Kim Mullin

The applicant sought a declaration that three school board trustees breached the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act by voting on a 'Sanctity of Life' motion.

The applicant alleged the trustees had an indirect pecuniary interest because they received $400 campaign contributions and endorsements from a teachers' union that opposed the motion.

The court dismissed the application, finding no evidence of any agreement with the union, no indirect pecuniary interest under section 2 of the Act, and that any hypothetical interest was too remote and insignificant to influence the trustees.

The applicant sought an interlocutory injunction to suspend a building permit issued by the town for the construction of a dock on a neighbouring waterfront property.

The applicant argued the proposed location differed from a previously approved site plan and would eventually house a boathouse that would obstruct his view.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test and dismissed the motion, finding that while there was a serious issue to be tried regarding the planning process, the applicant failed to demonstrate irreparable harm from the dock's construction, and the balance of convenience favoured the respondent property owner.

The applicant brought a motion to consolidate or hear together two applications seeking the removal of a mayor and a councillor for alleged breaches of the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that one of the applications had already been fully argued and was no longer 'pending' as required by Rule 6.01.

Furthermore, the court held that the applications required individualized reviews of separate impugned votes, meaning there were no common material facts that would justify joinder or risk inconsistent judicial findings.

The defendant appealed a Master's order allowing an action to continue under Rule 48.14(13) of the Rules of Civil Procedure after delay.

The underlying action alleged negligence and breach of contract by an accountant relating to tax consequences of a U.S. real estate transaction, and involved a significant limitation period issue.

The Master found the plaintiffs provided a satisfactory explanation for post‑litigation delay and that no real prejudice to the defendant had been established despite the death of one plaintiff and the defendant’s health concerns.

On appeal, the court held the Master applied the correct legal principles governing delay and status hearings and committed no palpable or overriding error in assessing explanation and prejudice.

The appeal on the merits and the challenge to the costs decision were both dismissed.

The plaintiffs invested $50 million in a Russian oil and gas joint venture, relying on representations made by the defendants regarding the involvement of another major investor and the status of the corporate vehicles.

The plaintiffs later discovered that the corporate vehicles were sham public companies, the other investor had not funded its portion, and the defendants had engaged in stock manipulation and unauthorized issuance of free-trading shares.

The plaintiffs sued for deceit, breach of fiduciary duty, and unlawful conspiracy.

The defendants counterclaimed for breach of contract, inducing breach of contract, and malicious prosecution.

The Superior Court of Justice found several defendants liable for fraudulent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, and conspiracy, awarding substantial damages to the plaintiffs.

The defendants' counterclaim was dismissed in its entirety.

The plaintiffs were required to show cause at a status hearing why their professional negligence action against the defendant accountant should not be dismissed for delay under Rule 48.14(13).

The court applied the conjunctive test from Khan, requiring an acceptable explanation for the delay and no non-compensable prejudice to the defendant.

The court found the delay was adequately explained by the need to gather particulars, the death of a plaintiff, and the defendant's health issues.

Despite the defendant's health and the passage of time, the court found no non-compensable prejudice, noting the case relied heavily on documentary evidence.

The action was allowed to continue, with the condition that the defendant's discovery be conducted via written questions.