Aron Zaltz

The plaintiff moved to set aside a registrar's dismissal order for delay in a personal injury action.

The court applied the four-factor test from Habib v. Mucaj and Reid v. Dow Corning Corp., finding that while there were periods of unexplained delay attributable to counsel, the plaintiff himself was not at fault.

Crucially, the prejudice to the defendants due to a defendant's terminal illness was not solely attributable to the plaintiff's counsel's delay, as defendants' counsel also contributed to the delay and failed to mitigate prejudice by preserving evidence under Rule 36.01.

The motion was granted, and the dismissal order was set aside, with the action to be set down for trial by a specified date.

On appeal from a trial judgment in a personal injury case arising from a motorcycle accident, the appellants challenged the trial judge's decisions regarding collateral benefits deductions under the Insurance Act.

Specifically, they contested the trial judge's refusal to deduct an overpayment of income replacement benefits and short-term disability benefits from the jury's award.

The appellants argued that if successful on either issue, the respondent's judgment would fall below their Rule 49 settlement offer, warranting a costs adjustment.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decisions on both issues and dismissed the appeal.

This costs endorsement followed the dismissal of the plaintiff's action against the defendant insurer for long-term disability benefits, where the court found the matter fell within arbitral jurisdiction.

The defendant sought substantial indemnity costs of $17,233.80.

The plaintiff requested no costs or nominal costs, citing confusion from prior settlement minutes and ambiguity in the collective agreement and insurance policy.

The court, exercising its discretion under section 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, considered the moderate complexity of the jurisdictional issue, the importance of the matter to the defendant, and the plaintiff's circumstances.

The court awarded nominal costs of $2,500.00 to the defendant, excluding costs related to a motor vehicle accident or a companion action.

The defendant, Manulife Financial, brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's action for long-term disability benefits, arguing that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction as the claim arose from a collective agreement and was exclusively within arbitral jurisdiction.

The plaintiff contended the claim was inarbitrable due to the employer's lack of direct liability and discrepancies between the collective agreement's referenced plan (HOODIP) and the Manulife policy's definition of total disability.

The court applied the Weber test and the Brown and Beatty categories for arbitrability, finding that the collective agreement obligated the employer to provide LTD benefits, placing the dispute within category 2, making it arbitrable.

The motion to dismiss was granted.

The appellant insurer appealed an Arbitrator's decision finding that the respondent's election to opt out of Workplace Safety and Insurance Act benefits was not made primarily for the purpose of claiming statutory accident benefits.

The insurer argued that the respondent's tort claim in North Carolina was not viable due to contributory negligence and the involvement of an unidentified driver.

The Director's Delegate dismissed the appeal, holding that the Arbitrator's conclusions regarding the respondent's bona fide intent to pursue a tort claim were findings of fact supported by evidence, which an appellate body limited to reviewing errors of law cannot overturn.

During a civil jury trial for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident, the court ruled on whether questions regarding the plaintiff's future loss of income, future medical treatment, and future mileage expenses should be put to the jury.

The court found that the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidentiary foundation, such as vocational, occupational, or economic expert evidence, to support these claims.

Concluding that leaving these questions to the jury would invite speculation, the court ruled that the questions would not be put to the jury.