Jeffrey Joseph Paul Langevin

Mr. Flaro was convicted of 11 firearms-related offences, including possession of a loaded, restricted handgun.

He was found with multiple firearms in a detached garage, which he claimed were for protection against debt collectors.

The court considered sentencing principles, aggravating factors (illegal possession, loaded firearms, drug use, children nearby, school proximity, dissuading police call) and mitigating factors (pro-social upbringing, work history, family support, acceptance of responsibility, insight).

The judge determined the offences fell into the "true crime" spectrum, warranting a sentence in the 3-5 year range.

Due to an unusual situation regarding presentence custody and a conditional sentence order breach, which unintentionally disadvantaged the offender, the judge applied principles of totality and restraint to temper the sentence.

This judgment concerns the trial of two co-accused, Jordan Lazore and Brandon Laffin, jointly charged with firearms trafficking and importation, and Mr. Lazore also with careless storage of ammunition.

The Crown alleged the accused transported guns into Canada and transferred them to other individuals.

The court found the identity of both accused established by overwhelming evidence.

Regarding the trafficking charges, the court found the circumstantial evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused knowingly possessed and intended to transfer the firearms, establishing a clear chain of continuity for the seized weapons.

However, the court acquitted the accused of the importation charges due to an 82-minute gap in surveillance after they crossed the border, which created a reasonable doubt as to when and where the firearms were acquired, preventing the inference that they were imported from New York.

The conspiracy to traffic charge was also acquitted due to insufficient proof of a prior agreement.

The careless storage charge was acquitted at the Crown's request.

The Applicant, Althea Reyes, sought certiorari in aid of prohibition to challenge a trial judge's decisions regarding disclosure and the introduction of her prior criminal record.

The Crown moved for summary dismissal of Reyes' application.

The court found that the alleged errors by the trial judge were not jurisdictional in nature, but rather discretionary matters within the trial judge's purview (e.g., length of adjournment for disclosure review, recall of witnesses, abuse of process, or mistrial applications).

The court emphasized that extraordinary remedies like certiorari are reserved for jurisdictional errors, not mere alleged errors reviewable on appeal.

Consequently, the court summarily dismissed Reyes' application, finding it manifestly frivolous as it was "obviously doomed to fail."

The accused, Terrence McLaren, was tried on three counts of breaking and entering dwelling houses with intent to commit theft or committing theft.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, relying on DNA evidence found at two separate crime scenes (a water bottle and a toque) that matched McLaren's profile.

The court applied the principles of circumstantial evidence, including the "solitary reasonable inference" test and the holistic assessment of DNA evidence.

The court found that the only reasonable inference from the totality of the evidence was that McLaren committed the offenses, leading to a conviction on all counts.

The Respondent brought a motion for contempt against the Applicant for alleged breaches of parenting time, communication, joint decision-making, and financial disclosure orders.

The court found the Applicant in contempt beyond a reasonable doubt for wilfully breaching the parenting time and communication terms of previous orders, specifically regarding the child's access to the Respondent.

The court found the Applicant had not genuinely encouraged the child's relationship with the father and had abdicated parental authority.

The finding of contempt was limited to parenting time breaches, with other alleged breaches serving as notice for future compliance.

Sanctions were deferred to a subsequent appearance, with encouragement for parenting time to resume.

An appeal from a sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal issued an addendum clarifying that the appellant was to be freed on November 4, 2019, and that the sentences imposed were concurrent and therefore complete as ordered.

The appellant appealed a sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The parties had agreed to a joint submission intended to result in a penitentiary sentence to allow the appellant access to treatment programs.

However, the parties miscalculated, resulting in a sentence that was practically too long.

The appellant argued for 150 days while the Crown acknowledged that four to six months would have been appropriate.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and substituted a sentence of 150 days for the original 307-day sentence.

The appellant appealed both his conviction for home invasion entered on September 26, 2016 and his sentence imposed on February 13, 2017.

The Court of Appeal upheld both the conviction and sentence.

