WARNING

THIS IS AN APPEAL UNDER THE

YOUTH CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT

AND IS SUBJECT TO:

110(1) Subject to this section, no person shall publish the name of a young person, or any other information related to a young person, if it would identify the young person as a young person dealt with under this Act.

(2) Subsection (1) does not apply

(a) in a case where the information relates to a young person who has received an adult sentence;

(b) in a case where the information relates to a young person who has received a youth sentence for a violent offence and the youth justice court has ordered a lifting of the publication ban under subsection 75(2); and

(c) in a case where the publication of the information is made in the course of the administration of justice, if it is not the purpose of the publication to make the information known in the community.

(3) A young person referred to in subsection (1) may, after he or she attains the age of eighteen years, publish or cause to be published information that would identify him or her as having been dealt with under this Act or the Young Offenders Act, chapter Y-1 of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1985, provided that he or she is not in custody pursuant to either Act at the time of the publication.

111(1) Subject to this section, no person shall publish the name of a child or young person, or any other information related to a child or a young person, if it would identify the child or young person as having been a victim of, or as having appeared as a witness in connection with, an offence committed or alleged to have been committed by a young person.

138(1) Every person who contravenes subsection 110(1) (identity of offender not to be published), 111(1) (identity of victim or witness not to be published), 118(1) (no access to records unless authorized) or 128(3) (disposal of R.C.M.P. records) or section 129 (no subsequent disclosure) of this Act, or subsection 38(1) (identity not to be published), (1.12) (no subsequent disclosure), (1.14) (no subsequent disclosure by school) or (1.15) (information to be kept separate), 45(2) (destruction of records) or 46(1) (prohibition against disclosure) of the Young Offenders Act, chapter Y-1 of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1985,

(a) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years; or

(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.

COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION: R. v. C.G., 2020 ONCA 357

DATE: 20200609

DOCKET: C64190

Nordheimer, Harvison Young and Zarnett JJ.A.

BETWEEN

Her Majesty the Queen

Respondent

and

C.G.

Appellant

Howard L. Krongold, for the appellant

Joanne Stuart, for the respondent

Heard: March 11, 2020

On appeal from the conviction entered on May 5, 2017 by Justice Mitch Hoffman of the Ontario Court of Justice.

Harvison Young J.A.:

[1] C.G. was convicted of multiple charges arising out of a series of “swatting” incidents that took place in early 2014. These charges included public mischief, mischief to property, and uttering threats. At the time of his arrest in early May 2014, the appellant was 16 years old and home schooled.

[2] The appellant sought a stay of proceedings on the basis that his right to a trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was violated. The trial judge denied the appellant’s request. This is the only ground raised on this appeal.

[3] The appellant’s argument is narrow and focusses on delay arising from two instances of Crown conduct, both of which occurred before the trial began. First, he submits that the Crown took excessive time for disclosure and did not set the trial date as promptly as it should have. Second, and at the heart of this appeal, the appellant argues that the Crown failed to digest the disclosure at the outset and thus proffered a “woefully inadequate” trial time estimate. In the appellant’s view, the trial time underestimation made it necessary to request further continuations, which were only available on much later dates, causing greater delay than would have been the case if the estimate had been accurate at the outset.

[4] The time between the appellant’s arrest and the end of the trial was just under three years. As there was no defence delay, the net Jordan delay is three years. There is no dispute that this delay exceeds the presumptive ceiling outlined in R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 631 for trials in the Ontario Court of Justice. The question is whether the Crown discharged its burden to show exceptional circumstances that render this delay reasonable.

[5] For the following reasons, I would dismiss the appeal.

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

[6] The appellant was accused of initiating various swatting incidents that took place in multiple places across North America – including California, Quebec, Alberta, and Ontario – over about a month in early 2014. The term “swatting” refers to hoax threats that lead to tactical police or special weapons and tactics (SWAT) team responses.

[7] The swatting threats in this case were directed primarily at schools, and in one instance a mall. In some instances, the caller claimed they had planted a bomb inside the premises and that people were going to die. The caller sometimes added that they were armed and prepared to shoot people. In other instances, the caller said they had taken people hostage. As a result of these hoax threats, schools were evacuated, and homes were entered by tactical police teams. The calls to the police were made using a Skype account with the username “Anonymouse Official”.

