Joanne Stuart

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and uttering threats, arguing his right to a fair trial was compromised by his inability to hear the proceedings, that the trial judge erred in assessing a witness's credibility regarding text messages, and that the transcript record was incomplete.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence regarding the appellant's hearing but found his claim that he could not hear the trial was not credible, given the accommodations made and his repeated confirmations that he could hear.

The court also deferred to the trial judge's credibility findings and concluded the transcript deficiencies did not prevent a meaningful appeal.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant, charged with first-degree murder, applied for bail pending a retrial ordered by the Court of Appeal.

The court found that the applicant failed to meet his burden to show that his detention was not justified on the secondary and tertiary grounds.

The proposed release plan was deemed insufficient to mitigate the risk of reoffending or interfering with the administration of justice, and the strong circumstantial case against the applicant necessitated his continued detention to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

The application for bail was dismissed.

The appellant, an Indigenous man, appealed his ten-year global sentence for multiple violent in-custody assaults, including an aggravated assault that left a victim severely brain-damaged.

He sought to introduce fresh evidence on appeal, including a post-sentencing diagnosis of schizophrenia and a Gladue report that was waived at the original sentencing.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence and reconsidered the sentence but concluded that the ten-year global sentence remained fit given the extreme violence, the custodial setting, and the need for denunciation and deterrence.

The appeal was dismissed, save for minor corrections to pre-sentence custody credit and the setting aside of victim fine surcharges.

The young person appealed his convictions for multiple swatting incidents, arguing his right to a trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter was violated.

The net delay was approximately three years, exceeding the 18-month Jordan ceiling.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the delay was justified by the exceptional circumstance of the case's complexity, which involved highly technical computer forensic evidence, voluminous disclosure, and multiple jurisdictions.

The appeal was dismissed.

The victim of an assault sought leave to intervene in a Crown appeal of a disposition by the Ontario Review Board regarding the accused, who had been found not criminally responsible.

The victim sought to argue for a geographic boundary restriction, an issue the Crown had raised unsuccessfully at the board but did not appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, holding that permitting the victim to intervene would unfairly prejudice the accused by raising an issue not raised by the parties.

The court noted that the victim's concerns had been articulated by the Crown, whose responsibility it is to speak for the community regarding public safety.

The appellant sought leave to challenge refusals to extend time to appeal multiple Part III provincial offence sentences for driving without insurance, relying on fresh evidence of serious mental illness and inability to pay.

The court held that it has jurisdiction under s. 131 of the Provincial Offences Act to hear, with leave, an appeal from a judgment denying an extension of time under s. 85 in a Part III proceeding.

Although the motion judge made no reversible error on the record then before him, the court admitted fresh psychiatric and financial evidence under the Palmer test and concluded that the interests of justice warranted sentence relief.

The total outstanding fines were reduced to $5000 with two years to pay.

The appellant appealed his convictions for break and enter and assault with a weapon, as well as his sentence of five years' imprisonment and a ten-year long-term supervision order.

On the conviction appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding eyewitness identification and the Vetrovec warning for an accomplice's testimony.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the instructions.

On the sentence appeal, the appellant argued he should have received enhanced credit (1.5:1) for pre-sentence custody.

The Court of Appeal held that while the trial judge erred in denying enhanced credit solely because the appellant did not apply for bail, enhanced credit was not warranted because the appellant's extensive criminal record and likelihood of reoffending meant he was unlikely to be granted early release.

Both appeals were dismissed.

The appellant appealed a conviction for luring a child to engage in sexual activity arising from an undercover online investigation.

The principal issue was whether the proceedings should have been stayed for entrapment.

Applying the entrapment framework, the court held that the police had reasonable grounds to suspect criminal activity from the advertisement and ensuing communications, and did not induce the offence.

Additional grounds concerning jury trial, warrant naming errors, medical condition, psychological assessment methodology, and alleged evidence tampering were all rejected.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, and leave to appeal sentence was also dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions on two counts of assault causing bodily harm relating to his two-month-old infant, who suffered 12 rib fractures on two separate occasions.

The appellant argued the first verdict was unreasonable and the trial judge misapplied the W. (D.) principles, and that the second verdict involved an error in applying the test for implied consent during an attempt to administer CPR.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's factual findings reasonable, the W. (D.) principles properly applied, and that the force used during the alleged CPR was excessive, vitiating any defence of implied consent.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching in respect of a seven-year-old child.

