable suspicion that Ms. Denchik may have failed to provide competent legal services, misled the client and her ex-spouse, and failed to communicate.

27MC complains that, despite repeated requests that a hard copy of the separation agreement that Ms. Denchik drafted for MC be mailed to her, Ms. Denchik did not do so for seven months. Instead, she continued to provide only an electronic copy which MC could not print out. Months after receiving the hard copy, MC reported that both she and her husband had signed the agreement. Almost a year later, Ms. Denchik responded that the husband had to obtain ILA. The separation agreement remains outstanding.

28Ms. Denchik testified that she was in frequent communication with MC throughout the duration of her retainer but was hampered by her client’s failure to produce financial information throughout. On March 26, 2020, she first requested financial information including notices of assessment from Canada Revenue Agency. In May 2020, MC advised she had sent all she could find. Ms. Denchik does not dispute late delivery of the hard copy of the separation agreement but says she was awaiting financial disclosure. She maintains she advised MC that her husband would have to obtain independent legal advice (ILA) before signing. She did not advise that he could waive ILA. There is no documentation supporting her advice.

29There is strong evidence that Ms. Denchik may have failed to competently serve and to effectively communicate with her client. Her delays in sending the separation agreement, responding to the client, and advising that the husband needed ILA, as well as failing to note a waiver was possible indicate both. The material before us does not support an allegation she may have intentionally misled her client.

NS complaint

30On March 8, 2022, NS retained Ms. Denchik to represent her in a family law matter against her spouse. The Law Society investigator said the investigation provided a reasonable suspicion that Ms. Denchik may have misled; failed to be courteous, civil or act in good faith; failed to provide competent services; and failed to comply with obligations on terminating a retainer.

31NS complained that Ms. Denchik delayed in setting motion dates and provided her with the opposing party’s settlement brief the morning of the settlement conference, although Ms. Denchik had received it in a timely manner. NS complained that Ms. Denchik failed to properly advocate for her, and pressured her to accept the opposing party’s offer. She said she was pressured to sign the agreement that did not contain parenting time and access to the children during the Orthodox holidays, with Ms. Denchik saying it could be dealt with later.

32Ms. Denchik explained that settlement negotiations caused some delay in obtaining motion dates and that, when she late-delivered settlement conference materials to her client, it was because she hadn’t realized she had received the documents about 10 days earlier. She said there was nothing new in the materials as the parties had been discussing settlement for some time. She said she reviewed the materials with her client in the morning of the pre-trial. Ms. Denchik knew that her client was anxious to have the Orthodox holidays included in the agreement.

33Ms. Denchik testified that she did not consider asking for an adjournment so the client could review the materials. She said they had the whole day in court to review the documents and work out the terms of the settlement. She said her client was anxious to proceed with the settlement conference. In her affidavit, Ms. Denchik said her client was distracted and left early and that she (Ms. Denchik) had stayed behind to complete the agreement. In cross-examination, she clarified that she and her client reviewed the handwritten agreement and that her client left after signing but that she (Ms. Denchik) remained to review it carefully and to await the judge’s endorsement.

34The following day, NS complained that the provisions of the settlement agreement did not allow her parenting time during the Orthodox holidays. Ms. Denchik sent a letter to opposing counsel asking for consent to proposed changes to the signed settlement agreement to address the holidays, but the husband did not agree. She had drafted a motion to amend the signed agreement on consent but it was not served. She said NS did not want to pay for a motion to amend the terms of the agreement without consent.

35Some months later, opposing counsel moved for an order to enforce the minutes of settlement. Ms. Denchik asked for instructions to bring a motion seeking changes or consenting to the order. She never received instructions.

36Subsequently, NS retained new counsel. Ms. Denchik accepts she was wrong in failing to provide the contents of her file to new counsel on request. She said that NS was in possession of most of the contents of her file including correspondence required for new counsel to get up to speed.

37There is strong evidence that Ms. Denchik may have failed to competently serve NS and failed to provide her file to new counsel. There will be a credibility issue as to what transpired at the settlement conference but it is undisputed that Ms. Denchik knew her client wanted parental access during the Orthodox holidays and the agreement did not address that. Further, Ms. Denchik did not draft materials for a contested motion to amend the agreement once consent was not forthcoming or serve a motion to be removed as counsel of record. There is some evidence that Ms. Denchik may have misled her client during the settlement conference.