[8] At trial, the appellant admitted that the calls had been made but denied that he had made them. The case was circumstantial. As all parties readily acknowledge, and as the trial judge noted in his reasons, the case was technically complex. The Crown was required to link the appellant to the Anonymouse Official Skype account through associated Twitter and Gmail accounts. Much of the crucial evidence was led through a Crown expert in computer forensics.

[9] The defence position was that it was a reasonable inference that one or more third party hackers – either the appellant’s online enemies or “hacktivists” – had hacked into the appellant’s computer, made these threats and calls using a remote access tool, and used malware to cover their tracks.

[10] The appellant was arrested on May 8, 2014. The Crown took about six and half months to complete disclosure, and the defence received a crucial forensic report in “mini” form in early November 2014. On November 25, 2014, based on counsel’s estimate of required trial time, the trial was set for 10 days, June 16-29, 2015, at the Ontario Court of Justice.

[11] The trial began on the scheduled date. By that time, it had become clear that the initial 10-day trial estimate was inadequate. It became necessary to obtain dates for continuation. The trial judge requested that the continuances be scheduled in blocks of four days or more. The parties ultimately secured additional dates for February 3-9; February 29-March 4; April 20-21; May 5-6; and May 9-10. The s. 11(b) application was heard on May 9-10, 2016. I note that the parties also secured shorter blocks of time in between these continuances to deal with a voir dire on the voluntariness of the appellant’s statement to the police and a similar fact application.

[12] For the purposes of this appeal, the key point is that the trial took about 30 days to complete — instead of the 10 days in which the trial was originally scheduled — and the evidence was not completed until May 10, 2016. Pending the trial judge’s decision on the s. 11(b) application and the receipt of written closing submissions, Jordan was released in July 2016. The parties made oral closing submissions on October 24-25, 2016. Shortly after this, the parties agreed to file additional submissions to address Jordan and did so in late November and early December of 2016.

[13] On February 14, 2017, the trial judge delivered his reasons dismissing the s. 11(b) application. On May 5, 2017, he delivered his reasons for judgment convicting the appellant. A few months later, the trial judge sentenced the appellant to nine months in a youth open custody facility.

B. The trial judge’s reasons on the s.11(b) application

[14] In applying the framework in Jordan, the trial judge applied a presumptive ceiling of 15 months for youth offenders, based on R. v. J.M., 2017 ONCJ 4, 344 C.C.C. (3d) 217, at paras. 138, 141, 144 and 145. He assumed that the total delay period ended with the anticipated date of final judgment, not with the end of the evidence. As he found no defence delay in the case, the “net” delay was just under three years.

[15] This delay exceeded the presumptive ceiling of 15 months, so the delay was presumptively unreasonable. Consequently, the Crown bore the burden of justifying the delay through showing exceptional circumstances that were reasonably unforeseen, reasonably unavoidable, and reasonably irremediable.

[16] The trial judge agreed with the Crown that this case was particularly complex, which constituted an exceptional circumstance justifying the delay. Though the trial judge noted that the initial trial time estimate was “woefully inadequate”, he found the Crown made the estimate in good faith. The case involved “relatively novel evidence, at least to the criminal courts”. In the future, more realistic time estimates for such complex cases would be expected.

[17] The trial judge listed various ways the case’s complexity impacted the delay. Given the inadequate trial time estimate, it was necessary to schedule further dates for continuation. The trial judge had requested that these new dates be scheduled in blocks of four days or more, due to the nature of the evidence. As he explained:

Given the nuanced, interrelated, and highly complex nature of the individual pieces of circumstantial evidence which the Crown reasonably required to call to try to establish identity, each time the case came back for trial continuation all parties were required to get up to speed on the previous testimony to fully appreciate the relevance and interconnectedness of the nuance [sic] circumstantial evidence.

[18] The requirement of larger blocks of time for continuations meant that they were much more difficult to schedule. As a result, the trial was spread out over a longer time than would have been the case if only another day or two had been required.

[19] In addition to the technical detail of the evidence, the trial judge noted that the number of charges (34), the range of jurisdictions where the incidents took place, and the large number of discrete swatting incidents, added to the case’s complexity. The only issue was identity, but the case was circumstantial.

