Chris Barnett

The appellants appealed a Superior Court decision granting the municipality's application for an order to demolish above-ground construction on a contaminated property.

The appellants had proceeded with above-grade construction without a full building permit, having failed to obtain the required Record of Site Condition.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's factual findings and concluding that the demolition order was a proper exercise of discretion to enforce compliance with the Building Code Act.

The appellant property owner appealed a judgment granting the City's application to enforce a Heritage Easement Agreement.

The appellant had made unauthorized alterations to his property, including cutting down trees and building a hockey rink and cabana.

The application judge found the appellant breached the Agreement and granted a permanent injunction.

On appeal, the appellant argued the application judge misinterpreted the Agreement and that the City's enforcement was motivated by bad faith.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable or overriding error in the application judge's decision and concluding that the City had exercised its contractual discretion in good faith.

The City of Markham brought an application for declaratory relief and a permanent injunction against a homeowner who removed trees and built a concrete hockey rink in the backyard of his heritage-designated property without City approval.

The homeowner argued the Heritage Easement Agreement only applied to the building, not the grounds, and that the City's enforcement was unconscionable and violated his Charter rights.

The Superior Court of Justice held that the agreement applied to the entire property and granted the City sole discretion to determine breaches and conduct remedial work.

The court dismissed the unconscionability and Charter arguments, issued the requested declarations, and granted a permanent injunction prohibiting further unauthorized work.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a decision of the Ontario Land Tribunal that approved Official Plan and Zoning By-law amendments to permit a hot mix asphalt plant.

The moving party argued the Tribunal erred in law by stating the applications conformed with the 'purpose and intent' of the Growth Plan rather than strictly stating they 'conform with' it.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that when read as a whole, the Tribunal correctly understood and applied the conformity test, and its phrasing was directly responsive to the evidence presented at the hearing.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a decision of the Ontario Land Tribunal that dismissed his appeal of a zoning by-law without a hearing.

The Tribunal had dismissed the appeal on the basis that it did not disclose any apparent land use planning ground and failed to explain how the by-law was inconsistent with provincial policy or the official plan.

The Divisional Court found that the Tribunal provided sufficient reasons and made no error of law in applying the test for dismissing an appeal without a hearing under the Planning Act.

The moving party had failed to provide responding affidavit evidence or expert planning opinions to support his appeal grounds before the Tribunal.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal a decision of the Local Planning Appeal Tribunal.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

Costs were awarded to the responding party in the fixed amount of $25,000.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a decision of the Local Planning Appeal Tribunal (LPAT).

The Divisional Court denied the motion for leave to appeal.

Following established jurisprudence, the court declined to provide reasons for denying leave.

Costs were awarded to the responding parties in the total amount of $25,000.

The applicant school board sought judicial review to quash clauses 10(2)(i) and (ii) of O. Reg. 20/98 under the Education Act as ultra vires.

The impugned regulations restrict the availability of education development charges (EDCs) to circumstances where a school board does not have board-wide surplus capacity.

The applicant argued this undermined the purpose of the EDC regime, which is to ensure growth pays for growth.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the regulations were consistent with the statutory grant of authority and the broader scheme of the Education Act, which includes strict financial oversight and efficient use of education funds.

The applicant, a former Auditor General for the City of Oshawa, brought an application for judicial review seeking to quash a 2013 City Council resolution and expunge an investigator's report.

The application was commenced more than five years after the resolution was passed.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for delay, finding the delay was lengthy, lacked a reasonable explanation, and caused prejudice to the City given the one-year statutory limitation period for quashing municipal resolutions.

The moving party municipality sought leave to appeal a decision of the Ontario Municipal Board that approved official plan and zoning bylaw amendments permitting a mixed-use high-density development.

The municipality argued the Board failed to have regard to its new official plan, exceeded its jurisdiction regarding community benefits, and provided inadequate reasons.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding that the Board's decision on the applicable official plan and height issues were matters of fact or mixed fact and law entitled to deference.

The court also held that the Board did not impose community benefits and that its reasons were adequate and met the duty of procedural fairness.

On an appeal from an application judgment concerning a non-profit airport authority's refusal to appoint a municipal nominee as member and director, the court upheld the declaration that the board acted contrary to its by-law.

The appeal turned on whether the board had clear and unambiguous evidence that the nominee would not at all times act in the authority's best interests.

The court held that neither the nominee's cautious interview answers nor the board's adverse credibility finding based on his subsequent letter could reasonably satisfy that stringent anticipatory standard.

The board's rejection of the nomination therefore fell outside the scope of its authority under the by-law, and the appeal was dismissed with costs.