LW complaint

38LW’s spouse, CW, retained Ms. Denchik to represent him in family law proceedings. LW complained to the LSO about Ms. Denchik’s conduct in that representation. The Law Society investigator said the investigation provided a reasonable suspicion that Ms. Denchik may have misled; failed to be courteous, civil or act in good faith; and failed to act with honour and integrity. The most significant concern is the allegation that Ms. Denchik made a misrepresentation to the court.

39In a January 11, 2023 settlement/trial management conference, Ms. Denchik claimed financial disclosure was made on August 30, 2022 while opposing counsel said it was received January 10, 2023. Ms. Denchik did not have evidence available of earlier disclosure when it was requested by the court. The judge found no evidence of delivery before the January date. It is also alleged that Ms. Denchik failed to file the necessary pre-conference documentation.

40In a May 10, 2023 trial management conference, the judge noted that costs of the January attendance remained unpaid and that Ms. Denchik again failed to file the requisite materials. On May 12, 2023, Ms. Denchik sent a letter containing unprofessional and accusatory language and that threatened opposing counsel with an LSO complaint. She admitted her threat was improper.

41In testimony before us, Ms. Denchik was adamant she had delivered materials related to financial disclosure earlier. On October 25, 2025, she retained an IT specialist to search her computer. The specialist confirmed that there was an August 23, 2022 email from Ms. Denchik to opposing counsel attaching “our client’s financial disclosure. Part – 1”. Opposing counsel responded that the disclosure was insufficient. On August 29, 2022, Ms. Denchik requested additional financial disclosure from her client. That additional disclosure was provided on January 10, 2022.

42There is some evidence that Ms. Denchik may have misled the court but that is tempered by the production of correspondence to support her position that she had served some financial disclosure earlier. There is strong evidence that Ms. Denchik may have failed to be courteous, civil, or act in good faith. She admits that her tone should have been more professional. There is some evidence that she may have failed to act with honour and integrity.

JB complaint

43On September 4, 2024, JB retained Ms. Denchik to act for him in a family law matter. The Law Society investigator said the investigation provided a reasonable suspicion that Ms. Denchik may have breached client confidentiality and/or her fiduciary duty to the client, and failed to assume complete responsibility for the practice.

44JB complained that after he ended his brief retainer with her, Ms. Denchik continued to correspond with opposing counsel without his consent. In that correspondence, she provided false medical information, and advised that JB was unable to provide clear instructions or to comply with his parenting obligations.

45On October 23, 2024, at 2:11 PM, Ms. Denchik left a message for opposing counsel. The transcription states:

Even though I am no longer his counsellor, I have serious concerns about his ability to take care of the child. He has been provided very obscure and nonsense, the instructions which does not have and any sense and any nonsense, I believe that he had a serious mental health problem recently he was in a hospital and my serious concern if you if your client is going to proceed to provide child for visitation, it is it is really real serious concerns that he is not capable to take care of the child. (sic)

46In an email to opposing counsel, dated October 23, 2024 at 2:16 PM, Ms. Denchik said, “Please note that even though I am no longer [representing JB], I wish to advise you that he does no provide clear instructions and is not able to comply with his parenting time obligations to the child” (sic). She also attached JB’s corporate income tax information.

47The Law Society alleges Ms. Denchik disclosed confidential information in retaliation for JB supposedly instructing Visa to stop a payment from going through on her account. In an email on October 23, 2024 at 2:36 PM, Ms. Denchik’s clerk accused JB of “through Visa, [you] took away her retainer. You committed a theft. I propose you to return the amount of $7,345 plus $25 immediately. If you refuse to do it, our office will take immediate action.” JB denied stopping payment and advised the clerk to “be respectful and sort out your accounting on your end properly”. The problem was subsequently sorted out and the clerk apologized.

48It is alleged that Ms. Denchik also sent JB a message threatening to call police if he did not remove an unflattering online review of her services.