[20] Further, the trial judge acknowledged that, going into the trial, his level of computer forensic knowledge was “significantly limited”. Consequently, he frequently asked that evidence be repeated, explained, or given at a slower pace.

[21] The trial judge found that both the Crown and the defence worked diligently to move the case along. In particular, he stated it was reasonable that the initial trial date was set within six and a half months of the appellant’s arrest, by which time “thousands of pages of highly technical disclosure”, including the expert report in “mini” form, had been disclosed.

[22] He also found that the Crown took numerous steps to address the delay when it became apparent that the initial 10-day estimate would become insufficient. Such steps included raising the issue of inadequate time a month before trial; securing additional trial time before the trial began; and declining to call further witnesses as initially planned, having recognized that calling its forensic evidence had taken unexpectedly long.

[23] To conclude his analysis on the exceptional circumstance of complexity, the trial judge stated:

In sum, this was an extremely complex case requiring an inordinate amount of investigation, preparation time, trial time, time to schedule trial continuations, to write and make argument, and ultimately to provide judgment.

[24] In concluding that the delay in this case was reasonable due to the case’s complexity, the trial judge relied heavily on Jordan, at para. 80, which reads:

Where the trial judge finds that the case was particularly complex such that the time the case has taken is justified, the delay is reasonable and no stay will issue. No further analysis is required.

[25] The trial judge determined that if he was wrong that the exceptional circumstance of complexity justified the delay, then the transitional exceptional circumstance justified the delay. To begin, he cited R. v. Williamson, 2016 SCC 28, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 741, as articulating the factors relevant to whether the transitional exceptional circumstance applies to justify delay above the presumptive ceiling. The trial judge assessed five relevant factors in this case.

[26] First, for the reasons stated earlier, the case was highly complex.

[27] Second, using attributions that were “overly generous to the [appellant]”, the Morin delay in this case was in the range of eight and a half months. This exceeded the five to six-month Morin guideline for regular youth matters. However, this case was “anything but a one to two day run of the mill case”. In this context, the excess delay was “not significant”.

[28] Third, the Crown’s response to institutional delay was “focused, efficient, and effective.” The defence was also eager to move the case along.

[29] Fourth, there was limited prejudice to the appellant. Media coverage of the incidents greatly diminished as time went on, and the appellant was able to finish school on schedule. Upheaval in the appellant’s life was only partly caused by his bail conditions. While the cost of defence counsel’s service was understandably high, the cost “would not have been less and may have actually increased” if the trial continuations were scheduled in shorter blocks of time.

[30] Lastly, the charges were serious. The swatting incidents had wide and significant impact, law enforcement resources were wasted, homes and schools were invaded, and (often young) people had unpleasant, sometimes traumatizing, encounters with the police.

[31] Balancing these factors, the trial judge found that the delay would have been reasonable under R. v. Morin, 1992 CanLII 89 (SCC), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 771, and thus the transitional exceptional circumstance applied to justify the delay.

C. The parties’ submissions

[32] The parties agree that the case was complex in terms of the volume of evidence and its technical foundations. However, the appellant submits that the case’s complexity does not give the Crown license to breach the Jordan ceiling. Instead, when the presumptive ceiling is exceeded, the Crown must show that it has taken reasonable steps to avoid or mitigate the delay.

[33] The appellant argues that the Crown failed to take such reasonable steps in two ways. First, the Crown took excessive time to disclose key evidence, particularly the initial “mini” forensic report, which was necessary to set trial dates.

[34] Second, and central to the appellant’s s. 11(b) appeal, is that the Crown’s trial time estimate was “woefully inadequate”. The appellant argues that the mere fact of complexity and the Crown’s good faith conduct does not relieve it of the responsibility to develop and follow a plan to minimize the delay occasioned by a complex case. The Crown should have fully digested the evidence and appreciated the trial’s complexity before setting the trial date. Had it done so, it would have been obvious that the trial could not be completed in 10 days. As it stands, the Crown’s initial 10-day estimate was symptomatic of the Crown’s failure to develop a “solid plan for bringing the matter to trial within a reasonable time”. The delay was in the Crown’s control and the exceptional circumstance of complexity should not apply.

