Aron Zaltz

The plaintiff, Joel Pilotte, sought production of Father Roy’s personnel file from the non-party Archdiocese of St.-Boniface, arguing its relevance to allegations of sexual assault and institutional knowledge of Roy’s history.

The court found the documents relevant to a material issue and ordered their production, emphasizing the need for a fair trial and the balancing of interests under Rule 30.10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiff, a party under disability, sued his former lawyers for professional negligence regarding the handling of his accident benefits claim.

The defendants brought a motion to remove the plaintiff's current law firm as counsel of record, arguing a conflict of interest because a lawyer from that firm had sworn an affidavit approving a prior settlement and would likely be a key witness.

The motions judge dismissed the removal motion.

On appeal, the Divisional Court set aside the decision and ordered the firm removed, finding the motions judge erred by failing to properly consider the scope of the conflict, the plaintiff's status as a party under disability, and the likelihood that the lawyer would be called as a witness.

The decision addresses a motion by Robyn Lynn Minifie for disclosure and production of documents from the Diocese’s investigation into allegations of sexual assault by Lawrence Paquette.

The court orders the Diocese to provide particulars of the investigation documents and affirms that a pre-trial conference brief is settlement privileged, requiring its destruction and removal from the court file.

The ruling clarifies the scope of settlement privilege and the process for challenging privilege claims in civil litigation.

The appellant appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision finding she did not sustain a catastrophic impairment from a motor vehicle accident.

The appellant argued the adjudicator misapplied the 'but for' test for causation regarding her psychological and behavioural impairments.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the adjudicator correctly applied the legal test for causation and that her conclusions were factual findings supported by the evidence.

The court also upheld the adjudicator's finding that the appellant failed to prove a marked impairment in three spheres of functioning.

The appellants, Brandon Book and his parents, appealed a trial judge's decision dismissing their motion to set aside a 2015 personal injury settlement.

They argued Brandon was under a disability at the time of settlement and that it was unconscionable.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, concluding there was no error in the capacity assessment and that the settlement should not be set aside, even if incapacity had been proven, given the principles of finality of judgments and the circumstances of the case.

This decision addresses the costs arising from three related motions in a professional negligence action.

The plaintiff sought to strike a portion of the statement of defence, while the defendants sought production of an unredacted affidavit and removal of plaintiff's counsel.

The court previously ruled that the improvident settlement defence should not be struck and ordered affidavit production (defendants successful on these two), and dismissed the motion to remove counsel (plaintiff successful).

The court determined that the motions should be viewed discretely, not collectively, for costs purposes.

Ultimately, the defendants were awarded net costs of $3,356.19, reflecting their success on two of the three motions.

In the context of Laurentian University's CCAA proceedings, a former student (BR) and the University of Sudbury sought to lift the stay of proceedings to pursue civil litigation regarding historical sexual assault allegations.

BR argued that her claim was exempt from the CCAA claims process under s. 19(2)(b)(i), which exempts awards of damages for sexual assault.

The court dismissed the motions, applying the Supreme Court's reasoning in Montreal (City) v. Deloitte Restructuring Inc. to hold that the s. 19(2) exception must be interpreted narrowly and only applies once an award of damages has actually been established.

Consequently, the claims must be determined within the CCAA Claims Process.

The moving parties sought to set aside an order dismissing their personal injury action on consent, arguing that the primary plaintiff was a person under disability at the time of the settlement and that the settlement was unconscionable.

The court found that the plaintiff had the capacity to understand the information relevant to the settlement and appreciate its consequences, and was therefore not under disability.

Furthermore, the court held that even if the plaintiff had been under disability, the circumstances did not warrant setting aside a final judgment four years later, especially where the defendant settled in good faith and the plaintiffs could not return the settlement funds.

The motion was dismissed.

The plaintiff's lawyers brought a motion to be removed from the record and for a charging order for disbursements, 19 days before a scheduled six-week personal injury trial.

The lawyers cited a breakdown in the relationship after the plaintiff refused to follow settlement advice.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that withdrawing so close to trial would severely prejudice the plaintiff and put him in a position of peril, contrary to the Rules of Professional Conduct.

The court also directed the lawyers to file redacted motion materials to protect solicitor-client privilege.