49Ms. Denchik testified that she disclosed confidential information as she thought she had a duty to report a child in need of protection under s 125(1) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act. Her belief was based on JB’s confirmation that he was a patient at Humber River Hospital seeking treatment for his mental health and substance abuse. She had concerns about his ability to care for his child. She denies that she acted in retaliation or that she gave instructions or knew about the demand letter from her clerk.

50Ms. Denchik admits that she was wrong about her legal obligations and, on that basis, that she should not have disclosed confidential information to opposing counsel. Ms. Denchik denies her actions were motivated by retaliation, but the timing of the emails is evidence that could well support a finding that that was the motive.

51There is strong evidence that Ms. Denchik breached client confidentiality and/or her fiduciary duty to the client by disclosing that he had mental health problems and could not fulfil parenting obligations. There is evidence that this disclosure was motivated by retaliation. Alternatively, there is evidence she may have failed to assume complete responsibility for the practice.

NST complaint

52The Law Society investigator said the investigation provided a reasonable suspicion that Ms. Denchik may have failed to provide competent legal services, breached client confidentiality and/or fiduciary duty to the client, failed to account or properly account, and failed to comply with obligations relating to termination of the retainer.

53NST complained that during an urgent motion on July 17, 2023, Ms. Denchik disclosed that NST was residing in a shelter for abused women and that she intended to enroll her children in a new school in Aurora, contrary to NST’s instructions not to reveal her location due to safety concerns. Ms. Denchik testified that she did not reveal the location of the shelter but that it was relevant to disclose the fact she was living in a shelter.

54On August 24, 2023, an urgent motion was brought before the court concerning parenting time and decision-making responsibility. The judge issued an order (the first order) preventing either parent from making major decisions about the children, including school enrollment, without a written agreement or a court order. The Law Society relies on Ms. Denchik’s October 24, 2023 letter to NST to support its position that Ms. Denchik counselled NST to breach that order.

55Ms. Denchik testified that in the fall of 2023, NST had to move out of the shelter and was looking for an apartment in Aurora. In October 2023, NST asked if she could move the children to a new school in Aurora. Ms. Denchik understood that to mean at some point in the future as both knew the first order prohibited that change.

56In an email dated October 24, 2023, Ms. Denchik advised NST that there was case law that supported the children’s transfer to a new school and attached a Superior Court decision. She suggested NST secure a residence and provide the lease. On November 4, 2023, NST signed and provided a lease on an apartment in Aurora.

57At some point, and without Ms. Denchik’s knowledge, NST enrolled the children in a school in Aurora, allegedly in reliance on Ms. Denchik’s October 24, 2023 letter. The letter does not counsel NST to move the children. It does not reference the order prohibiting NST from doing so without her ex-husband’s consent. Ms. Denchik denies she counselled her client to breach a court order, saying the opinion was not meant to be acted upon without discussion and/or a motion.

58On January 11, 2024, the judge found NST had violated the court order and ordered her to pay $4,000 in costs. The judge allowed the children to stay at the school because it was in their best interests to do so.

59On March 11, 2024, NST emailed Ms. Denchik a list of concerns about her representation including never meeting in person; behaviour that found disfavour with the judge (i.e. interrupting the judge); failing to attend court in person; improperly advising she could enroll the children in another school, resulting in a breach of the court order and subsequent penalties; advising she did not have to deliver the children to her ex-husband on Wednesday, which was in breach of the court order; and that everything was done at the last minute, causing lots of mistakes.

60In response, Ms. Denchik accused NST of making ridiculous allegations. She filed a motion to be removed as counsel of record, serving materials on opposing counsel and the OCL. In the motion materials, Ms. Denchik stated that NST had provided unreasonable instructions and created false factual scenarios which she claimed were incompatible with family law principles and ethics. Despite NST’s denial, the OCL included this information in its assessment form. Ms. Denchik admits this disclosure was a breach of confidential information.

61In August 2024, Ms. Denchik provided NST’s November 6, 2023 Direction re Funds to opposing counsel without copying NST’s new counsel. When advised, NST’s new counsel expressed concern that the document contained privileged information, the disclosure of which could prejudice NST’s claims for primary residence and decision-making authority.