[35] The appellant also argues that the Crown’s failure to develop and follow a realistic plan for the trial prevents the transitional exceptional circumstance from applying. In addition, he says the trial judge erred in failing to infer prejudice to the appellant resulting from the three years of delay. Inferred prejudice was especially warranted in this case, given the appellant was a young person.

[36] On the disclosure issue, the Crown argues that disclosing the “mini” forensic report and setting the trial date six and a half months after the appellant’s arrest was reasonable in this case. The forensic expert required highly voluminous and technical information from multiple jurisdictions.

[37] On the time estimate issue, the Crown relies on the exceptional circumstance of complexity to justify the delay. It highlights that defence counsel shares responsibility for the initial trial estimate, as he had pressed for a trial date to be set quickly. The Crown also emphasizes the that the trial judge found that the Crown had made the initial time estimate in good faith, and the Crown was proactive in addressing delay when she realized the trial estimate was inadequate. These are factual findings entitled to deference on appeal. The forensic evidence at trial was extremely technical, while the trial judge’s computer knowledge was limited. The Crown submits that, given the complexity of this case, the appellant’s argument would impose an unfairly strict standard assessed with the benefit of hindsight.

[38] In the alternative, the Crown submits that the transitional exceptional circumstance under Jordan should apply and, as a result, the delay was reasonable. It relies on the arguments above to conclude that the delay would have been reasonable under Morin. The Crown adds that any inferred prejudice would be outweighed by the complexity of the case and the seriousness of the offences.

D. Law and Analysis

[39] Jordan sets ceilings beyond which delay is presumptively unreasonable. For cases in provincial court, the presumptive ceiling is 18 months from the charge to the actual or anticipated end of trial. Defence delay does not count towards the presumptive ceiling.

[40] While the trial judge applied a lower 15-month presumptive ceiling for youth matters, the Supreme Court of Canada has since clarified that the presumptive ceilings in Jordan apply equally to youth matters: R. v. K.J.M., 2019 SCC 55, 381 C.C.C. (3d) 293, at paras. 62-68. As such, the applicable ceiling for this case, which occurred in the Ontario Court of Justice, is 18 months.

[41] The appellant was arrested and charged on May 8, 2014. The trial judge delivered his reasons for judgment convicting the appellant on May 5, 2017. The total delay was about three years. As there was no defence delay in this case, the net or “Jordan” delay is about three years. This delay exceeds the presumptive ceiling of 18 months. The Crown must establish that the delay is reasonable by showing exceptional circumstances apply.

[42] For the reasons that follow, I find that the trial judge did not err in concluding that the Crown met its burden to show that the exceptional circumstances of complexity and that the transitional exceptional circumstance rendered the delay in this case reasonable.

(1) Complexity was an exceptional circumstance

[43] In Jordan, at paras. 77 to 78, Moldaver J. described “particularly complex” cases as follows:

Particularly complex cases are cases that, because of the nature of the evidence or the nature of the issues, require an inordinate amount of trial or preparation time such that the delay is justified. As for the nature of the evidence, hallmarks of particularly complex cases include voluminous disclosure, a large number of witnesses, significant requirements for expert evidence, and charges covering a long period of time. Particularly complex cases arising from the nature of the issues may be characterized by, among other things, a large number of charges and pre-trial applications, novel or complicated legal issues, and a large number of significant issues in dispute….

…if an inordinate amount of trial or preparation time is needed as a result of the nature of the evidence or the issues such that the time the case has taken is justified, the complexity of the case will qualify as presenting an exceptional circumstance. [Emphasis in original.]

[44] This was a case that bore all the hallmarks of complexity. As the trial judge noted, the nature of the evidence was very technical and included the following topics: Skype operability (how logs are stored and how they may be manipulated), metadata, virtual private networks, proxy servers, Internet Protocol addresses (spoofing, dynamic versus static), malware such as Trojans, botnets, Tor browsers, distributed denial of service, and voice modification software. The case involved competing expert witnesses and voluminous disclosure. The appellant faced multiple charges arising out of several discrete swatting incidents occurring in various jurisdictions across North America. Detective Alan Reed, the Crown’s expert witness, testified that this case was the biggest he had ever dealt with in his 21-year career as a police officer, in terms of the amount of data he had to analyse and the time it took to analyse it.

