Kirk Frederick Stevens

The appellants appealed a trial judgment awarding damages arising from a fatal motor vehicle accident.

The appellants argued the trial judge erred in finding the respondent was the deceased's 'spouse' under the Family Law Act, as they had not 'moved in' together three years prior to the accident.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that 'living together in a conjugal relationship' is a flexible, unitary concept and maintaining separate residences does not preclude a finding of cohabitation.

The court also upheld the trial judge's refusal to reduce damages for contingencies, as no evidence was led on that issue.

The appellants, representing the estate of a party under disability, sought to enforce a $3.1 million settlement of an accident benefits claim.

The settlement was reached prior to the party's unexpected death but had not yet received court approval as required by Rule 7.08(1).

The application judge ruled the settlement unenforceable, finding court approval was a true condition precedent.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the settlement was a binding agreement suspended pending approval.

Upon the party's death, the protective need for court approval ceased, and the contractual right to the settlement devolved to her estate, making the agreement enforceable.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment, arguing the trial judge misapprehended the date he signed an agreed statement of facts admitting his children were in need of protection, and that an interim custody order was fraudulently obtained.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the date error immaterial as the appellant signed the statement while represented by counsel and his claim of duress was rejected.

The court also found the interim custody order was made on consent while the appellant was represented by counsel, and he had knowledge of it shortly after.

The insurer appealed a jury verdict awarding the insureds compensatory and punitive damages following a fire that destroyed a commercial building.

The insurer had denied the claims based on arson, misrepresentation, and fraud.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge misdirected the jury on the law of misrepresentation and the interpretation of a 'shut down' exclusion clause.

The Court also set aside the jury's $1.2 million award for loss of profits as unsupported by evidence, and found the $2.5 million punitive damages award to be grossly excessive.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following the appellants' substantial success on appeal.

The court determined the appropriate quantum of costs to be awarded.

Costs were fixed and awarded to the appellants in the amount of $10,000, inclusive of GST and disbursements.

The respondent was sexually assaulted by an ultrasound technician at a private clinic.

The technician performed unauthorized tests and surreptitiously videotaped her.

At trial, a jury found the clinic negligent and vicariously liable, awarding substantial damages.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal set aside the finding of negligence against the clinic, concluding it was plainly unreasonable.

However, the Court upheld the finding of vicarious liability, determining that the clinic's enterprise materially increased the risk of the assault.

The Court also significantly reduced the general and aggravated damages from $175,000 to $25,000, finding the jury's award excessive.

The respondents brought a medical malpractice action against several doctors, alleging a failure to diagnose the deceased's ovarian cancer.

The trial judge found the appellant gynaecologists liable for failing to detect the cancer when they treated her for pelvic inflammatory disease.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by ignoring evidence that the deceased did not return to see one of the appellants, establishing a break in the chain of causation, and dismissed the claim against her.

For the other appellant, the Court found the trial judge made contradictory findings regarding the visual appearance of the ovaries during a laparoscopy and failed to properly assess expert evidence on cancer survival rates.

The appeal was allowed, the judgment set aside, and a new trial ordered for the remaining appellant.

The appellants appealed a jury verdict dismissing their action against the police services board, alleging errors in the trial judge's jury charge regarding sections 8, 9, and 12 of the Charter, as well as appealing the costs award.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the jury instructions and noting that the trial was essentially about credibility, which the jury resolved in favour of the respondent.

The court also upheld the trial judge's costs award, finding no basis to interfere with his discretion under Rule 49.

The respondent was injured when the top of a utility pole erected by the appellant municipality snapped during a windstorm and struck his vehicle on the highway.

The trial judge found the municipality liable in negligence and awarded damages.

On appeal, the municipality argued the action was barred by the limitation periods in sections 284(2) and 284(3) of the Municipal Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that section 284(3) only applies when a vehicle leaves the highway, and section 284(2) did not apply because the claim was properly framed in negligence rather than non-repair.

The trial judge's inference of negligence and assessment of evidence were also upheld.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following an appeal.

Costs were awarded against the appellant on a partial indemnity basis.

The respondents were awarded a total of $70,000, distributed as $20,000 to the plaintiff, $30,000 to one set of defendants, and $20,000 to another set of defendants.

The applicant, a lobbyist and lawyer, sought judicial review of a Commissioner's order in a public inquiry.