The appellant argued the trial judge made three errors in assessing the child's credibility, including relying on stereotypical reasoning regarding a sex education book, speculating about the child's ability to operate a camera, and improperly assessing the child's motive to fabricate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's inferences were grounded in the specific evidence and correctly applied a common sense approach to assessing the child's evidence without rigid stereotypes.

The appellant appealed his convictions for manslaughter and assault in respect of the death of his infant son, as well as his sentence.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended the evidence of civilian witnesses and a medical expert.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no material error in the trial judge's appreciation of the evidence.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed to grant enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody at a ratio of 1.5:1, reducing the residual sentence to 5.25 years' imprisonment.

The appellant struck a pedestrian with his vehicle and left the scene without assisting.

A tractor trailer subsequently struck and killed the unconscious victim.

The appellant was committed to stand trial for failing to stop, manslaughter, and criminal negligence causing death.

He applied for certiorari to quash the committal for manslaughter and criminal negligence, which was dismissed.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the application judge properly applied the 'reasonably foreseeable' approach to legal causation from Maybin, and that leaving the scene carried a reasonably foreseeable risk of immediate and substantial harm.

The appellant pleaded guilty to aggravated assault following his participation in a prison riot where he severely injured an unconscious inmate.

He was sentenced to seven and one-half years' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the sentencing judge failed to properly apply the principle of parity, given the lighter sentences imposed on co-accused.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the disparity was justified because the appellant's participation was of significantly greater gravity and moral blameworthiness than that of the other participants.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible for forcible confinement and assault due to a delusional disorder, appealed an Ontario Review Board disposition ordering his continued detention on the Secure Forensic Unit at CAMH.

He sought a transfer to the less secure General Forensic Unit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision reasonable because the appellant's refusal to engage with his treatment team prevented the hospital from assessing his risk, and the higher staff-to-patient ratio on the secure unit actually allowed him more escorted passes.

The appellants were convicted of drug-related kidnapping and robbery.

At trial, two key Crown witnesses recanted their prior statements inculpating the appellants.

The trial judge admitted the prior inconsistent statements for the truth of their contents under the K.G.B. framework but refused to allow defence counsel to cross-examine one of the witnesses on her statement after it was admitted.

The trial judge also admitted the entire transcript of a co-accused's guilty plea proceedings.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge erred by denying the defence the right to cross-examine the witness on her prior statement and by admitting the guilty plea proceedings where cross-examination was limited by solicitor-client privilege and the statement contained inadmissible hearsay.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board, arguing the Board erred by failing to explicitly consider and reject a conditional discharge, despite a joint submission for a detention order with expanded privileges.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board had evidence that a conditional discharge could risk decompensation and suicidal or homicidal reactions due to stress related to the appellant's transgender status.

The Court concluded the Board fully discharged its obligation to impose the least onerous and restrictive disposition.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for sexual assault and choking.

On the conviction appeal, he argued that the trial judge's interventions during the complainant's cross-examination prevented a fair trial and that the trial judge erred in finding no air of reality to the defence of honest belief in consent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the interventions did not curtail cross-examination or show bias, and the factual findings foreclosed the honest belief defence.

On the sentence appeal, the Court found that consecutive sentences for sexual assault and choking were not warranted as the choking was part of the sexual assault.

The Court also applied a 1.5:1 credit for pre-sentence custody, reducing the total sentence from six years to four and a half years.

The young person appealed a finding of guilt for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge applied differing levels of scrutiny to the evidence and that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to bring a section 11(b) Charter application for delay.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessment.

The Court also held that the appellant failed to demonstrate a miscarriage of justice, as a section 11(b) application would not have had a reasonable chance of success given the periods of defence delay.

The appellant was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while disqualified after being stopped driving an e-bike with inoperable pedals.

The trial judge and summary conviction appeal judge found the device was a motor vehicle under the Criminal Code because it could not be propelled by muscular power.

The appellant sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal, arguing he did not require a license under the Highway Traffic Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for leave, finding the appellant raised no question of law alone.

The appellant was convicted of firearm and drug offences arising from cross-border smuggling trips where she transported drugs to the U.S. and returned with guns.

She appealed her convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on wilful blindness and allowing cross-examination on her knowledge of gun crime in Toronto.

She also appealed her seven-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding sufficient evidence to support the wilful blindness instruction and no unfairness in the cross-examination.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was fit and within the appropriate range.