[45] As indicated earlier, the appellant argues the Crown took excessive time to disclose evidence, causing a delay in setting the trial date. The trial judge found the amount of time required for disclosure and setting the trial dates was very reasonable, given “the inherent complexities of the case”. Given the highly technical and voluminous nature of disclosure in this case, I agree that pace of disclosure was reasonable.

[46] The second impugned delay, which arose from the underestimate of the time required for trial, presents a more difficult problem. The Crown bears the burden of showing that it acted reasonably to minimize the delay arising from the case’s complexity. During the s.11(b) hearing held before the release of Jordan, the Crown fairly acknowledged that the trial time underestimate arose partly because the defence was pressing to set a trial date, but she had not been able to review the disclosure in enough depth in order to come up with a more accurate trial estimate. She stated:

[I]f I were to do it over again…I would either slow it down and say, “I need more time”, so that I can fully digest this material and come up with, what is likely a more suitable trial estimate. Or, alternatively…if I can’t prevent my friend from setting a trial date to give me that time, I would make the point of saying that on the record, that “I’ve said 10 days; my preference would be to wait another four weeks or six weeks, so I can…read more of this. But I can’t; and no one will allow me, so 10 days is my best guess.” That’s…the learning experience…and that’s how I think I could’ve done it…better to avoid, maybe, some of these pitfalls.

[47] In oral argument, one of the issues raised was that it is now impossible to quantify the amount of time that was lost because of this underestimate. If the Crown had sought a trial date in November 2014 for a 30-day trial, when would the trial have commenced and concluded? No evidence was led on this point so we do not know what that time frame would have been, or whether it could have been established at that point.

[48] The appellant argues that the Crown’s failure to provide the answer to this question, in combination with its failure to provide an accurate time estimate at the outset, means that the Crown did not establish that the delay was reasonable. I disagree for a few reasons.

[49] First, Jordan does not require perfection. Rather, it requires that the Crown, and all justice participants, be proactive in mitigating delay. Here, the Crown’s mistake was estimating the trial length before she had been able to sufficiently digest the disclosure. Somewhat ironically, the Crown did this in part to obtain a date as soon as possible, as the defence counsel was urging her to do. The trial judge found that the Crown made this trial estimate in good faith. This finding is entitled to deference.

[50] Second, this was not a case of the sort of complacency that Jordan seeks to address. As the trial judge noted, the Crown consistently took initiatives to mitigate delay throughout the process.

[51] For instance, the Crown was proactive in seeking additional trial dates. About one month before the trial, the Crown raised the issue of inadequate trial time in case management. The trial judge noted that the Crown sought a “last minute pre-trial to discuss confirmed trial admissions in order to ensure the trial time was sufficient”. At this pre-trial, the Crown learned for the first time the defence was contemplating expert evidence. It was the Crown who then sought and secured five additional days of trial time, before the trial began.

[52] The Crown also made efforts to ensure time was used as efficiently as possible. At the outset of the trial, the Crown provided a detailed summary to assist the trial judge in following the complex evidence, which the trial judge called “essential”. The trial judge also found that there was “no delay of any significance caused by technology not being ready, including video testimony from witnesses out of the country, or testimony from youthful witnesses travelling to Ottawa.” He expressed that this level of technological efficiency was rare.

[53] On June 24, 2015, when it became apparent that the initial trial estimate was inadequate, it was the Crown that suggested that the court deal with the voir dire on voluntariness before the longer continuation dates, since it was a discrete issue that could be resolved in the interim. More generally, like defence counsel, the Crown “showed up on time at the start of the day, after breaks, worked late on occasion, agreed to shorten lunch hours, started early…and [was] ready to use the time efficiently every day.”

[54] Third,in assessing the complexity of a matter as an exceptional circumstance under Jordan, the approach should be qualitative rather than quantitative: R. v. Cody, 2017 SCC 31, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 659, at para. 64. A case’s complexity as a whole may be relied upon to fully justify the delay in a case: Jordan, at para. 80.

