Denis Cadieux

The plaintiff, a police officer, sued his neighbours for intentional infliction of mental distress, defamation, nuisance, trespass, harassment, and malicious prosecution, stemming from years of escalating disputes including surveillance, false complaints to his employer, and a baseless peace bond application.

The court found the defendants liable for defamation, malicious prosecution, and intentional infliction of mental distress, awarding the plaintiff $25,000 in general damages.

The court emphasized the flagrant and outrageous nature of the defendants' conduct, particularly their deliberate and continuous recording of the plaintiff, knowing his history of PTSD, and their malicious use of legal processes.

The plaintiff, acting as trustee in bankruptcy for a company involved in a Ponzi scheme, sought to recover $121,845.37 in payments made to the defendant in the year prior to bankruptcy.

The trustee argued these were preferential payments made while the company was insolvent.

The court found that the defendant, who was the nephew of the company's founder and worked for the company, was not dealing at arm's length with the insolvent company.

The court ordered the defendant to reimburse the full amount to the trustee.

The defendants brought a second motion to strike the plaintiff's re-amended statement of claim in an action arising from a Ponzi scheme.

The court found that the plaintiff had addressed the deficiencies identified in a previous decision regarding the damages claimed against most defendants.

However, the court struck the claim against two defendants (the McKillips) without leave to amend, finding no material facts were pleaded to establish a duty of care.

The court also held that the defendants were precluded from raising new arguments about the duty of care that they could have raised on their first motion to strike, as serial attacks on a pleading constitute an abuse of process.

The defendants sought over $300,000 in substantial indemnity costs following partial success on a motion to strike the plaintiff's pleadings.

The plaintiff, acting as trustee in bankruptcy for a company involved in a Ponzi scheme, opposed the costs request and argued that costs should be reserved.

The court declined to fix costs immediately, finding it more just to reserve the costs of the initial motions pending the outcome of further motions to strike the reamended statement of claim.

The defendants brought motions to strike the plaintiff's statement of claim, which sought contribution and indemnity, damages, and disgorgement arising from the defendants' alleged involvement in a Ponzi scheme operated by Golden Oaks.

The court struck the claims for contribution and indemnity without leave to amend, finding no common liability to third parties and no viable duty of care owed to the unsecured creditors.

The claims for damages were struck with leave to amend to properly plead the losses suffered by the company.

The claims for disgorgement and accounting were permitted to proceed.

Appeal from a Superior Court judgment dismissing claims for liability arising from the failure of a daycare business and for unjust enrichment.

The appellants alleged that the respondents caused the failure of their daycare enterprise and sought damages for losses.

The appellants also claimed unjust enrichment based on renovations made to the leased premises.

The trial judge found that the appellants failed to prove the respondents caused the business failure and that the appellants' testimony was less credible than that of the respondent.

The appellants were in default of four months' rent when the lease was terminated.

The Court of Appeal found no error of law or palpable and overriding error of fact and dismissed the appeal.

The plaintiff, Caisse Populaire de la Vallée Inc., sought judgment against the defendant, Mark Sabourin, for mortgage default.

The defendant argued that his disability insurance should have covered the mortgage payments or the full balance, alleging the plaintiff failed to properly explain insurance options in 2006.

The court found that the specific full-payment disability insurance was not offered or available in 2006 and that the defendant failed to provide required medical proof of continued disability to the insurer, Desjardins.

Consequently, the court granted judgment to the plaintiff for the outstanding mortgage balance, municipal taxes, and the right to possess and sell the property.

The plaintiff brought a motion to find the defendants, Marcel and Jean-Georges Bisson, in civil contempt for deliberately refusing to sign Full and Final Releases as ordered by a previous judgment.

Applying the three-part test from Carey v. Laiken, the court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the order was clear, the defendants had actual knowledge of it, and they intentionally failed to comply.

The defendants were found in contempt, fined $20,000, and the releases were deemed signed by court order.

Costs were awarded to the plaintiff on a full indemnity basis.

The defendant was charged with three offences arising from a motor vehicle collision on November 5, 2015: careless driving contrary to section 130 of the Highway Traffic Act, failing to remain at the scene of an accident contrary to section 200(1)(a) of the Highway Traffic Act, and making a false statement in a collision report contrary to section 9(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The Crown presented evidence from the victim, an independent civilian witness, and a police officer.