62On March 28, 2025, Ms. Denchik demanded payment of outstanding amounts on her accounts and refused to release NST’s file until full payment was made. NST said she understood payment would be from equalization. In May 2025, Ms. Denchik assessed her accounts. The total owing was reduced from $76,978 to $50,000 all inclusive based on quantum meruit (reasonable value of services).

63In her affidavit in support of the assessment of accounts, the date of which is not disclosed, Ms. Denchik provided information indicating NST was a difficult client who was un-co-operative throughout and difficult to manage. Among other things, she said that NST had lied about domestic violence. Her statement appears based on the fact that, at some point, the criminal charges against BS for assaulting his wife were dismissed.

64Ms. Denchik also said NST admitted to her that she had lied to the court about the value of her Bulgarian property on her financial statement. The Law Society alleged Ms. Denchik knew the value was overestimated when NST filed the financial statement. Ms. Denchik testified that she questioned NST about the basis for the amount and NST had a logical explanation for the amount chosen. Ms. Denchik had no information to refute it and said the financial statement is NST’s to make. Without evidence as to the relative timing of the disclosure and the signing of the financial statement, we cannot conclude there is a reasonable basis for concluding Ms. Denchik knew her client was lying about the property value when she signed the financial statement.

65We conclude there is strong evidence that in representing NST, Ms. Denchik breached client confidentiality and/or her fiduciary duty in disclosing confidential information in motion materials and her affidavit and may have failed to comply with obligations relating to termination of the retainer. She admits breach of client confidentiality and failing to hand over the client file to the client’s new lawyer.

66Based on the material before us, including the October 24, 2023 letter, there is reasonable evidence that she may have failed to provide competent legal services. Ms. Denchik did not clearly warn her client not to move the children to another school without permission from the court. There are no reasonable grounds presented to support a failure to account.

67The Law Society submits that Ms. Denchik disclosed confidential client information in retaliation for the client questioning her advice and competence. On cross-examination, LSO counsel asked if Ms. Denchik agreed that it was not necessary to call her client a liar in her materials to support an assessment. Ms. Denchik disagreed. She said that it was necessary.

No, the information about the financial statements and the preparation of the financial statement in light of your claim to division of property and financial support, it’s necessary. The point is what is the level, how honest the claimant was with me. I doubt that … I will be able to find a lawyer in the Province of Ontario who worked for 10 months more or less without – for free having insecure offshore bills, no directing regarding funds, and with empty promise that my bills will be paid upon equalization. This is from transcript? I gather this is what was said, even if not clear

…[on the relevance of NST lying about domestic violence]

If she would not saying that it would be she’s not victim of domestic violence, she would be more co-operative in the process of resolution of this matter.

68As was the case with JB, there are grounds for the Law Society submission that she was retaliating. Ms. Denchik’s explanation that she had to disclose the information because NST’s dishonesty somehow supported the amount of her account strains credulity. However, the fact that there is no legal basis for her position also supports the conclusion that she is simply grossly incompetent. Even if Ms. Denchik did not act in retaliation, her failure to appreciate the importance of her duty of confidentiality and/or fiduciary duty of loyalty is very troubling.

BS complaint

69BS is the former partner of Ms. Denchik’s client NST. BS complained that Ms. Denchik continued to represent NST when she knew the information in NST’s financial statements and her claim of domestic violence were false. The Law Society investigator said the investigation provided a reasonable suspicion that Ms. Denchik may have failed to act with honour and integrity.

70Ms. Denchik denied that she knew during her representation of NST that either the financial statements contained false information or that NST had lied about the domestic violence. The timing of her knowledge is unclear.

71There may be grounds for this complaint but, on the present evidence before us, it is unsubstantiated.

SC complaint

72On July 21, 2022, SC retained Ms. Denchik. The Law Society investigator said the investigation provided a reasonable suspicion that Ms. Denchik may have breached a court order, failed to provide competent legal services, and misled.

73Ms. Denchik represented SC in a matrimonial matter, on a legal aid certificate, concerning access to her 15-year-old child. SC wanted an order requiring that the child spend time with her.

74On November 23, 2023, the judge issued an order directing SC to file her trial record by February 22, 2024, and that Ms. Denchik take out the order. Ms. Denchik did neither. She testified that SC refused to give instructions or information for the required affidavit.