[55] The qualitative assessment here leads to the conclusion, for the reasons mentioned by the trial judge, that this was an unusually difficult case. Even if the Crown had been able to fully digest the disclosure before setting the trial date, it is difficult to say that the estimate would or could have been very accurate, or that it would have substantially eliminated the delay in this case. The parties did not know who the trial judge would be. As the trial judge noted, he had little experience with technological evidence and he required the experts to proceed slowly and answer many questions to ensure that he understood the evidence. The Crown did not know that the defence would be calling its own expert until about three weeks before the trial was set to begin. Nor did it know that there would not only be one s.11(b) application, but also that revised submissions and additional time would be required as a result of the intervening Jordan decision. Further, at the trial judge’s request, the parties had to schedule trial continuations in blocks of four days or more, which likely took longer to obtain than a day or two would have. On the other hand, it may well have been more efficient, as the trial judge hoped, by reducing the breaks in the evidence and time needed to “gear up” on each continuance date.

[56] As stated in Jordan, at para. 79, the determination of whether a case’s complexity is sufficient to justify its length falls “well within the trial’s judge’s expertise.” I see no basis for interfering with the trial judge’s conclusion on this issue. Although the delay in this case exceeds the presumptive ceiling, I am satisfied that the delay was justified by the complexity and unprecedented nature of the case in all of these circumstances.

(2) The transitional exceptional circumstance applies

[57] In the alternative, if the case’s complexity does not justify the delay, the Crown relies upon the transitional exceptional circumstance. In order to successfully invoke the transitional exceptional circumstance, the Crown must establish that the time the case has taken is justified, based on the parties’ reasonable reliance on the previous state of the law: Jordan, at para. 96.

[58] R. v. Gopie, 2017 ONCA 728, 140 O.R. (3d) 171, at para. 178, sets out the factors that inform the transitional exceptional circumstances analysis. These factors are:

i) the complexity of the case;

ii) the period of delay in excess of the Morin guidelines;

iii) the Crown’s response, if any, to institutional delay;

iv) the defence efforts, if any, to move the case along; and

v) prejudice to the accused.

[59] As I have already discussed, this was a highly complex case. The trial judge held that the institutional delay in this case was in the range of eight and a half months. The appellant does not challenge this finding. While this delay is over the five to six-month Moringuideline for youth cases, the trial judge found the excess delay was “not significant” in light of the case’s complexity. I agree.

[60] Moreover, and as discussed earlier, the Crown did not have a complacent attitude towards delay. Instead, the Crown actively worked to mitigate delay, and its response to the institutional delay was “focused, efficient and effective”. The defence also helped move the case along and used court time efficiently.

[61] I also agree with the trial judge that the appellant suffered minimal actual prejudice arising from the delay. While the trial judge did not explicitly consider inferred prejudice, I find that any inferred prejudice would be outweighed by other relevant considerations under the Morin analysis.

[62] Notably, the offences here were very serious. As the trial judge outlined, the multiple swatting incidents had wide and deep impact. There were numerous victims confronted by police in the sanctity of their homes or schools. Many of the immediate victims were school-age children or young adults. These victims’ families and communities also suffered from lasting fear and anxiety due to the swatting and necessary aggressive police responses.

[63] When assessing whether the transitional exceptional circumstance applies, “the seriousness of the alleged offences remains a significant consideration”: R. v. Baron, 2017 ONCA 772, 356 C.C.C. (3d) 212, at para. 73.As this court outlined in R. v. Seegmiller (2004), 2004 CanLII 46219 (ON CA), 191 C.C.C. (3d) 347, at para. 25, leave to appeal refused, [2005] S.C.C.A. No. 64:

Where the nature of the allegation establishes a heightened societal interest in a trial on the merits, the absence of prejudice (particularly to the accused’s fair trial interests) takes on added significance in the s. 11(b) calculus…the absence of meaningful prejudice can lengthen the period of delay that is constitutionally tolerable.

[64] In this case, there was a high societal interest in a trial on its merits. The seriousness of the offences weighs in favour of finding the delay was reasonable.

[65] For these reasons, I conclude the delay would also be justified by the transitional exceptional circumstance.

E. DISPOSITION

[66] The trial judge did not err in dismissing the appellant’s s. 11(b) application. I would dismiss the appeal.

Released: June 09, 2020

“I.V.B.N.”

“A. Harvison Young J.A.”

“I agree I.V.B. Nordheimer J.A.”

“I agree B. Zarnett J.A.”