M. David Lepofsky

The appellant, aged 21, engaged in a sexual relationship with a 15-year-old complainant.

He was convicted of sexual touching and sexual assault, as the age difference precluded the defence of consent under s. 150.1 of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge stayed the proceedings, finding s. 150.1 violated s. 7 of the Charter.

The summary conviction appeal court set aside the stay.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that s. 150.1 is not overbroad and does not violate s. 7 of the Charter, as its purpose is to protect children from sexual contact with adults due to inherent power imbalances.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant sought leave to appeal a decision of the Summary Conviction Appeal Court that dismissed his appeal from a conviction.

The Court of Appeal refused leave, finding no jurisprudential issues raised and no strong likelihood of success on any proposed grounds of appeal.

The appellant appealed his convictions for aggravated assault and assault with a weapon, arguing the trial judge unfairly commented on his evidence and failed to relate the evidence to the elements of the offences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's caution regarding the appellant's after-the-fact theory was fair and the review of the evidence was sufficient.

The Court also noted the lack of objection at trial and the overwhelming case against the appellant.

The appellant, a physician, was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to seven years in prison for the death of his wife, which was caused by multi-drug toxicity from anaesthetics he injected.

On appeal, he argued that the trial judge erred in dismissing his application for a stay due to unreasonable delay, in her jury instructions on unlawful act manslaughter, motive, and causation, and in sentencing him based on unlawful act manslaughter rather than criminal negligence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's rulings or jury instructions.

The Court also dismissed the sentence appeal, holding that the trial judge was entitled to make independent factual findings consistent with the jury's verdict for sentencing purposes.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after intentionally setting fire to his home, knowing his paraplegic estranged wife was inside.

He appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge failed to consider the police's failure to video record a three-hour interaction prior to his videotaped confession when assessing its reliability.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly assessed the voluntariness and reliability of the confession, and correctly applied the W.D. principle.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and unlawful confinement, as well as his 30-month sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in her credibility findings and failed to consider a conditional sentence on compassionate grounds due to his poor health.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the W.D. principles and conducted a fair assessment of the evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the appellant's medical needs could be adequately managed in custody.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder after fatally stabbing the victim following a dispute.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding post-offence conduct, the common sense inference of intent, and the 'rolled-up' charge on mens rea.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury instructions were adequate, properly cautioned the jury, and correctly placed the burden of proof on the Crown.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting a videotaped police station statement that was allegedly tainted by earlier inadmissible statements made in a police cruiser, and in instructing the jury on the defence of accident and intent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the station statement was a 'fresh start' separated by time, location, and consultation with counsel, and that the jury was properly instructed on the requisite intent for murder.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder, arguing the trial judge erred in jury instructions regarding after-the-fact conduct, causation, and relating evidence to the issues.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no prejudice from the lack of a Marinaro instruction on after-the-fact conduct, noting the causation instruction was actually unduly favourable to the appellant, and concluding the charge as a whole was fair.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder after stabbing his stepmother 30 times in a parking lot.

He appealed the conviction on several grounds, including the admission of his initial statement to police, the adequacy of jury instructions regarding eyewitness identification, post-offence conduct, the intent required for murder, and the failure to give a complete W. (D.) instruction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant was not detained during his initial police interview, and that while there were minor errors in the jury charge, they did not amount to a reversible error or cause a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice given the overwhelming evidence of guilt.

The applicant sought to reopen his sentence appeal after being declared a dangerous offender and receiving an indeterminate sentence.

He argued that based on a subsequent Supreme Court of Canada decision, the sentencing judge erred by not considering the long-term offender provisions.

The Court of Appeal held it had jurisdiction to reopen the appeal because the merits were not previously decided.

The court found it was in the interests of justice to reopen the appeal due to the serious error of law and the possibility of a different result at a new sentencing hearing.

The appellant appealed her conviction for second degree murder and her thirteen-year parole ineligibility period for shooting and killing her former husband during a child custody dispute.

She argued the trial judge erred by refusing to leave the defence of provocation with the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no air of reality to the provocation defence because the appellant's actions were not sudden and she had time for her passion to cool.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge made no error in principle in setting the parole ineligibility period.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder after stabbing a victim during an altercation at a dance club.

The appellant argued he acted to protect his cousin.

The trial judge refused to leave self-defence and defence of a third party with the jury, and the appellant challenged the jury instructions on provocation and post-offence conduct.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's instructions on unanimity regarding provocation were confusing and that the instructions on post-offence conduct were erroneous and inadequately corrected.

The court declined to apply the curative proviso, allowed the appeal, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder and his life sentence with 14 years of parole ineligibility.

He raised several grounds of appeal, including the adequacy of the jury instructions on reasonable doubt and after-the-fact conduct, the reasonableness of the verdict, the trial judge's review of the evidence, and the handling of a jury question.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's instructions or handling of the trial.

The court also granted leave to appeal the sentence but dismissed the appeal, upholding the 14-year parole ineligibility period.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals on charges of aggravated assault and assault with a weapon.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by concluding she was prohibited from comparing the respondent's evidence to the complainant's evidence, misconstruing the W. (D.) framework.

The trial judge also erred by making a blanket statement that it is dangerous to draw conclusions from demeanour, thereby overstating the cautions relating to demeanour evidence.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittals were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of assault and uttering a death threat against his wife.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed his appeal.

On further appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge failed to give sufficient reasons for his decision.

The trial judge did not explain why he believed the complainant despite inconsistencies in her evidence, nor did he reference the W.D. test or the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for counselling to commit aggravated assault, arguing the trial judge's reasons were insufficient regarding his intent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge implicitly but clearly rejected the appellant's evidence and properly applied the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

The reasons were deemed sufficient under the Sheppard standard.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder after beating the victim to death.

At trial, the appellant's core defence was that he was not present when the victim was killed, but he also relied on the defence of provocation based on an alleged unwanted sexual advance by the victim.

The trial judge left provocation to the jury.

On appeal, the appellant argued the jury charge on provocation was flawed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the defence of provocation lacked an air of reality on both the objective and subjective elements, and therefore should not have been left to the jury.

As the jury had to find the appellant committed murder before considering provocation, the error occasioned no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice.

The appellant appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge failed to consider his statement to police about waving a cell phone and failed to properly apply the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt to a witness's evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that defence counsel at trial had tactically withdrawn the statement from consideration to avoid reply evidence.

The Court also found no error in the trial judge's application of the W.(D.) principles to the defence evidence.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on a charge of sexual assault.

The trial judge had acquitted the accused based on the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent, relying on the complainant's equivocal conduct.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge failed to consider a crucial interchange between the parties when assessing whether the accused took reasonable steps to ascertain consent under s. 273.2(b) of the Criminal Code.

The acquittal was set aside and a new trial ordered.