The Commissioner ordered that sealed boxes of the applicant's documents be reviewed by Commission counsel for relevance and potential solicitor-client privilege, with unresolved privilege claims to be determined by a Superior Court judge.

The applicant argued this procedure violated his Charter rights against unreasonable search and seizure.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the screening process minimally impaired solicitor-client privilege and that Commission counsel was not in an adversarial position.

The Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce appealed a trial judgment setting aside postponement agreements that had elevated its mortgage to first priority over Maple Valley Acres Limited's mortgages.

The trial judge found the agreements were induced by a misrepresentation made by a sub-agent acting within the scope of his authority for the Bank.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, confirming the rescission of the agreements and the restoration of mortgage priorities based on misrepresentation and unjust enrichment.

The Court also upheld a Sanderson costs order against the Bank but allowed a cross-appeal by third-party solicitors who had been improperly denied their costs at trial.

Mothers Against Drunk Driving Canada (MADD Canada) brought a motion for leave to intervene as a friend of the court in an appeal concerning social host liability for drunk driving.

The underlying case involved a plaintiff who was seriously injured by an intoxicated driver who had left a party hosted by the defendants.

The court granted the motion, finding that the appeal involved broad public policy considerations regarding whether to recognize a novel duty of care.

The court held that MADD Canada could make a useful contribution to the policy analysis without causing injustice to the parties, despite its alignment with the plaintiffs' position.

The appellant surgeon appealed a finding of negligence after he mistakenly cut the respondent's aorta during a laparoscopic hiatus hernia operation.

The trial judge drew an inference of negligence from circumstantial evidence, rejecting the appellant's explanations of medical misadventure.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings or inference-drawing process.

The respondent was rendered a partial quadriplegic after diving off a groyne into shallow water at a public beach.

The trial judge apportioned liability 75% to the respondent and 25% to the appellant city for failing to post warning signs.

The city appealed, arguing the trial judge made a palpable and overriding error regarding the location of warning signs at another beach and erred in finding a duty to warn and causation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that the city breached its duty of care as an occupier and that a warning sign would have deterred the respondent.

The respondent was completely successful on appeal.

The Court of Appeal awarded the respondent its costs of the appeal on a partial indemnity basis, fixed at $14,000 plus disbursements and applicable GST.

The appellant, Clarica Trust Company, appealed a motion judge's decision that a crossclaim by the respondent, Reemark Sterling I Limited, was not barred by cause of action estoppel or abuse of process.

The crossclaims arose from a prior action involving a bank, where it was determined that Mutual Trust (Clarica's predecessor) breached a financing commitment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that Reemark and the bank had independent causes of action, and it was not an abuse of process for Reemark to advance its claim separately.

Furthermore, the court held that it would be an abuse of process to permit Clarica to re-litigate the issue of liability which had already been determined against it in the prior action.

Following the release of the main judgment, the court received written submissions on costs.

The appellant achieved substantial success on the appeal and was entitled to costs.

However, the court reduced the appellant's bill of costs by $15,000 for widening the scope of the appeal with unsuccessful compensatory damages issues, by $15,000 for excessive factum preparation time, and by $4,364 for excessive counsel fees.

Costs were fixed at $56,770.77 on a partial indemnity scale.

The respondent's dairy barn and livestock were destroyed in a fire.

The appellant insurer paid over $1.17 million under the policy but disputed other aspects of the claim, including loss of livestock, loss of earnings, and damage to silos.

At trial, the jury awarded the respondent an additional $488,389 in compensatory damages and $750,000 in punitive damages for the insurer's breach of its duty of good faith.

The insurer appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, setting aside the punitive damages award.

The Court held that while the insurer breached its duty to act fairly and in good faith by failing to promptly pay amounts it reasonably believed were owing, its conduct was not so outrageous or extreme as to warrant punishment.

The respondent employee was seriously injured in a motor vehicle accident after leaving an office Christmas party where alcohol was served at an unmonitored open bar.

At trial, the judge discharged the jury on grounds of complexity and publicity, and found the employer 25% liable for the respondent's damages.

The employer appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge erred in law by discharging the jury based on his own difficulty in explaining the law, and erred in his analysis of causation by failing to consider evidence that the respondent was not inebriated when she left the party and by failing to address the assumptions underlying the toxicologist's opinion.