Andrew Wray

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal the interlocutory decision of Akazaki J. dated December 5, 2025.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

Costs were awarded to the responding parties in the agreed upon amount of $7,500, all inclusive.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the appeal of Colin Patrick Murphy, finding that the motion judge erred by compelling Murphy to testify during his own civil contempt proceedings, in violation of section 11(c) of the Charter.

The compelled testimony was improperly used to support a finding of contempt and to justify a sentence of incarceration.

The Court held that section 11(c) applies to civil contempt proceedings, including sentencing, and prohibits testimonial compulsion once contempt is alleged.

The finding of contempt for failing to produce deleted data and the sentence were set aside, and the matter was remitted for a new sentencing hearing on the admitted acts of contempt.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal the decision of Sutherland J. dated July 24, 2024.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the moving parties to pay costs in the amount of $4,520.56 to the responding party.

The appellants, suspected of defrauding the respondents of over US $71 million, entered into a settlement agreement requiring them to return assets in exchange for the respondents discontinuing various global civil proceedings.

The appellants brought a motion to compel the respondents to also withdraw Interpol Red Notices and discontinue criminal proceedings in Iran, or alternatively to set aside the settlement.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding the respondents only agreed to request the withdrawal of criminal proceedings, as they had no authority to unilaterally dismiss them.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's interpretation of the settlement agreement and dismissed the appeal.

The Plaintiff sought summary judgment to enforce an Agreement of Purchase and Sale for a residential property, claiming breach and seeking specific performance.

The Defendant sought summary judgment to dismiss the action, arguing no agreement was reached.

The court found that the parties never had a meeting of the minds (consensus ad idem) regarding an essential term, the "renovation clause" which was ambiguous and had different interpretations by each party.

Consequently, no valid contract was formed.

The Plaintiff's motion was dismissed, the action was dismissed, and the deposit was ordered to be returned to the Plaintiff.

The court also hypothetically addressed specific performance, finding the property unique.

The applicant requested to reactivate her human rights application, which had been deferred pending the conclusion of a grievance filed by her union.

The applicant argued the grievance was placed in abeyance after she rejected a settlement offer.

The respondents and the union opposed reactivation, stating the grievance remained active and had not been concluded or formally held in abeyance.

The Tribunal denied the request to reactivate, finding no basis under Rule 14.4 to proceed as the grievance process had not concluded.

In this costs endorsement following a wrongful dismissal trial, the plaintiff recovered modest damages well within the Small Claims Court monetary jurisdiction but sought substantial partial indemnity costs in the Superior Court.

The court held it was reasonable to commence the action in the Superior Court because the plaintiff had a bona fide fixed-term contract claim that, if successful, could have yielded damages of approximately $175,000.

The court rejected the defendant's submissions that the plaintiff should receive no costs, or should pay the defendant's costs, based on abandoned bad-faith allegations and the quantum recovered.

Partial indemnity costs of the trial and costs of the earlier security for costs motion were awarded to the plaintiff.

The plaintiff brought a wrongful dismissal action alleging he had a guaranteed five‑year fixed‑term employment contract and was dismissed after only eight months.

The employer denied any fixed‑term agreement and argued the employee resigned.

The court found that the parties formed an oral employment contract confirmed by email that did not include a five‑year guarantee, and that later documents referencing such a term were created primarily to assist the employee in obtaining mortgage financing and were unsupported by fresh consideration.

The court accepted the employee’s account that he had been dismissed during a heated confrontation rather than having resigned.

Damages were therefore limited to reasonable notice rather than the balance of a fixed term, and the court awarded two months’ notice damages.

The respondent submitted a claim for long-term disability benefits under a group insurance policy, which was denied.

After exhausting the internal appeal process, she commenced an action.

The insurer brought a motion for summary judgment, arguing the action was statute-barred under both the contractual and statutory limitation periods.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding the contractual limitation period ambiguous and that the statutory period began only when the final appeal was denied.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, agreeing the contractual language was unclear and deferring to the motion judge's factual finding on when the claim was discovered.

The Court also clarified that a group disability policy is not a 'business agreement' under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The applicant requested a six-month adjournment of the scheduled hearing dates due to the death of her father, which required her to travel out of the country.

The respondent opposed the request.

The Tribunal granted the adjournment but found a six-month delay unnecessary, instead directing that the hearing be rescheduled to commence in October 2014.

The applicant, a civilian manager of the Niagara Regional Police Service's Video Unit, applied to the Ontario Civilian Police Commission to be classified as a senior officer under s. 116 of the Police Services Act.

The application was opposed by the Niagara Regional Police Association.

The Commission applied the factors from the Metro Toronto Police Association decision to determine if the applicant was employed in a supervisory or confidential capacity under s. 114.

Finding that the applicant exercised significant responsibility, initiative, and supervisory duties over his unit and the Ontario Police Video Training Alliance, the Commission granted the application and ordered that he be classified as a senior officer.

The applicant employer sought judicial review of the Ontario Labour Relations Board's refusal to reconsider its decision certifying the respondent union.

The employer alleged that one of the employees had not signed a union membership card.

The Board denied the reconsideration request, citing the employer's delay and the fact that the Board had already returned the membership cards to the union.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Board's decision was reasonable and that it properly considered multiple factors, including delay, prejudice, and the loss of continuity of the evidence.

The applicant, a midwife, brought a motion for an order requiring the College of Midwives of Ontario to file the complete record of proceedings relating to an Inquiries, Complaints and Reports Committee (ICRC) decision about another midwife.

The applicant had made a mandatory report about the other midwife, and the ICRC decided to take no action but made critical comments about the applicant's report.

The applicant sought the record for her application for judicial review.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the ICRC did not exercise a statutory power of decision with respect to the applicant, and that the College was prohibited from producing the record under the confidentiality provisions of the Regulated Health Professions Act.