75On March 12, 2024, the OCL representative, Mr. Glass, noted SC’s failures and proposed a consent order. He reiterated and referenced case law standing for the proposition that no court will order a 15-year-old child to spend time with the parent if the child does not want to do so. Mr. Glass stated that it was unreasonable for Legal Aid Ontario to continue paying Ms. Denchik as SC’s representative. He proposed an order that provided for other relief requested (i.e. access to school records) but not that the child be required to attend with SC. Mr. Glass stated that if the consent was not signed before March 15, 2024, then costs would be sought against the client and Ms. Denchik personally.

76On March 12, 2024, Ms. Denchik and Mr. Glass attended at Assignment Court. The court granted SC until March 15, 2024 to file her trial affidavit, failing which the trial would proceed on an uncontested basis. Ms. Denchik and SC corresponded. She said that SC refused to sign the consent order or give instructions for the affidavit. Ms. Denchik advised Mr. Glass, who advised the court, that SC would not be filing a trial affidavit. She did not attend court or advise SC that she could do so herself. She did not seek to be removed from the record. The final order reflected the proposed consent order.

77Ms. Denchik testified that she encouraged SC to sign the consent order on at least three separate occasions by email and advised her that she could be liable for costs if she refused. Ms. Denchik maintains that she tried but could not get instructions to complete the required affidavit. SC’s correspondence with Ms. Denchik during this time was abusive and profane.

78Ms. Denchik testified that she advised SC that if she was not prepared to complete and swear the affidavit or sign the consent order, the only remaining option was to let the matter proceed uncontested. SC advised her to let the matter proceed. Ms. Denchik thus advised opposing counsel that SC would not be providing an affidavit and that the matter would proceed uncontested. She denies advising SC that she need not attend.

79Ms. Denchik was in a difficult position given her client’s refusal to address the realities of the order she sought. On the evidence before us, it is not clear whether she fulfilled her obligations as a competent lawyer. The panel hearing the matter will be in a better position to determine the merits.

SA complaint

80On February 21, 2025, SA retained Ms. Denchik. The Law Society investigator said the investigation provided a reasonable suspicion that Ms. Denchik may have failed to provide competent legal services and failed to assume complete professional responsibility for the practice.

81SA complains that Ms. Denchik made repeated mistakes in the preparation of court documents including spelling and grammatical errors, factual inaccuracies, and using inconsistent names for the children. SA also alleged that Ms. Denchik’s clerk failed to properly review the materials, resulting in incorrect names and addresses appearing in the materials. She alleged that Ms. Denchik did not properly advocate for her, minimized her concerns for safety, advised inappropriate concessions on financial matters, and failed to seek a restraining order although instructed to obtain one.

82Ms. Denchik testified that she sent documents to her client for review and correction in the normal course. She explained that she did not bring a motion for a restraining order because the husband had been criminally charged and was prohibited from communicating or being within close physical proximity by the conditions attached to his undertaking. She explained this to SA. She nonetheless drafted the motion but was discharged before proceeding.

83There are some grounds to support an allegation that Ms. Denchik did not competently serve her client.

Conclusion on the evidence

84There is strong evidence that Ms. Denchik breached client confidentiality, acted in a conflict of interest, and failed to competently serve her clients as alleged in some of the complaints. There is evidence that she acted without integrity in disclosing confidential client information but not as otherwise alleged. There is some, but not strong, evidence that she misled clients or the court.

LEGAL PRINCIPLES

85Section 47.27(2) of the Law Society Act, RSO 1990, c L.8, permits a panel to make an interlocutory order suspending or restricting the licensee’s licence if:

There are reasonable grounds for believing that there is a significant risk of harm to members of the public, or to the public interest in the administration of justice, if an order is not made.

86The threshold for finding a significant risk of harm is not high. As summarized in Edjidike,² “[t]he existence of a serious risk of potential harm need not be demonstrated on the balance of probabilities. The degree of risk need not be very likely or even probable. The potential harm need not be substantial although it must be to members of the public or the public interest.”

