Althea Francis

The accused, Jun Peng Wu, pleaded guilty to possession of 60 kilograms of MDMA for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The drugs and pill presses were inherited from his late father and had been stored in his residence for nine years, with the accused having a general, but unacted upon, intention to sell them.

The Crown sought a sentence of three to five years' imprisonment, while the defence requested a conditional sentence.

The court, considering the unique circumstances of passive possession, the accused's belief in the drugs' diminished potency, his first offender status, and significant rehabilitation efforts, imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day.

The sentence included strict community conditions, a 10-year and lifetime firearms prohibition, and a DNA order, finding that denunciation and deterrence could be achieved without incarceration given the specific facts.

Luan Ngo was found guilty of producing methamphetamine, possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime over $5000.

The Crown sought an eight-year penitentiary sentence, while the defence sought four to five years.

The court imposed a global sentence of seven years in the penitentiary, with concurrent sentences for the other offences, finding it fit and appropriate given the large-scale operation, the accused's significant role, and the dangerous nature of the drug.

The court also considered the accused's status as a first offender and the efficient conduct of the trial as mitigating factors, alongside potential immigration consequences.

The appellant, Adam Kaup, appealed his convictions for drug possession and trafficking, arguing two main points: that the search warrant for his home was invalid due to insufficient grounds and misleading information in the Information to Obtain (ITO), and that the trial judge erred in finding he had constructive possession of drugs found in the basement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's decision.

The court found no error in the trial judge's assessment of the ITO, concluding that it provided sufficient grounds for the warrant when viewed holistically.

Regarding constructive possession, the court affirmed that the trial judge correctly applied the law, considering all circumstantial evidence beyond mere occupancy, and reasonably concluded that the appellant had knowledge and control of the drugs.

The Crown sought summary dismissal of five constitutional questions (NCQs) raised by Indigenous respondents charged with various cannabis offences.

The respondents claimed their lands were not part of Canada, that cannabis laws infringed their traditional rights and economic well-being, and that the laws were part of genocide/apartheid, and that the Crown failed in its duty to consult.

The court summarily dismissed four of the five NCQs, finding them non-justiciable or without reasonable prospect of success (sovereignty, genocide/apartheid, economic well-being).

The fifth NCQ, regarding traditional use and trade of cannabis/hemp under s. 35 of the Charter, was not summarily dismissed, but the court ordered further case management due to delays in expert reports.

The plaintiffs purchased a home in 2008 that subsequently experienced significant water infiltration problems.

They sued multiple parties, including the original builders and The Corporation of The Township of Clearview, alleging negligent construction and failure to inspect/enforce the Building Code.

Clearview Township brought a motion for summary judgment, arguing the action against it was statute-barred by the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court dismissed Clearview's motion, finding that the plaintiffs had raised a triable issue regarding the discoverability of the latent structural defect, as they had reasonably relied on various professionals who did not identify a structural defect until an engineer's report in May 2015.

The applicant, Ramy Musa, sought a de novo bail review after being detained on the tertiary ground for serious drug trafficking and firearms offences.

The court found a material change in circumstances, including a revised, highly stringent release plan and a re-evaluation of the carfentanil's street value, which permitted a de novo hearing.

However, after considering the apparent strength of the Crown's case, the extreme seriousness of the offences (possession of multiple loaded unauthorized firearms and trafficking lethal carfentanil), the circumstances of the commission, and the potential for a lengthy penitentiary term, the court concluded that releasing the applicant would undermine public confidence in the administration of justice.

Despite a strong proposed bail plan and lack of criminal record, the application for judicial interim release was dismissed, and the detention order maintained.

The appellant appealed a 54-month global sentence imposed following conviction for possession for purposes of trafficking methamphetamine, marijuana, and morphine, as well as simple possession of other controlled substances.

The appellant argued that the trial judge's reasons were inadequate, that the judge failed to consider relevant mitigating circumstances, improperly considered defence conduct as aggravating, and that the sentence was demonstrably unfit.

The appellate court found the trial judge's paramount concerns of denunciation and deterrence were appropriate, that mitigating factors were properly considered, and that the sentence was fit given the appellant's extensive criminal record spanning over three decades with approximately eight prior convictions for possession for purpose of trafficking.

Leave to appeal was granted but the appeal was dismissed.

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after police found drugs in a safe inside an apartment.

At the conclusion of the Crown's case, the defence moved for a directed verdict of acquittal.

The court applied the test for a directed verdict, finding that while there was some circumstantial evidence of control via a key found on a keychain used by the accused, there was no evidence from which a jury could infer the accused had knowledge of the cocaine hidden in the safe.

The motion was granted and a directed verdict of acquittal was ordered.

The accused, charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, brought an application seeking disclosure of the identity of a confidential source.

The accused argued the source acted as a police agent rather than a confidential informant by engaging in drug transactions during the investigation.

After applying the Garofoli Step 6 procedure and holding an in camera hearing, the court concluded the source acted solely as a confidential informant and was entitled to informer privilege.

The application was dismissed.

The accused were involved in a large-scale marijuana trafficking operation.

Following guilty findings based on Agreed Statements of Fact, the court proceeded to sentencing.

The primary sentencing principles of general deterrence and denunciation were emphasized, particularly given the commercial nature and significant profits involved.

The court rejected arguments to delay sentencing based on anticipated changes to marijuana laws, affirming the rule of law.

State misconduct in the investigation, while acknowledged, was deemed to have negligible impact on sentencing.

Credit was given for onerous bail conditions and the efficient conduct of the trial through Agreed Statements of Fact.

Conditional sentences were deemed inappropriate, with penitentiary sentences warranted for all accused.

The accused brought a motion for a stay of proceedings based on an alleged violation of the right to be tried within a reasonable period of time under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the total delay of 17.5 months, when reduced to account for neutral intake and institutional delay, resulted in 12.5 months of attributable delay—exceeding the Morin guidelines by 2.5 months.

The Crown was responsible for 3.5 months of unreasonable delay in providing essential disclosure, particularly the Information to Obtain (ITO) for the search warrant.

The court found that the accused suffered both inherent prejudice and real prejudice, including disruption to family court proceedings regarding custody and access to his children.

The court granted the stay of proceedings.

The applicant, charged with drug trafficking and money laundering, sought an order under s. 462.34 of the Criminal Code to access $271,100 in seized funds for living and legal expenses.

The court dismissed the request for living expenses, finding the applicant failed to prove he had no other means available.

However, the court granted access to the funds for reasonable legal expenses related to the preliminary inquiry, capping the amount at $60,000 and setting specific hourly rates for counsel.

The accused was sentenced for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking following a guilty plea.

A general warrant executed at his residence revealed involvement in methamphetamine production and drug trafficking.

The Crown and defence jointly recommended 15 months' incarceration.

The key issue was whether a sentence reduction should be granted for the accused's surrender of significant contraband items, including a machine gun, methamphetamine, ephedrine, and GBL, valued at approximately $165,000.

The court distinguished between cooperation with police that leads to arrests or investigations versus mere surrender of items, ultimately imposing a nine-month sentence with a six-month credit for the surrender.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application to quash an order that he stand trial on offences under the Excise Tax Act.

He argued that the joint representation of himself and his co-accused wife by the same counsel at the preliminary inquiry created a conflict of interest that breached the principles of natural justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant failed to demonstrate an actual conflict of interest at the preliminary inquiry stage or that his counsel's representation was compromised in a way that deprived him of a fair hearing.