Maggie Scull

The moving party children's aid society brought a motion to quash the appellant's appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The appellant sought to appeal a final order of the Superior Court of Justice – Family Branch placing the children in the care and custody of their maternal aunts under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion to quash, finding that the appeal properly lies with the Divisional Court pursuant to s. 19(1)(a.1) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The applicant children's aid society moved to terminate a supervision order placing two children in the care of a family friend.

The children's lawyer opposed termination, arguing the children's anxiety about potentially returning to their father constituted a new protection concern, and alternatively sought a custodial order under s. 102 of the CYFSA.

The court found the original protection concerns had been resolved, that the children were no longer in need of protection, and that the society was not required to proceed by summary judgment.

The court declined to make a s. 102 custody order, noting it would be inequitable where the father had not filed materials and the proposed custodian was a non-party.

The supervision order was terminated and the cross-motion dismissed.

The applicant parent filed an application with the Child and Family Services Review Board regarding concerns about her child's wellbeing in the care of the respondent children's aid society.

The respondent questioned the Board's jurisdiction, arguing the issues were already before the Superior Court of Justice in an ongoing child protection proceeding.

The Board found that the applicant's concerns, including the child's wellbeing, access with the father, and a psychological report, were not separate and different from the substantive issues before the Court.

Consequently, the Board concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the application.

The appellant father appealed a summary judgment order finding his two children in need of protection and placing them in the custody of their maternal aunt.

The father argued ineffective assistance of counsel, procedural unfairness, and errors in fact-finding regarding his sobriety and history of domestic violence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the ineffective assistance claim failed because former counsel was not given notice, there was no procedural unfairness, and the motion judge's factual findings were supported by the evidence and free of palpable and overriding error.

The court held that the children required stability and permanency, which the current custodial arrangement provided.

The Children's Aid Society sought an order for extended Society care for three Indigenous children with high needs.

The father sought their return under a supervision order, supported by the mother.

The court found that the protection concerns that led to the children's removal had not been mitigated by the parents, and the Society's efforts to provide culturally appropriate services and support were inadequate.

Despite the children's strong desire to return to their father, the court concluded that extended Society care was the only safe option.

However, recognizing the importance of the children's Indigenous identity and their meaningful relationships with their family, the court ordered robust access for both parents and the paternal grandmother.

In a child protection trial, the Children's Aid Society sought to qualify a pediatrician as a participant expert.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer and the parents opposed the qualification, arguing the pediatrician was engaged for litigation and his methodology was flawed.

The court applied the White Burgess framework and Rule 20.2 of the Family Law Rules, concluding the pediatrician could testify as a participant expert because his opinions were formed during his involvement as a treating pediatrician, not for litigation.

The court circumscribed the scope of his permissible evidence to his observations, diagnosis, treatment, and prognosis of the children.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion for an interim order to change the child's care and custody pending a status review application.

The child had been placed with the paternal grandparents under a final order.

The Society sought to return the child to the mother under supervision.

The court found that the mother was not yet ready for unsupervised care and that the grandparents and mother had recently agreed to a comprehensive joint parenting plan through mediation.

The court held that the child's best interests did not require a temporary change in placement and dismissed the motion.

The applicant filed a complaint with the Child and Family Services Review Board alleging that the respondent children's aid society failed to comply with a previous settlement agreement, falsified documents, and made false allegations.

The Board reviewed the written submissions and found that the respondent had adequately addressed each term of the settlement agreement, including providing explanations for alleged file inaccuracies and false allegations.

The Board concluded that the respondent met its commitments and obligations under the agreement and the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, and closed the file.

The applicants, foster parents who had cared for a three-year-old child since birth, sought judicial review of a Child and Family Services Review Board decision that overruled the Children's Aid Society's approval of their adoption application.

The Board had directed the child be placed with the respondents, who had previously adopted two of the child's maternal half-siblings, citing the importance of the child's Métis heritage and biological siblings.

The Divisional Court found the Board's decision unreasonable, noting it applied differential standards to the evidence, ignored the child's strong bond with the foster family, and relied on speculation regarding the child's ability to transition to a new home.

The application for judicial review was allowed, the Board's decision was quashed, and the Society's decision approving the applicants' adoption was restored.

The applicant, a paternal grandmother, filed a complaint with the Child and Family Services Review Board regarding the respondent children's aid society's handling of access to her grandchild and historical concerns regarding the apprehension of her own children.

The Board dismissed the application, finding that it lacked jurisdiction under section 120(8)(a) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, because the historical issues had already been decided by the court and the issue of access to the grandchild was currently before the court.

The applicant, a paternal grandmother, filed a complaint under section 120 of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act against the respondent society regarding access to her grandchild, the society's handling of abuse allegations, and historical concerns regarding the apprehension of her own children.

The Child and Family Services Review Board held that it lacked jurisdiction to review access issues that were already before the court or the society's handling of abuse reports.

However, the Board found it had jurisdiction to review the historical complaints and the society's failure to provide reasons for denying access over Christmas.

The plaintiff and the deceased purchased a property together, with the plaintiff contributing half the down payment but title registered solely in the deceased's name.

Following the deceased's death, his estate claimed the plaintiff was merely a tenant, while the plaintiff claimed 100% beneficial ownership.

On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court found the parties had been in a domestic relationship and applied the presumption of resulting trust.

The court concluded the plaintiff held a 50% beneficial ownership interest in the property and ordered it sold with proceeds divided equally.

The applicant sought an order to remove a mature black walnut tree located on the property line between his and the respondents' properties, arguing that falling nuts hitting his roof constituted a private nuisance.

The court applied the two-part test for private nuisance, finding that the interference was neither substantial nor unreasonable.

The court noted the nuts only fell for a few weeks a year, and the property was located in a heritage conservation district known for its mature trees.

The application was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.