87Section 49.27(2) limits when an order can be made but does not specify what order should be made. An interlocutory suspension that might last for a lengthy time should not be made when the misconduct, if proven, would typically warrant a short suspension. Further, the strength of the evidence supporting the misconduct is a factor to consider and balance in determining whether a suspension or restrictions is appropriate.³

88Tribunal jurisprudence emphasizes that if an order is made, it should be the least restrictive necessary to address the risk of harm.⁴

89In this interlocutory motion, our task is not to determine whether Ms. Denchik has engaged in professional misconduct.⁵ Instead, we are to assess the nature and strength of the evidence to determine if there are reasonable grounds to believe that there is a significant risk of harm to the public or the public interest in the administration of justice such as to require a protective order.

ANALYSIS

90We find there are reasonable grounds for believing there is a significant risk of harm to members of the public or the public interest in the administration of justice if Ms. Denchik is allowed to practise without restrictions pending a hearing on the merits of these allegations. The main reason for concluding as we do is that Ms. Denchik has repeatedly breached client confidentiality to her clients’ detriment, possibly with malintent, with no appreciation of the importance of her breach to client trust and public confidence in the profession.

91We have concluded that restrictions on Ms. Denchik’s licence rather than a suspension are appropriate and sufficient to protect the public and the public interest in the administration of justice. Ms. Denchik has acted in good faith to address her alleged shortcomings pending a full hearing on the merits and retained a supervisory lawyer to assist.

Significant risk of harm

92In our view, Ms. Denchik’s abdication of her responsibility to protect client confidentiality is the most serious of the complaints. Ms. Denchik failed to appreciate that clients must be able to trust their lawyers with confidential and potentially harmful information. They must be able to trust their lawyers to protect their interests, to advance their causes, and to safeguard their personal information and property. Lawyers can’t prefer their own interests in getting off the record or assessing their accounts over a client’s and the public’s interest in protecting confidential and solicitor-client communication. That her motive may have been retaliation escalates the risk of harm to clients and the public interest.

93To her credit, Ms. Denchik admits that she breached confidentiality with three clients (CV, JB and NST) by disclosing confidential and privileged information to opposing counsel, the OCL, and/or the court.

94In CV’s case, in materials to be removed as her lawyer, Ms. Denchik said her client had been providing “very confusing and inconsistent instructions” and was

95Ms. Denchik showed no insight into the seriousness of breaching client confidentiality. In the three instances before us, she did not consider her clients’ interests when choosing to disclose confidential information. Ms. Denchik justified the information as being necessary to her motions to be removed as their lawyers or to the assessment of her account. There is no evidence she made a careful or even casual assessment of what was or wasn’t necessary at the time. Quite the opposite, there is some evidence supporting the conclusion that she may have disclosed confidential information to retaliate against her clients for questioning her representation and/or not paying her.

96In addition, there is also the conflict of interest that Ms. Denchik admits, as well as numerous allegations and good or reasonable evidence to support the conclusion that Ms. Denchik failed to competently serve, and in some cases may have misled, her clients. This had real consequences. In LW’s case, Ms. Denchik’s lack of diligence resulted in two cost orders against him. In NST’s case, Ms. Denchik’s failure to advise her client not to move the children to another school without a court order caused cost orders and other problems for the client. There were also cost consequences for CV, who had to retain new counsel.

Suspension or restrictions

97The question before us is whether an interlocutory suspension is required to protect the public and the public interest in the administration of justice pending a hearing on the merits or if a supervisory order will suffice.

98In answering this question, we are directed to balance the adverse effect of the interlocutory order on the licensee against the protective effect on the public and the public interest with the protective interest being paramount.

99The panel must determine the least restrictive order that is likely to reduce the risk. It should consider the nature of the alleged misconduct and the strength of the evidence before the panel.⁶ There are numerous factors which may influence the appropriate order including a serious dispute as to facts and the risk and nature of potential future harm. An interlocutory suspension may not be appropriate in cases where the suspension that results is likely more onerous than the typical penalty if the misconduct is proven. Ongoing harm more easily justifies suspension.⁷

100Law Society counsel advised that they expect to bring the matter to a hearing within the next year. The Law Society submits that an interlocutory suspension is required given the nature and extent of the complaints, the harm Ms. Denchik has caused, and the likely penalty if the allegations are proven. It submits that supervision is not adequate and, even if it was, that Mr. Goudimenko’s role is more that of a peer reviewer than that of a supervisor.

