Lauren Marie Wilhelm

The Crown appealed acquittals for sexual assault and sexual interference, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding the respondent's state (asleep/awake) and provided insufficient reasons.

The appellate court found the trial judge's reasons deficient, failing to articulate findings of fact or explain how the evidence of the respondent's actions could be reconciled with the complainant's testimony about him being asleep.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial ordered before a different judge.

A young person, T.M., challenged the constitutionality of sections 42(2)(p) and 42(5)(a) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA).

These provisions limit the availability and duration of deferred custody and supervision orders (DCSOs) for offences involving serious bodily harm, making them unavailable for youth in such cases and capping their duration at six months.

The Crown sought to dismiss the application.

The court found that these provisions violate sections 15 (equality) and 7 (liberty and fundamental justice) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court reasoned that the provisions deny young persons a benefit (a community-based custodial sentence option) that is available to similarly situated adults, thereby perpetuating the disadvantage arising from their diminished moral blameworthiness and forcing youth into potentially harsher custodial sentences.

The court declared the impugned sections invalid.

The respondent was acquitted of child luring, with the trial judge finding him reckless as to the complainants' ages but concluding recklessness was insufficient mens rea based on a misinterpretation of R. v. Morrison.

The Court of Appeal clarified that recklessness as to age is sufficient mens rea for child luring under s. 172.1(1)(a) of the Criminal Code where the Crown proves an actual child complainant, distinguishing this from police sting operations.

However, as the trial judge did not make findings on the respondent's subjective intent to facilitate a secondary offence, the appeal was allowed, acquittals set aside, and a new trial ordered.

This endorsement addresses the adjournment of three criminal trials (R. v. Q., R. v. D.O., R. v. J.N.) scheduled to commence in the Superior Court of Justice in Milton.

The trials were adjourned due to recent findings of contamination and ongoing assessment of the courthouse building, rendering it unsafe for in-person proceedings.

The court emphasized that the health and safety of all participants, including potential jurors, litigants, lawyers, accused persons, and witnesses, was the overarching priority, necessitating the extraordinary step of adjourning matters until further notice.

A young person, M.W., was charged with murder, aggravated assault, and assault with a weapon following a group attack.

The Crown's case relied heavily on video identification, comparing high-quality surveillance footage of the accused from his residence with a low-quality cellphone video of the attack.

The court found that while the accused was clearly identifiable in the surveillance video, the clothing in the cellphone video only resembled, but could not definitively be identified as, the clothing worn by the accused.

Other circumstantial evidence, such as phone calls and post-attack behaviour, was deemed insufficient to corroborate participation beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court acquitted the accused of all charges due to the Crown's failure to prove identification beyond a reasonable doubt.

The defendant, a young person identified as M.W., applied for a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging an unreasonable delay in bringing the case to trial.

The total delay from charge to anticipated trial completion was 20.8 months, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling established by R. v. Jordan.

The court analyzed the delay, specifically identifying periods attributable to the defence.

It found that the defence's rejection of earlier trial dates without providing alternative availability constituted defence-caused delay.

After subtracting 9 months and 16 days of defence-caused delay, the net delay was calculated at 11 months and 3 days, which is well below the Jordan ceiling.

The court further determined that the defence failed to demonstrate a sustained effort to expedite proceedings or that the case markedly exceeded its reasonable time requirements, as required for delays below the presumptive ceiling.

Consequently, the application for a stay of proceedings was denied.

The Defence brought an application seeking a declaration that s. 12(3) of the Cannabis Control Act, which permits warrantless searches of vehicles and occupants for unlawfully stored cannabis, violates ss. 7 and 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, arguing it is unreasonable and overbroad.

The Crown contended the provision is constitutional, citing public safety and the regulatory nature of the Act.

The court dismissed the application, finding that s. 12(3) does not infringe either section of the Charter, is reasonable, and is justified by its regulatory purpose and the exigencies of vehicle searches.

The respondent was acquitted of sexual assault and sexual interference charges at trial.

The Crown appealed, arguing that the trial judge's reasons for acquittal were inadequate and that the judge applied a higher degree of scrutiny to the Crown's evidence than to the respondent's.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's reasons met the legal requirement of adequacy, explaining the factual and credibility determinations and the basis for reasonable doubt.

The court also found that the Crown failed to meet the high burden of showing that the credibility determinations were the result of a legally erroneous application of different standards of scrutiny, upholding the deference owed to the trial judge on credibility issues.

The accused, G.M., was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference involving his granddaughter, S.M., for incidents occurring between 2014 and 2019.

The court assessed S.M.'s credibility and the reliability of her testimony, particularly regarding inconsistencies and delayed/incremental disclosure of abuse.

The court found G.M. guilty beyond a reasonable doubt for one incident (the November 2019 basement incident) but acquitted him on two other alleged incidents (patio and bedroom incidents) due to insufficient reliability of the evidence.

The conviction for sexual assault was conditionally stayed under R. v. Kienapple.

The accused, C.I., was charged with criminal harassment, multiple counts of sexual assault (including with a weapon), and assault against his former intimate partner, M.P. The court dismissed the criminal harassment charge, finding that M.P.'s fear of reconciliation was not the type of fear intended by the legislation.

However, the court found C.I. guilty on all other counts of sexual assault and assault, largely based on M.P.'s credible testimony, corroborated by other witnesses and C.I.'s own inconsistent statements and admissions.

The judge rejected the defence's arguments regarding M.P.'s credibility and reliability, including the "spectre of motive to fabricate."

The complainant, A., sought certiorari to quash a trial judge's decision regarding the admissibility of her sexual history evidence under s.276 of the Criminal Code in a sexual assault trial.

