Aron Zaltz

The applicant sought statutory accident benefits following a motor vehicle accident but failed to submit the OCF-1 application within the 30-day timeline prescribed by section 32(5) of the Schedule.

The applicant argued that past traumas triggered by the accident rendered her mentally incapable of applying on time.

The Tribunal applied the Horvath factors and found the applicant's explanation was not credible, noting she had actively advocated for her health, attended numerous medical appointments, and successfully navigated other government support programs during the 19-month delay.

The application was dismissed as barred under section 55(1)1 of the Schedule.

The plaintiff, Joel Pilotte, sought production of Father Roy’s personnel file from the non-party Archdiocese of St.-Boniface, arguing its relevance to allegations of sexual assault and institutional knowledge of Roy’s history.

The court found the documents relevant to a material issue and ordered their production, emphasizing the need for a fair trial and the balancing of interests under Rule 30.10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiff, a party under disability, sued his former lawyers for professional negligence regarding the handling of his accident benefits claim.

The defendants brought a motion to remove the plaintiff's current law firm as counsel of record, arguing a conflict of interest because a lawyer from that firm had sworn an affidavit approving a prior settlement and would likely be a key witness.

The motions judge dismissed the removal motion.

On appeal, the Divisional Court set aside the decision and ordered the firm removed, finding the motions judge erred by failing to properly consider the scope of the conflict, the plaintiff's status as a party under disability, and the likelihood that the lawyer would be called as a witness.

The decision addresses a motion by Robyn Lynn Minifie for disclosure and production of documents from the Diocese’s investigation into allegations of sexual assault by Lawrence Paquette.

The court orders the Diocese to provide particulars of the investigation documents and affirms that a pre-trial conference brief is settlement privileged, requiring its destruction and removal from the court file.

The ruling clarifies the scope of settlement privilege and the process for challenging privilege claims in civil litigation.

The appellant appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision finding she did not sustain a catastrophic impairment from a motor vehicle accident.

The appellant argued the adjudicator misapplied the 'but for' test for causation regarding her psychological and behavioural impairments.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the adjudicator correctly applied the legal test for causation and that her conclusions were factual findings supported by the evidence.

The court also upheld the adjudicator's finding that the appellant failed to prove a marked impairment in three spheres of functioning.

The appellants, Brandon Book and his parents, appealed a trial judge's decision dismissing their motion to set aside a 2015 personal injury settlement.

They argued Brandon was under a disability at the time of settlement and that it was unconscionable.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, concluding there was no error in the capacity assessment and that the settlement should not be set aside, even if incapacity had been proven, given the principles of finality of judgments and the circumstances of the case.

This decision addresses the costs arising from three related motions in a professional negligence action.

The plaintiff sought to strike a portion of the statement of defence, while the defendants sought production of an unredacted affidavit and removal of plaintiff's counsel.

The court previously ruled that the improvident settlement defence should not be struck and ordered affidavit production (defendants successful on these two), and dismissed the motion to remove counsel (plaintiff successful).

The court determined that the motions should be viewed discretely, not collectively, for costs purposes.

Ultimately, the defendants were awarded net costs of $3,356.19, reflecting their success on two of the three motions.

The applicant requested a reconsideration of a decision finding he was not catastrophically impaired.

He argued the adjudicator made an error of law and violated procedural fairness by failing to properly apply the AMA Guides regarding concentration, persistence, and pace, as well as activities of daily living and social functioning.

The adjudicator dismissed the request, finding the original decision complied with the methodology in the Guides and that no significant legal or evidentiary mistake was made.

The applicant requested a reconsideration of a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision which found she did not sustain a catastrophic impairment as a result of a motor vehicle accident.

The applicant argued the adjudicator erred in law or fact by incorrectly applying the 'but for' test for causation regarding her psychological impairments.

The adjudicator dismissed the request, finding that the correct legal test for causation was applied and that the applicant failed to meet her burden of proof to show the accident was a necessary cause of her psychological impairments.

The adjudicator also found no error in the assessment of the applicant's impairments under the AMA Guides.

The applicant requested a reconsideration of a decision finding she did not meet the criteria for catastrophic impairment under s. 3(2)(f) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The applicant argued the adjudicator erred in law by treating a brain injury as a necessary element of the test, and erred in fact by misstating her expert's impairment rating.

The Tribunal dismissed the request, finding that the original decision did not add a brain injury requirement but merely noted the absence of one in evaluating the evidence.

Furthermore, the Tribunal confirmed that the original decision explicitly acknowledged the applicant's expert's Class 4 impairment rating but properly exercised its discretion to prefer the respondent's expert report.

The applicant sought statutory accident benefits following a 2017 motor vehicle accident, claiming catastrophic impairment due to psychological disorders.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal found that while the applicant suffered from accident-related post-traumatic stress disorder and major depressive disorder, these resulted in only moderate impairments in the activities of daily living and social functioning.

Consequently, the applicant did not meet the threshold for catastrophic impairment under Criterion 8.

