Impaired driving

The accused was found guilty of impaired driving causing bodily harm after a single motor vehicle collision that resulted in life-altering injuries to her passenger.

The Crown sought an 18-month custodial sentence, while the defence sought a conditional sentence.

The court considered the recent Bill C-5 amendments that made conditional sentences available for this offence.

Despite the serious aggravating factors and the paramount objectives of denunciation and deterrence, the court found that a 21-month conditional sentence with strict house arrest and GPS monitoring was appropriate due to the accused's young age, significant rehabilitation efforts during pandemic-related delays, and history of trauma.

A 3-year probation order and a driving prohibition were also imposed.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a conveyance and possession of MDMA.

During a traffic stop, the original driver moved to the backseat and persuaded the highly intoxicated accused to move into the driver's seat.

The court found that the accused failed to rebut the presumption of care or control under section 320.35 of the Criminal Code, as it was equally likely he entered the driver's seat to put the vehicle in motion.

The court also found that his actions created a realistic risk of danger.

The accused was found guilty of both charges.

The accused was charged with impaired operation and operating a conveyance with a blood alcohol concentration over 80mg.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging breaches of his ss. 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) rights due to the officer's failure to make an approved screening device (ASD) demand promptly and failure to provide rights to counsel at the roadside.

The court dismissed the Charter application, finding that the accused's own actions of repeatedly exiting his vehicle allowed the officer to form grounds for an impaired driving arrest before an ASD test could be administered.

The court found the accused guilty of both charges based on the cumulative evidence of impairment, entering a conditional stay on the impaired operation conviction.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction decision dismissing two applications alleging breach of the right to be tried within a reasonable time following impaired driving and over 80 charges.

The appeal focused on whether the trial judge wrongly attributed part of the delay to the inherent time requirements of the case rather than institutional delay.

Applying the pre-Jordan s. 11(b) framework, the court held that the trial judge did not err in assigning two months for trial preparation and in limiting the later period of institutional delay where defence availability and defence-driven applications contributed to adjournment.

Given aggregate institutional delay of about 9.5 to 10 months and minimal prejudice, the appeal was dismissed.

The accused pleaded guilty to impaired driving causing death, impaired driving causing bodily harm, driving over 80, and breach of an undertaking.

While on bail for a previous impaired driving charge and bound by a condition not to consume alcohol, the accused drove with a blood alcohol concentration over three times the legal limit.

He drove in the wrong lane on a highway, colliding head-on with a vehicle driven by an 18-year-old, killing him, and then colliding with another vehicle, injuring its driver.

The court accepted a joint submission, sentencing the accused to 5 years in prison and imposing a 10-year driving prohibition, emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles' decision to indefinitely suspend his driver's licence following his third impaired driving conviction.

The applicant argued that his first conviction, which occurred when he was a youth, could not be used to calculate the suspension under the Highway Traffic Act due to the provisions of the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

He also argued that the Registrar was estopped from imposing the indefinite suspension because he had previously received an erroneous notice of a three-year suspension and a notice of eligibility for reinstatement.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no conflict between the provincial and federal legislation, and holding that the doctrines of public estoppel and legitimate expectations cannot override the Registrar's mandatory statutory duty to suspend the licence.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level over the legal limit.

At trial, the defendant brought a Charter motion arguing his s. 10(b) right to counsel of choice was violated.

The arresting officer's field notes indicated the defendant asked for a specific lawyer, but her typed report stated he had no preference and was fine with duty counsel.

Due to the material inconsistency and the officer's lack of independent recollection, the court found a s. 10(b) violation.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the breathalyzer evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision that ordered a new trial on the basis that the trial judge's reasons for dismissing the charges did not meet the requirements of R. v. Sheppard.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's reasons were sufficient to explain why the traffic stop was arbitrary and violated s. 9 of the Charter.

The trial judge had accepted the appellant's evidence and rejected the officer's testimony regarding the reason for the stop.

The Court of Appeal restored the order dismissing the charges.

The Crown appealed a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision upholding the respondent's acquittal on a charge of operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit.

The trial judge had excluded the breath readings under s. 8 of the Charter, finding the police officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds because the approved screening device had not been calibrated within departmental guidelines.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge applied the wrong test by effectively requiring the Crown to prove the device was in good working order rather than assessing whether the officer had reasonable grounds on an objective basis.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his total sentence of 43 months imprisonment for two sets of offences, including impaired driving and driving while disqualified.

The appellant had a lengthy record with eight prior convictions for drinking and driving.