The trial judge had admitted certain prior sexual activity as relevant to the accused's belief in communicated consent, while prohibiting its use for propensity reasoning.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, finding no error of law going to jurisdiction and exercising its discretion to refuse interlocutory review, emphasizing the need to minimize delay in criminal trials and the non-final nature of the ruling at that stage.

The Crown applied to vacate preliminary inquiries scheduled for thirteen accused persons, seeking to apply amendments to section 535 of the Criminal Code (Bill C-75) retrospectively.

These amendments, which came into force on September 19, 2019, restricted the availability of preliminary inquiries to a reduced class of offences.

The accused had elected to proceed to trial in the Superior Court with a request for a preliminary inquiry prior to the amendments coming into force.

The court considered whether the amendments applied retrospectively to strip the accused of their vested right to a preliminary inquiry.

The court dismissed the Crown's application, finding that the amendments do not apply retrospectively to accused persons who had already requested a preliminary inquiry before the amendments came into force.

This criminal trial involved three accused (Adeel Safdar, Shaheen Safdar, and Aatif Safdar) charged with various assaults and uttering threats against Sara Salim, Adeel's wife.

The central issue was whether Sara's extensive injuries were inflicted by the accused or were self-inflicted due to mental illness, as she initially claimed.

The court found Adeel Safdar guilty of two counts of aggravated assault related to breaking Sara's jaw and permanently disfiguring her ear, based on Sara's testimony corroborated by expert medical evidence.

Shaheen Safdar and Aatif Safdar were found not guilty of all charges due to reasonable doubt, as Sara's testimony against them lacked sufficient corroboration and suffered from inconsistencies.

A young person was convicted of sexual assault charges against his half-sister based on a two-witness credibility contest.

The trial judge found the complainant credible and rejected the appellant's denial, resulting in convictions.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misapplied the burden of proof by treating credibility assessments as determinative of guilt without properly applying the legal framework for assessing burden of proof in credibility-based cases.

The court quashed the convictions and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed a three-year sentence imposed after a guilty plea to production of marijuana and a concurrent six-month sentence for possession for the purpose of trafficking.

The trial judge had rejected a constitutional challenge to the minimum punishment provisions under s. 7(2)(b) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The Court of Appeal found that subsequent decisions in R. v. Vu and R. v. Tran rendered the trial judge's constitutional ruling incorrect.

The court reduced the sentence to two years, considering the appellant's pre-sentence custody, guilty plea, significant pre-trial release period including house arrest, and the sizable nature of the grow operation.

The accused was charged with sexual assault following a complaint made by his former partner approximately one year after the alleged incident.

The complainant alleged that the accused forced anal intercourse upon her in their bedroom between January 1 and February 29, 2016.

The trial proceeded on the basis of the complainant's evidence alone, as the Crown did not proceed with related assault charges.

The court found the complainant's evidence unreliable due to significant credibility concerns, including prior false statements made under oath to police, material omissions from her initial police statement that were later added at trial, and a clear motive to fabricate the complaint in the context of a custody dispute over their child.

The court acquitted the accused.

Four young men were charged with sexual assault and group sexual assault following an incident in which a highly intoxicated eighteen-year-old woman was driven in a car and engaged in sexual contact with three of the four defendants.

The Crown alleged the complainant was incapable of consenting due to extreme intoxication.

The defendants argued the sexual contact was consensual.

The court acquitted all defendants, finding that while the Crown's evidence was more compelling than the defence evidence, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the complainant lacked capacity to consent, that she did not subjectively consent, or that the defendants did not honestly believe in consent.

The judgment emphasizes the high burden of proof in criminal trials and the particular challenges in sexual assault cases involving intoxicated parties.

This mid-trial ruling addresses the Crown's application regarding alleged violations of the rule in Browne v. Dunn.

The Crown contended that the defence adduced evidence without first confronting Crown witnesses, particularly the complainant, Sara Salim, during cross-examination.

The court found four specific instances where the defence's failure to cross-examine on substantial matters constituted a breach of the rule, while dismissing the majority of the Crown's 16 alleged violations as either insubstantial or generally covered by the extensive cross-examination.

As a remedy, the court permitted the Crown to recall the complainant or other witnesses for reply testimony, declining the Crown's request for an adverse inference against the accused's credibility.

A 17-year-old youth pleaded guilty to two counts of robbery and two counts of breaching a Deferred Custody and Supervision Order.

The first robbery occurred on August 24, 2017, when the youth and an unknown accomplice robbed an escort of approximately $1,000 using violence.

The second robbery occurred on August 25, 2017, when the youth attempted to rob another escort using a knife, choking her and threatening her with a firearm.

The youth had been on a Deferred Custody and Supervision Order for a prior robbery of an 81-year-old woman committed on June 30, 2016.

The court imposed a custodial sentence of 11 months less 4 months pre-trial custody (7 months remaining), with consecutive sentences on the two robbery counts and concurrent sentences on the breach counts.

A 2-year probation order with strict conditions followed release from custody.

Christopher Newton applied for severance of accused persons in a multi-count indictment, seeking to be tried separately from co-accused Shaquille Collins.

Newton argued that joinder would delay his trial beyond a reasonable time and confuse the jury due to different charges (second-degree murder for Newton, first-degree murder for Collins) and complex liability paths.

The Crown opposed, arguing the evidence was intertwined, separate trials would be inefficient, and juries are capable of following complex instructions.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the 13-week delay was not significant enough to override the presumption of joint trials, and that jurors are capable of understanding complex legal instructions.