The court found that the trial judge's identification conclusion was amply supported by evidence, rejected claims of reasonable apprehension of bias based on the trial judge's prior representation of the appellant six years earlier, and determined that the sentence imposed was fit and, if anything, lenient for a home invasion offense.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession for the purpose of trafficking cocaine and related weapons offences, as well as his five-year sentence for trafficking.

The appellant argued that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence regarding his presence in the bathroom and possession of the cocaine, that the verdict was unreasonable due to unexplained contradictions, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because a key witness was not called.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding that the trial judge's findings of fact and credibility were supported by the evidence and owed deference, that fresh evidence regarding ineffective assistance did not meet the Palmer test, and that the sentence was fit and within the appropriate range.

The appellant appealed a forfeiture order granted by the application judge under the Civil Remedies Act, 2001.

The application judge had ordered forfeiture of approximately $44,425 in Canadian currency found by police during a search warrant execution on a camping trailer owned by the appellant during a drug investigation.

The appellant argued that the application judge failed to provide adequate reasons for concluding the funds were proceeds or instruments of unlawful activity.

The Court of Appeal rejected this argument, finding the application judge was entitled to accept the uncontradicted expert opinion and gave cogent reasons for rejecting the appellant's explanation.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused applied under s. 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms for a stay of proceedings unless the state funded his defence on a charge under the Excise Act.

The court found that a previous Rowbotham decision had already determined the accused’s indigency and inability to fund counsel, creating issue estoppel preventing relitigation of that question.

The court further concluded that despite the relative simplicity of the possession charge, the presence of statements evidence, a jointly charged co‑accused represented by counsel, and the potential for incarceration created a real risk that the accused could not receive a fair trial without legal representation.

A conditional stay was therefore warranted to permit the state an opportunity to provide publicly funded counsel.

During a criminal trial for drug trafficking offences involving cocaine and cannabis, the Crown sought to qualify an RCMP officer as an expert to provide opinion evidence regarding drug trafficking indicators, drug jargon, and related matters.

The defence objected, arguing the proposed evidence lacked relevance and necessity and that the witness lacked independence due to police bias.

Applying the test for expert evidence in R. v. Mohan, the court held that some proposed opinions were relevant and necessary to assist the jury, including opinions regarding the level of trafficking indicated by seized items and the use of drug-related jargon.

However, opinions concerning cocaine purity, the role of weapons in trafficking, and evidence relating to hashish or trafficking hierarchies were excluded as irrelevant or unnecessary.

The officer was qualified to give expert opinion evidence only on limited issues.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on charges of impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg.

The trial judge had found that the Crown failed to prove the accused had care or control of an operable vehicle within the two-hour statutory presumption period under s. 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

Evidence showed the accused was seated in a damaged and potentially inoperable vehicle awaiting a tow truck after a collision, and the timing of the incident relative to the breath samples was uncertain.

The appeal court held that the trial judge correctly applied the law governing care or control and the statutory presumption, and that the factual findings regarding operability and timing were supported by the evidence.

The Crown therefore failed to establish any legal error or unreasonable verdict.

The applicant brought a Charter application seeking exclusion of statements made to police following arrest during a large-scale drug trafficking investigation.

He argued that police failed to properly inform him of the reasons for his detention under s. 10(a) of the Charter and that his right to counsel under s. 10(b) was infringed, rendering his waiver invalid.

The court found that advising the applicant he was being arrested for drug trafficking and conspiracy to traffic drugs sufficiently informed him of the nature of his jeopardy.

The court further held that the applicant validly waived his right to counsel and later spoke with counsel before a subsequent interrogation.

Although additional details about the investigation were provided several hours after arrest, any delay was minor in context and did not justify exclusion of the statements under s. 24(2).

The Crown appealed a summary conviction acquittal for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg.

The trial judge had concluded that breath samples were not taken “as soon as practicable” under s. 258(1)(c)(ii) of the Criminal Code due to several perceived unexplained delays.

The appeal court held that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence regarding delays following arrest and during roadside investigation, which had reasonable explanations.

Because those errors materially affected the acquittal, the appellate court set aside the acquittal and ordered a new trial.