The Tribunal also dismissed claims for attendant care benefits, finding them not reasonable and necessary based on orthopedic evidence of normal range of motion.

Claims for an attendant care assessment and various treatment plans were dismissed because the applicant had exhausted the $65,000 non-catastrophic funding limit.

The applicant was involved in a motor vehicle accident and sought statutory accident benefits, including a determination of catastrophic impairment due to a mental or behavioural disorder.

The respondent denied the benefits, arguing the applicant's psychological impairments pre-dated the accident.

The Tribunal found that the accident exacerbated the applicant's pre-existing condition, resulting in a marked class 4 impairment in her adaption to the workplace.

The Tribunal concluded the applicant was catastrophically impaired and awarded attendant care benefits of $931.57 per month, along with partial entitlement to claimed medical, rehabilitation, and examination expenses.

In the context of Laurentian University's CCAA proceedings, a former student (BR) and the University of Sudbury sought to lift the stay of proceedings to pursue civil litigation regarding historical sexual assault allegations.

BR argued that her claim was exempt from the CCAA claims process under s. 19(2)(b)(i), which exempts awards of damages for sexual assault.

The court dismissed the motions, applying the Supreme Court's reasoning in Montreal (City) v. Deloitte Restructuring Inc. to hold that the s. 19(2) exception must be interpreted narrowly and only applies once an award of damages has actually been established.

Consequently, the claims must be determined within the CCAA Claims Process.

The moving parties sought to set aside an order dismissing their personal injury action on consent, arguing that the primary plaintiff was a person under disability at the time of the settlement and that the settlement was unconscionable.

The court found that the plaintiff had the capacity to understand the information relevant to the settlement and appreciate its consequences, and was therefore not under disability.

Furthermore, the court held that even if the plaintiff had been under disability, the circumstances did not warrant setting aside a final judgment four years later, especially where the defendant settled in good faith and the plaintiffs could not return the settlement funds.

The motion was dismissed.

The applicant sought statutory accident benefits for psychological impairments sustained after rushing to the scene of a fatal motor vehicle accident to assist a pedestrian who had been struck.

The respondent denied the claim on the basis that the applicant was not an 'insured' who was 'involved' in an 'accident' under s. 3(1) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal dismissed the application, finding that the applicant was not involved in the accident, as he was sitting on a nearby patio when the collision occurred and only attended the scene after the use or operation of the vehicle had ceased.

The Tribunal rejected the applicant's argument that tort principles regarding rescuers should expand the definition of an accident under the Schedule.

The plaintiff's lawyers brought a motion to be removed from the record and for a charging order for disbursements, 19 days before a scheduled six-week personal injury trial.

The lawyers cited a breakdown in the relationship after the plaintiff refused to follow settlement advice.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that withdrawing so close to trial would severely prejudice the plaintiff and put him in a position of peril, contrary to the Rules of Professional Conduct.

The court also directed the lawyers to file redacted motion materials to protect solicitor-client privilege.

An employee sought long-term disability benefits from her insurer after being injured in an automobile accident.

The insurer denied her claim after two years, determining she no longer met the definition of "total disability" under the policy.

The employee filed a grievance under her union's collective agreement with her employer, which was settled.

She then commenced an action against the insurer for breach of contract and punitive damages.

The motion judge dismissed the action on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction, as the dispute arose from the collective agreement and was subject to exclusive arbitral jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the employee's entitlement to long-term disability benefits fell within the exclusive grievance and arbitration provisions of the collective agreement.

The appellant sued his former solicitor for professional negligence regarding a statutory accident benefits claim.

The solicitor sought production of documents from the appellant's subsequent infant settlement, which had been sealed by court order.

The motions judge granted the solicitor standing under Rule 38.11 to vary the sealing order and access the documents.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that a sealing order does not supplant the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The proper mechanism for the solicitor to seek production of the documents, and for the appellant to assert privilege, is the documentary discovery process under Rule 30, not a motion to vary the sealing order.

The applicant requested a reconsideration of a Tribunal decision that dismissed her claim for statutory accident benefits.

The applicant had slipped and fallen on ice while opening her car door.

The adjudicator originally found that the incident was not an 'accident' under the Schedule because the ice was the intervening and dominant cause of the fall, breaking the chain of causation.

On reconsideration, the applicant argued this finding was an error of fact and law.

The adjudicator dismissed the request, finding no error in the application of the causation test, the intervening causes analysis, or the dominant feature analysis.

The plaintiff, D.S., brought a motion for default judgment against the defendant, Louis Omer Quesnelle, for damages arising from intentional torts of assault, sexual assault, and sexual interference committed when the plaintiff was a child.

The defendant had been criminally convicted for these acts.

The court found the defendant liable, ruling that the criminal convictions constituted proof of the intentional torts and that no limitation period applied.

The court awarded the plaintiff $400,000 in general damages and $1,533,416 in economic damages for past and future loss of earning capacity, but declined to award punitive damages given the defendant's prior penitentiary sentence.