101Ms. Denchik submits that supervision by Mr. Goudimenko is sufficient to protect the public interest pending a hearing on the merits. She is also prepared to adjust Mr. Goudimenko’s role if we require more stringent supervision.

102Ms. Denchik’s alleged misconduct is extensive and serious. She breached client confidentiality. In doing so she prejudiced her client’s positions. There is some evidence that her motive may have been retaliatory. At the very least, the disclosure was incompetent. The penalty for breach of client confidentiality can be significant. In Rahimi, although the circumstances were more egregious, the misconduct warranted revocation.⁸ If retaliation is proven as Ms. Denchik’s motive, revocation is a possibility.

103She also acted in a conflict causing her client to incur the cost of retaining another lawyer. We have found strong grounds for some allegations of incompetence but not for allegations she acted without integrity. We accept Ms. Denchik’s submission that some alleged misconduct is minor and may be a question of best practice rather than misconduct. Competence-related misconduct typically warrants a short suspension and often some remedial education.

104To her credit, Ms. Denchik has been practising for 20 years without a discipline history. She has taken these complaints seriously. Although she disputes many of the facts before us, she admitted misconduct on the most serious issues. Further, she has taken steps to avoid harm to current and future clients. She has taken a LawPRO course on conflict-of-interest. She has retained Mr. Goudimenko to review client materials that she sends to him. We accept her evidence that she has used his services extensively.

105Mr. Goudimenko presented as a responsible and careful practitioner. We accept his evidence as honest and forthright. He was called to the bar in 2009. He initially practised criminal and civil litigation, but in the last ten years, his practice has primarily been in family law. Mr. Goudimenko testified that he knew Ms. Denchik from practice and had used her as an agent on several occasions. He testified that he read the LSO complaints.

106Mr. Goudimenko testified that in September 2025, Ms. Denchik called him and advised that she thought it would be helpful to her practice if she had someone supervising her work. They agreed she would provide him with written materials and he would respond with insights and suggestions on the appropriate course of action.

107Mr. Goudimenko said that since his retainer at the end of September 2025, Ms. Denchik reached out to him 41 times on 28 client matters; more of these were in the first two months before LAO transferred her legal aid client files to other counsel. In all cases she sent him draft materials.

108Mr. Goudimenko testified that he reviewed pre-trial and trial briefs, motions (including to be removed as solicitor of record), and affidavits and made suggestions. He understood from Ms. Denchik, and she testified, that she follows all his advice. He agreed that he did not have day-to-day oversight of her practice and understood that going forward the Tribunal might require a different arrangement.

CONCLUSION

109In balancing the interests of the public and the licensee and considering the strength of the evidence on misconduct and the likely penalties if the misconduct is proven, we conclude that public protection can be achieved by an order that requires Mr. Goudimenko or another lawyer, approved by the LSO, to more closely supervise Ms. Denchik’s practice.

110The order would have to ensure that Mr. Goudimenko’s retainer does not end before the decision on the merits unless there is notice to the Law Society, and that Ms. Denchik is required to submit for Mr. Goudimenko’s review all substantive client materials prior to them being disclosed to opposing counsel, or the courts.

111We invite submissions, ideally joint submissions, on the substance and form of the order by April 9, 2026. If the parties cannot agree, then each party should submit its proposed order and we will decide.

112Costs are reserved to the panel hearing the related application.

Footnotes

1. 12025 ONLSTH 166.
2. 2Law Society of Upper Canada v Edjidike, 2016 ONLSTH 69 at para 55.
3. 3Edjidike at paras 67-69.
4. 4Law Society of Upper Canada v Marusic, 2016 ONLSTA 22 at para 42.
5. 5Law Society of Ontario v Manatov, 2019 ONLSTH 94 at para 55.
6. 6Law Society of Ontario v Vinton, 2024 ONLSTH 93 at para 121.
7. 7Law Society of Ontario v Constable, 2022 ONLSTH 41 at para 11.
8. 8Law Society of Ontario v Rahimi, 2024 ONLSTH 36 at para 116.