An employee sought long-term disability benefits from her insurer after being injured in an automobile accident.

The insurer denied her claim after two years, determining she no longer met the definition of "total disability" under the policy.

The employee filed a grievance under her union's collective agreement with her employer, which was settled.

She then commenced an action against the insurer for breach of contract and punitive damages.

The motion judge dismissed the action on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction, as the dispute arose from the collective agreement and was subject to exclusive arbitral jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the employee's entitlement to long-term disability benefits fell within the exclusive grievance and arbitration provisions of the collective agreement.

The appellant sued his former solicitor for professional negligence regarding a statutory accident benefits claim.

The solicitor sought production of documents from the appellant's subsequent infant settlement, which had been sealed by court order.

The motions judge granted the solicitor standing under Rule 38.11 to vary the sealing order and access the documents.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that a sealing order does not supplant the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The proper mechanism for the solicitor to seek production of the documents, and for the appellant to assert privilege, is the documentary discovery process under Rule 30, not a motion to vary the sealing order.

The plaintiff, D.S., brought a motion for default judgment against the defendant, Louis Omer Quesnelle, for damages arising from intentional torts of assault, sexual assault, and sexual interference committed when the plaintiff was a child.

The defendant had been criminally convicted for these acts.

The court found the defendant liable, ruling that the criminal convictions constituted proof of the intentional torts and that no limitation period applied.

The court awarded the plaintiff $400,000 in general damages and $1,533,416 in economic damages for past and future loss of earning capacity, but declined to award punitive damages given the defendant's prior penitentiary sentence.

The plaintiff moved to set aside a registrar's dismissal order for delay in a personal injury action.

The court applied the four-factor test from Habib v. Mucaj and Reid v. Dow Corning Corp., finding that while there were periods of unexplained delay attributable to counsel, the plaintiff himself was not at fault.

Crucially, the prejudice to the defendants due to a defendant's terminal illness was not solely attributable to the plaintiff's counsel's delay, as defendants' counsel also contributed to the delay and failed to mitigate prejudice by preserving evidence under Rule 36.01.

The motion was granted, and the dismissal order was set aside, with the action to be set down for trial by a specified date.

On appeal from a trial judgment in a personal injury case arising from a motorcycle accident, the appellants challenged the trial judge's decisions regarding collateral benefits deductions under the Insurance Act.

Specifically, they contested the trial judge's refusal to deduct an overpayment of income replacement benefits and short-term disability benefits from the jury's award.

The appellants argued that if successful on either issue, the respondent's judgment would fall below their Rule 49 settlement offer, warranting a costs adjustment.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decisions on both issues and dismissed the appeal.

This costs endorsement followed the dismissal of the plaintiff's action against the defendant insurer for long-term disability benefits, where the court found the matter fell within arbitral jurisdiction.

The defendant sought substantial indemnity costs of $17,233.80.

The plaintiff requested no costs or nominal costs, citing confusion from prior settlement minutes and ambiguity in the collective agreement and insurance policy.

The court, exercising its discretion under section 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, considered the moderate complexity of the jurisdictional issue, the importance of the matter to the defendant, and the plaintiff's circumstances.

The court awarded nominal costs of $2,500.00 to the defendant, excluding costs related to a motor vehicle accident or a companion action.

The defendant, Manulife Financial, brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's action for long-term disability benefits, arguing that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction as the claim arose from a collective agreement and was exclusively within arbitral jurisdiction.

The plaintiff contended the claim was inarbitrable due to the employer's lack of direct liability and discrepancies between the collective agreement's referenced plan (HOODIP) and the Manulife policy's definition of total disability.

The court applied the Weber test and the Brown and Beatty categories for arbitrability, finding that the collective agreement obligated the employer to provide LTD benefits, placing the dispute within category 2, making it arbitrable.

The motion to dismiss was granted.

During a civil jury trial for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident, the court ruled on whether questions regarding the plaintiff's future loss of income, future medical treatment, and future mileage expenses should be put to the jury.

The court found that the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidentiary foundation, such as vocational, occupational, or economic expert evidence, to support these claims.

Concluding that leaving these questions to the jury would invite speculation, the court ruled that the questions would not be put to the jury.