Firearm possession

The Crown appealed a conditional sentence of two years less a day imposed on the respondent for possession of a loaded prohibited firearm.

The respondent had discharged the firearm during a shootout in a public parking lot.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred in principle by prioritizing rehabilitation over denunciation and deterrence, and that the sentence was demonstrably unfit.

However, the majority dismissed the appeal and declined to incarcerate the respondent, citing his significant rehabilitative progress and the time already served under the conditional sentence.

On a pre-trial Charter motion arising from a firearm arrest in a parking lot, the applicant alleged racial profiling, unlawful investigative detention, unlawful search, and breaches of the right to counsel.

The court found that racial profiling played a role in the officer’s detention decision, rendering the detention contrary to s. 9 and the satchel search contrary to s. 8, while finding no s. 10(a) breach and a qualified s. 10(b) breach.

Applying the Grant framework, the court held the Charter-infringing conduct was serious, had a serious impact on the accused’s protected interests, and required exclusion of the firearm and ammunition evidence despite society’s interest in adjudication on the merits.

With the Crown electing to call no evidence, the charges were dismissed.

The accused was arrested near the Rideau Canal after officers believed he was smoking marihuana and later found drugs, cash, a folding knife, and a loaded handgun in a satchel.

The court found multiple pre-arrest Charter breaches, including improper attempts to search the accused's fanny pack and failures to comply with ss. 10(a) and 10(b), but held those breaches did not lead to the discovery of the impugned evidence and therefore did not justify exclusion under s. 24(2).

The arrest for marihuana possession and the subsequent search incident to arrest were held lawful.

The accused was convicted on multiple drug, firearm, and recognizance-breach counts, but acquitted on the proceeds count and the folding-knife counts.

The accused, charged with firearm possession offences, brought a Charter application challenging an investigative detention and search based on a confidential-source tip describing a group of Black males at a large apartment building, one allegedly armed.

The court held that the accused was detained from the moment an officer physically stopped him and told him to stop, and that the available tip information was too generalized and insufficiently particularized to amount to reasonable suspicion.

Because the detention was arbitrary, the incidental search was unreasonable, and the police also breached the accused’s right to counsel both by failing to advise immediately and by eliciting a statement after he requested duty counsel.

Applying the Grant s. 24(2) framework, the court found the first two factors strongly favoured exclusion and ordered the firearm, ammunition, and statement excluded.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearm offences and his sentence.

At trial, the judge rejected the testimony of a defence witness who claimed ownership of the firearm found in the car driven by the appellant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessment.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed.

The sentencing judge erred by refusing to grant credit for harsh presentence custody conditions (lockdowns) despite agreement between the parties that such credit was warranted.

The Court granted 75 days of additional credit.

The appellant appealed his convictions for various firearm offences, including possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, arising from a traffic stop where a handgun was found in the back of his vehicle.

The appellant argued that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence regarding his movements in the vehicle and rendered an unreasonable verdict regarding his knowledge and control of the firearm.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's factual findings were supported by the record and that it was open to the trial judge to infer that the appellant knew the loaded gun was in his car.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for firearm offences.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence in rejecting his testimony.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge made one factual error, it was not material to the conviction.

On the sentence appeal, the Court agreed that the sentence for unauthorized possession should be concurrent, not consecutive, to the sentence for possession of a loaded restricted firearm.

The Court upheld the trial judge's calculation of presentence custody credit, noting the appellant's poor conduct in custody negated the quantitative rationale for enhanced credit.

The total sentence was reduced from six to five years.

The applicant brought a Garofoli application seeking exclusion under s. 24(2) of the Charter of a firearm, ammunition, drugs, and identification seized during execution of a search warrant at his residence.

The court held that, although the redacted ITO alone did not sufficiently link the firearm to the residence, the Step 6 judicial summary of the unredacted material established that the confidential informer information was compelling, credible, and corroborated by police investigation.

Applying the deferential Garofoli review standard, the court concluded the authorizing justice could have issued the warrant.

The applicant failed to establish a breach of s. 8, and the exclusion application was denied.

The appellant appealed his conviction for firearm possession and his sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury's verdict was reasonable based on circumstantial and DNA evidence linking the appellant to a gun thrown from a room.

The sentence appeal was allowed to grant enhanced credit for pre-trial custody at a ratio of 1.5 to 1, applying the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. Summers, which reduced the sentence by two months.

The appellant appealed sentence after the trial judge imposed a term exceeding the statutory maximum for unlawful possession of a firearm under s. 91 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown conceded the error.

The court held that, applying the proper sentencing range and taking account of fresh evidence of the appellant's institutional progress, a sentence of 45 months was appropriate before credit for pre-trial custody.

Applying enhanced credit under Summers, the court reduced the sentence to 17 months while maintaining the ancillary orders.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of a handgun, arguing that the trial judge erred in her correcting instruction to the jury.

During closing submissions, defence counsel improperly gave evidence by stating that if the appellant had touched the gun, his fingerprints would definitely be on it.

The trial judge corrected this by instructing the jury that there was no evidence on how often fingerprints are left on firearms, but went further to state that the jury could not reason that the absence of prints meant the appellant could not have handled the gun.

The Court of Appeal held that this final sentence improperly deprived the appellant of the ability to argue that the lack of fingerprint evidence raised a reasonable doubt.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The accused was arrested during a high-risk takedown based on information from a confidential informant and police observations of a suspected drug transaction.

A search incident to arrest revealed drugs and a loaded firearm.

The accused applied to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, arguing his ss. 8 and 9 rights were violated because police lacked reasonable grounds for the arrest.

The court found the arrest for firearm possession was unlawful, breaching ss. 8 and 9, but admitted the evidence under s. 24(2) because the police acted in good faith and the evidence was highly reliable.

The court also ruled the accused's utterances to police were voluntary and admissible.