The Court of Appeal upheld the global sentence as fit but found the sentencing judge erred in denying two-for-one credit for pre-sentence custody due to an adjournment requested by the appellant's counsel.

The appeal was allowed in part to reduce the sentence on the second impaired driving charge by 1.5 months to reflect the proper pre-sentence custody credit.

The appellant was acquitted at trial after the trial judge excluded evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding the appellant had a realistic opportunity to consult counsel during the delay in obtaining an approved screening device.

The summary conviction appeal judge overturned the acquittal.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the summary conviction appeal judge erred by retrying the case, as the trial judge applied the correct test and her findings were entitled to deference.

The appeal was allowed and the acquittal restored.

The appellant appealed his custodial sentence for an impaired driving offence that resulted in a collision with a motorcyclist whose leg was amputated.

The appellant had a very high blood alcohol level, was driving without insurance, and breached a zero-alcohol licence condition.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly concluded that general deterrence required a custodial sentence rather than a conditional sentence.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal court's order requiring it to pay $12,000 in costs to the respondent.

The respondent had successfully avoided a minimum jail sentence for impaired driving after the summary conviction appeal court stayed the sentence, despite finding the minimum penalty provision constitutional.

The summary conviction appeal court awarded costs against the Crown, characterizing the appeal as a test case.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and set aside the costs order, finding that the appeal was not a test case as the respondent had a vital personal interest in avoiding incarceration, and there was no Crown misconduct to justify the award.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving, arguing the trial judge erred in preferring the opinion evidence of five Crown witnesses based on their past experience with impaired drivers.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no prejudice because all opinion and observational evidence, along with the appellant's admission of drinking, supported a conclusion of impairment, and there was no defence evidence to the contrary.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction appeal decision that allowed a Crown appeal and ordered a new trial.

The central issue was the sufficiency of an information to obtain a warrant following a single-car accident where the appellant had consumed alcohol.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the summary conviction appeal judge that the information was sufficient based on the totality of the circumstances, including an anonymous tip about erratic driving and evidence of alcohol consumption.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for impaired driving, dangerous driving, and assault with intent to resist arrest.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal regarding the driving offences, finding no error by the summary conviction appeal judge.

However, the Court allowed the appeal on the assault charge, holding that the appellant's act of pulling his arm away to disengage from police officers did not constitute an assault in law, though it likely amounted to an offence under s. 129 of the Criminal Code.

The conviction for assault resisting arrest was set aside.

The appellant appealed his convictions for driving over eighty, dangerous driving, and impaired driving.

He argued that the police violated his s. 8 Charter rights by placing Centre of Forensic Sciences seals on vials of his blood, which had been drawn for medical purposes, prior to obtaining a search warrant.

He also argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the issue of bolus drinking.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the brief sealing of the vials did not interfere with the appellant's spatial, physical, or informational privacy interests and thus did not constitute an unreasonable seizure.

The court also found the jury charge on the burden of proof regarding bolus drinking was sufficient.

The Crown appealed an acquittal entered by a summary conviction appeal court judge, who had overturned the respondent's conviction for 'over 80' while having care or control of a motor vehicle.

The respondent had driven her vehicle into a ditch and subsequently consumed more alcohol before police arrived.

The trial judge rejected her evidence of post-offence drinking and found she had care or control of the operable vehicle.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, finding that the summary conviction appeal judge erred by substituting his own findings of fact regarding care or control and credibility, and by faulting the trial judge's application of the W.D. test.

The conviction and sentence were restored.

The appellant was convicted of operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 milligrams.

At trial, a toxicologist testified that based on the appellant's reported consumption, an average person would have registered below the legal limit, but a slow eliminator could register over the limit.

The trial judge convicted the appellant, and the summary conviction appeal judge dismissed the appeal.

On further appeal, the Court of Appeal held that expert evidence relying on population averages, without establishing the appellant's actual elimination rate, is impermissible speculation and does not constitute evidence tending to show the appellant's blood alcohol was below the legal limit.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant pleaded guilty to criminal negligence causing death, failing to comply with a recognizance, impaired driving, and driving while suspended after striking and killing two pedestrians while highly intoxicated.

The trial judge imposed a total sentence of 12 years, reduced by 18 months for pre-trial custody.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the nine-year sentence for criminal negligence causing death as fit given the severe aggravating factors.

However, the Court found the total sentence of 12 years was a marked departure from customary sentences and varied the total sentence to 10 years.

The Court also held that the sentence for impaired driving should be served concurrently, not consecutively, with the criminal negligence sentence.