The defendant testified in her own defence.

The court found the Crown's evidence credible and reliable, particularly the corroborating testimony of the independent witness.

The defendant's testimony was found to be problematic, inconsistent, and contradictory.

The court found the defendant guilty on all three counts.

The Third Party, Miguel Villeneuve, brought a motion for summary judgment to strike third-party claims by the Laferrière defendants and Calypso Theme Waterpark.

The claims alleged Villeneuve caused the plaintiff's injuries, which directly contradicted findings from a prior criminal conviction of the Laferrière defendants for assaulting the plaintiff.

The court found that these third-party claims constituted a collateral attack on the criminal court's findings and were an abuse of process.

The motion was granted, and the third-party claims were struck.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for summary judgment to recover the balance owing on a loan agreement.

The defendants argued the agreement was unenforceable, claiming they lacked independent legal advice and that the arrangement was actually a partnership where losses should be shared.

The court found no evidence of a partnership and noted the loan agreement explicitly remained in force if no partnership agreement was executed.

The court granted summary judgment in favour of the plaintiffs for the agreed outstanding amount.

The accused, charged with historical sexual offences including gross indecency and indecent assault, contested the voluntariness of a statement he made to police.

He argued that he was not properly informed of the reasons for his arrest or his right to counsel under s. 10(a) and (b) of the Charter, as the police initially only mentioned one complainant and used the term 'sexual assault' rather than the specific historical charges.

The court applied the Oickle framework and found that the accused, an intelligent man who was aware of the historical complaints, understood the extent of his jeopardy.

The court concluded that the Crown proved the voluntariness of the statement beyond a reasonable doubt and ruled the statement admissible.

Motion by the prosecution at the close of its case seeking admission of the evidence of five complainants as similar fact evidence across multiple historical sexual offence counts arising from conduct by a parish priest toward boys in the early 1970s.

Applying the governing similar fact evidence framework, the court found no collusion proven on a balance of probabilities and held the improbability of the recurring lap-sitting conduct gave that evidence sufficient probative value to outweigh prejudice.

However, the court refused to admit the evidence cross-count on the further issue of sexual or indecent circumstances, finding those proposed inferences weak and highly prejudicial.

The motion was therefore granted only in part.

Following the plaintiff’s successful motion for summary judgment recovering funds advanced to the defendants for investment, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The defendants had accepted funds from the plaintiff and invested them despite lacking proper qualifications, allegedly losing the money through inappropriate stock market investments.

The defendants made no submissions on costs.

Considering the plaintiff’s complete success, the complexity of the motion including limitation and forum issues, and the defendants’ reprehensible conduct, the court awarded substantial indemnity costs.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment seeking repayment of funds transferred to the defendants for investment in the American stock market.

The defendants admitted receiving the funds but claimed the losses resulted from stock market risks.

The court found there was no genuine issue requiring a trial regarding negligence and breach of the implied contractual duty to invest the funds prudently.

The defendant who undertook the investments admitted lacking competence and taking unreasonable risks, leading the court to conclude that the plaintiff’s losses resulted from negligent investment conduct.

The co‑defendant was held jointly liable as a joint holder of the investment account that received and commingled the plaintiff’s funds.

The defendants brought two preliminary motions challenging the Ontario court’s territorial jurisdiction and asserting that the plaintiff’s action for breach of contract was statute‑barred.

The claim sought recovery of $188,000 allegedly provided for risk‑free investment that was lost during the 2008 financial crisis.

Applying the real and substantial connection framework and Rule 17.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court found sufficient connection to Ontario given the plaintiff’s residence and the sequence of events.

The court further held that acknowledgments of the debt and promises of repayment could extend the limitation period.

Both preliminary objections were dismissed.

The respondent paid the appellant $112,056 in advance for hardwood flooring.

The appellant failed to deliver the product and instead applied the funds to a debt owed by a third party, claiming the third party was the respondent's agent.

The motion judge granted summary judgment to the respondent.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding no evidence of actual or ostensible authority to support the agency claim.

The appeal was dismissed.