Lauren C. Bale

The respondent father sought to vary a 2019 final order regarding parenting issues, including decision-making authority (especially education), parenting schedule, and incidents of parenting.

The applicant mother opposed significant changes.

The court found a material change in circumstances due to the child's declining academic performance under the mother's sole educational decision-making and the unabated high conflict between the parents.

The court reallocated decision-making authority, granting the father sole authority over educational issues and the mother retaining medical, dental, and therapeutic issues.

The parenting schedule was changed to an equal time regime, and detailed terms were ordered for holidays, travel, exchanges, and information sharing to reduce conflict and promote the child's best interests.

The applicant father brought a motion for an order compelling family therapy for his 16-year-old daughter, D, to support their relationship, which had deteriorated significantly.

The respondent mother and the Office of the Children's Lawyer, representing the child, opposed the motion.

The court dismissed the father's motion, giving considerable weight to the mature minor's strong and consistent opposition to forced therapy.

The court found that while it had jurisdiction to order therapy, the potential benefits did not outweigh the risks of exacerbating the child's physical and mental health issues, and that such an order would be practically unenforceable given the child's age and maturity.

The respondent mother brought an ex parte motion under the Children's Law Reform Act seeking an order to enforce a final parenting order from the Supreme Court of India, which had previously been recognized by the Ontario court.

The applicant father had failed to return the child to India and had subsequently obtained an ex parte emergency protection order in Illinois granting him physical care of the child.

The court dismissed the mother's ex parte motion, finding it inappropriate to conduct a best interests analysis to choose between conflicting foreign orders without notice to the father.

The dismissal was without prejudice to the mother returning to court after her pending motions in Illinois were determined or upon providing notice to the father.

The applicant mother and respondent father each brought motions following a case conference.

The respondent sought to set aside a procedural order granting the applicant leave to bring substantive motions, arguing inadequate notice.

The applicant sought interim child support, spousal support, and contribution to orthodontic expenses.

The court dismissed the respondent's motion, finding he had adequate notice of the case conference and the court had jurisdiction to make procedural orders.

The court granted the applicant's motion, ordering the respondent to pay interim Table child support of $1,769 per month, 70% of orthodontic expenses, and interim spousal support of $2,500 per month, which was adjusted downwards to account for the respondent's ongoing payment of the joint mortgage.

The Family Responsibility Office (FRO) initiated a default hearing seeking an incarceration clause against the payor for child support arrears.

The payor opposed the incarceration term, arguing his conduct did not meet the threshold of wilful and deliberate disregard required by appellate caselaw.

The court reviewed the payor's history of non-payment, periods of unemployment, and subsequent compliance with varied support orders.

The court found that despite historical defaults, the payor's recent voluntary compliance and lack of aggravating conduct did not warrant an incarceration term.

The FRO's request for an incarceration clause was denied, and the default application was dismissed on a without prejudice basis, allowing the FRO to re-commence proceedings if future defaults occur.

No costs were awarded due to divided success.

The applicant mother sought to vary a final joint custody order to grant her sole decision-making authority and reduce the respondent father's parenting time, citing ongoing conflict and communication issues.

The court dismissed the request for sole decision-making, finding that the conflict was largely driven by the mother's own unreasonable conduct and failure to adhere to the spirit of the existing order.

However, the court found a material change in circumstances regarding the regular parenting schedule due to the children's evolving views and the logistical issues causing conflict.

The court modified the schedule to reduce transitions and ordered an equal division of holiday time, including a week-about summer schedule.

The court also addressed extracurricular activities, child support, and the treatment of the children's RESP and bank accounts.

The moving party (former wife) brought a motion to change a 2013 final order for spousal support, seeking a retroactive and prospective increase, reinstatement of medical benefits, and additional life insurance/pension security.

She argued a material change in circumstances based on her increased medical needs and the payor's increased post-separation income.

The court found no compensatory basis to share in the payor's post-separation income increases and no evidence of increased medical expenses.

However, the court held that the eroding effect of inflation on the recipient's fixed income constituted a material change.

The court ordered the spousal support to be indexed annually to the Consumer Price Index, retroactive only to the date of effective notice in May 2019.

All other claims were dismissed.

In a child protection proceeding, the court held a focused hearing to determine whether three children were First Nations, Inuk or Métis children under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act.

The court found that the two older children were First Nations children based on their own self-identification and ancestral connection through their father.

The youngest child, who had a different father and no paternal Indigenous ancestry, was also found to be a First Nations child based on her sibling relationship with the older children, despite the court's concerns regarding the mother's standalone claim of Indigenous identity.

The Children's Aid Society brought a protection application regarding a six-year-old Indigenous child due to the mother's severe and ongoing alcohol abuse.

The child had been residing with the maternal grandmother under a voluntary safety plan.

The Society and the father sought to have the child placed in the father's care, while the mother sought to have the child remain with the maternal grandmother under a supervision order.

The court found the child in need of protection and determined that the mother had 'charge' of the child prior to intervention.

However, returning the child to the mother was unsafe.

The court concluded it was in the child's best interests to be placed in the custody of the father, who offered long-term stability and supported the child's Indigenous heritage.

A final custody order was granted to the father, with supervised parenting time for the mother and contact time for the maternal grandmother.

The payor brought a motion under Rule 25(19) of the Family Law Rules to set aside a Final Default Order that fixed his spousal support arrears at over $480,000 and ordered incarceration in the event of future default.

The payor argued he did not receive adequate notice of the remote default hearing and was unable to attend due to age and health concerns amid the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court applied the Mountain View Farms factors and found that the payor had received adequate notice, simply chose to ignore the proceeding, and failed to establish an arguable case on the merits regarding his inability to pay.

