Cornelius Alfred Brennan

Following a split decision on motions, the defendant sought $1,500 in costs for responding to relief the plaintiffs abandoned during submissions.

The plaintiffs argued for no costs, citing financial hardship.

The court ordered the plaintiffs to pay $500 in costs for the abandoned claims, but deferred payment until the final disposition of the action to avoid creating a barrier to the proceedings.

The defendant brought a motion for costs thrown away after the plaintiffs' counsel cancelled examinations for discovery in August 2020 for personal reasons, and after the defendant aborted rescheduled discoveries in November 2020.

The plaintiffs brought a cross-motion to compel the defendant to attend discovery.

The court ordered the plaintiffs' counsel to personally pay $400 in costs thrown away for the August cancellation.

However, the court found the defendant was not justified under Rule 34.14(1) in aborting the November discoveries due to the plaintiff's alleged lack of preparation.

Both parties were ordered to reattend examinations for discovery.

The respondent father brought a motion to change a final order that had terminated his access to his two children due to a history of emotional abuse, harassment, and anger issues directed at the applicant mother and witnessed by the children.

The court applied the two-stage test from Gordon v. Goertz, finding that the father failed to demonstrate a material change in circumstances.

Despite engaging in minimal psychiatric consultation and an anger management course, the father lacked insight into his past abusive behavior, continued to blame others, and did not adequately address his mental health issues.

The court dismissed the motion to reinstate access but ordered the parties to use an online communication platform for child-focused information exchange and restricted the father from bringing further variation applications for 15 months without leave.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a finding that three children were in need of protection and an order placing them in extended society care.

The parents opposed the motion, arguing there were genuine issues for trial.

The court found no genuine issue for trial regarding the protection finding, as the evidence of the parents' substance abuse, inadequate supervision, and the children's needs clearly established they were in need of protection.

However, the court found a genuine issue for trial regarding disposition, as the mother had obtained housing, completed rehabilitation, and proposed a plan of care that could not be summarily dismissed.

The matter was remitted for trial on disposition.

This endorsement addresses the costs of a summary judgment motion where the plaintiffs, Regan Maureen Brennan and Cornelius A. Brennan, successfully defended against a motion brought by Jake Rowntree.

The plaintiffs sought substantial indemnity costs.

The court found that while success is a presumptive factor for costs, the plaintiffs failed to justify a substantial indemnity award, making partial indemnity the appropriate scale.

Crucially, the court determined that Cornelius Brennan, a co-plaintiff and lawyer who acted for his daughter, Regan Brennan, could not claim costs for his services as he did not demonstrate an "opportunity cost" by foregoing remunerative activity, a requirement for self-represented litigants (including lawyers acting for themselves or closely aligned parties).

Consequently, the court declined to award costs for legal services, granting only disbursements.

Jake Rowntree brought two motions for summary judgment to dismiss negligence and occupiers liability claims against him arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The claims stemmed from an incident where Regan Brennan, who had alcohol addiction issues, consumed Rowntree's alcohol without permission at his residence and was subsequently asked to leave, later being involved in an accident while intoxicated.

The court dismissed the summary judgment motions, finding a genuine issue requiring a trial due to the absence of crucial evidence from a key witness, Jeff Mailoux, which prevented a fair and just determination of foreseeability and proximity for a duty of care.

A trial decision addressing custody, access, child support, and spousal support following an application by the mother to modify a separation agreement.

The parties had shared joint custody with a three-day rotation since separation in 2012.

The mother sought sole custody or primary residence; the father sought to maintain joint custody with a week-about schedule.

The court maintained joint custody but modified the time-sharing arrangement to provide the mother with most school nights to facilitate homework assistance, while the father retained significant weekend time.

The court ordered child support under the shared custody provisions of the Child Support Guidelines and awarded spousal support for a seven-year term.

The applicant mother brought a motion for summary judgment regarding child support and the distribution of proceeds from the sale of jointly owned property.

The respondent father claimed he was unable to work or pay child support due to a bout of encephalitis, but provided insufficient medical evidence to support an ongoing inability to work.

The court found the father voluntarily left his employment as a truck driver and was intentionally under-employed.

The court imputed income to the father at $66,000 per year, calculated child support arrears, and ordered the applicant to be reimbursed for expenses incurred to prepare the joint property for sale.

The Children's Aid Society of Haldimand and Norfolk brought a summary judgment motion seeking an order that three children be made wards of the Crown without access to their biological parents.

The respondent parents had a lengthy history with child protection services dating back to 2007, involving domestic violence, alcohol abuse, and failure to cooperate with service providers.

The children had been in and out of Society care multiple times.

The mother conceded that the children should be made Crown wards but sought ongoing access.

The father opposed Crown wardship but did not present a viable alternative plan.

The court granted summary judgment, finding that the children continued to be in need of protection and that Crown wardship without access was in their best interests, particularly given the need for permanency planning through adoption.

The Children's Aid Society brought summary judgment motions in two child protection applications concerning two young children.

The respondent mother opposed the motions and sought a trial.

The court found that the children were in need of protection due to the mother's ongoing marijuana use, inability to maintain a safe home, mental health concerns, financial instability, lack of cooperation with the Society, and inconsistent access attendance.

The court granted summary judgment and made the children Crown wards without access to facilitate adoption by their current kin caregivers, finding that the mother had not demonstrated sufficient change over three years to rebut the Society's prima facie case.

The municipality brought a motion seeking appointment as receiver of a property owned by the respondents in order to evict residential tenants and enforce compliance with the Building Code Act after prolonged non‑compliance with court orders.

The respondents had previously been ordered to vacate the building, cease renting residential units, and bring applications before the Landlord and Tenant Board to terminate tenancies, but repeatedly failed to comply and continued to collect rent and conduct unauthorized construction.

Evidence showed ongoing building code violations posing health and safety risks to tenants and continued contempt of court orders.

The court found that the respondents had been given numerous opportunities over an extended period to purge their contempt but had failed to bring the property into compliance.

Relying on its jurisdiction under s. 101 of the Courts of Justice Act, the court appointed the municipality as receiver for the limited purpose of bringing eviction applications and ensuring compliance with safety requirements.