The motion was dismissed.

The applicant wife brought a motion for the production of expert business valuation and income reports, and for an order requiring the respondent husband to maintain life insurance as security for spousal support.

The parties had signed a marriage contract in 1991 waiving property and spousal support rights.

The court held that to order cost-prohibitive expert reports, the applicant must show it is more likely than not the contract will be set aside or overridden.

The court dismissed the request for business valuations, finding it equally possible the property provisions would be upheld.

However, the court ordered the production of an income report, finding it likely the spousal support waiver would be overridden under a Miglin analysis.

The request for life insurance was dismissed due to lack of evidence on insurability, but alternative security was ordered.

The Respondent mother sought a mistrial in a child protection proceeding after an off-record exchange was inadvertently broadcast in the virtual courtroom, raising concerns about an unknown third party and potential drug transactions.

The mother argued the judge became a compellable witness and the information was prejudicial.

The Society and father opposed, arguing against delay and that the judge could disabuse herself of the information.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the judge was not compellable, the information was not properly before the court, and the judge could disabuse herself of it.

The court emphasized that mistrials are a last resort and that continuing the trial was in the best interests of the child and the administration of justice.

The parties engaged in a high-conflict 12-day trial regarding parenting issues for their six-year-old child.

The father sought unsupervised access, the termination of a restraining order, and an order that the child be immunized.

The mother opposed, alleging domestic violence and seeking to maintain supervised access and her decision not to vaccinate.

The court found the mother had exaggerated and fabricated allegations of abuse and alienated the child from the father.

The court ordered a graduated schedule of unsupervised access for the father, terminated the restraining order, and ordered the mother to commence the routine immunization schedule for the child.

On a jurisdiction motion in a family proceeding, the court dismissed claims seeking custody, access, and child support relating to three adult children with disabilities where substantial prior litigation and operative orders existed in Bermuda.

The court held that under the Children's Law Reform Act it had no subject matter jurisdiction to make custody or access orders for adult children, and that any Ontario proceedings concerning personal care should instead proceed, if at all, under the Substitute Decisions Act in the proper court.

The court further held that Ontario lacked territorial competence over the support claim under the Family Law Act because a final Bermuda support judgment already addressed the same issues, the responding party had not attorned to Ontario, and comity, finality, and the real and substantial connection analysis weighed against a fresh Ontario application.

In the alternative, Bermuda was found to be the more appropriate forum, and amendment of the pleadings was refused.

The respondent father brought a motion seeking an order that the children attend in-person school or, alternatively, that he be granted equal parenting time to assist with their remote learning.

The applicant mother, who had de facto and legal custody, had enrolled the children in remote learning due to concerns about the COVID-19 pandemic and one child's history of asthma.

The court found no compelling evidence that the mother's decision was contrary to the children's best interests and declined to interfere with her decision-making authority.

The father's alternative request for equal parenting time was also dismissed, as a change in the learning platform did not justify altering the long-standing parenting regime.

The children's aid society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking an order to place three children in extended society care with no access to the respondent parents.

The court found no genuine issue for trial regarding the need for protection, citing chronic exposure to domestic violence and conflict in the home.

The children were ordered into extended society care.

The court granted summary judgment denying access to one father who had no relationship with his child.

However, the court found a genuine issue for trial regarding access for the mother and the other father, directing that issue to a focused hearing.

The Respondent sought costs arising from two motions: a long motion that settled and an urgent motion where the Respondent was wholly successful.

For the long motion, the court found divided success and awarded modest costs to the Respondent.

For the urgent motion, the Applicant was found to have acted in bad faith by failing to remove a Certificate of Pending Litigation as agreed and ordered, misleading parties, and obstructing the property sale.

This conduct led to a full indemnity costs award for the Respondent.

The Applicant's arguments regarding the Respondent's unreasonable behavior and her limited financial means were given limited weight.

The respondent mother sought an urgent temporary order for unsupervised access to the child, K.L.J., and police enforcement of access.

The applicant father opposed, raising concerns about the mother's lifestyle, past conduct, and the child's development, arguing for continued supervision.

The court found the matter urgent due to the complete cessation of contact between the mother and the vulnerable child.

It rejected the father's arguments for supervised access, finding insufficient evidence of safety concerns, and ordered immediate unsupervised access for the mother on alternate weekends and a mid-week overnight.

The request for police enforcement was declined.

The Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Hamilton applied for a secure treatment order for the child O.O., who consented to the placement.

The court, proceeding in writing due to COVID-19, reviewed the application under Part VII of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017.

It applied the six guiding principles for secure treatment applications, modified to reflect the child's consent.

The court found that all six criteria under s. 164(1) of the CYFSA were met, including O.O.'s mental disorder, recent and chronic self-harm/harm to others, the efficacy and availability of treatment at Roberts Smart Centre, and the lack of less restrictive alternatives.

The court granted the order for 180 days of secure treatment, emphasizing O.O.'s best interests and continuity of care.

The respondent father brought a motion to change a final order that had terminated his access to his two children due to a history of emotional abuse, harassment, and anger issues directed at the applicant mother and witnessed by the children.

The court applied the two-stage test from Gordon v. Goertz, finding that the father failed to demonstrate a material change in circumstances.

Despite engaging in minimal psychiatric consultation and an anger management course, the father lacked insight into his past abusive behavior, continued to blame others, and did not adequately address his mental health issues.

The court dismissed the motion to reinstate access but ordered the parties to use an online communication platform for child-focused information exchange and restricted the father from bringing further variation applications for 15 months without leave.