Edward Royle

The accused faced an eight-count indictment arising largely from intercepted communications obtained under a lawful wiretap authorization.

He pleaded guilty to conspiracy to traffic in marijuana, while the remaining counts proceeded to a judge-alone trial.

The Crown alleged conspiracies to commit robbery, offers to transfer firearms and ammunition, and possession of a firearm and ammunition discovered during a police search.

The court held that the intercepted conversations demonstrated discussions about criminal conduct but did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had entered into an actual agreement to commit robbery or had made genuine offers to transfer firearms or ammunition.

The court also found insufficient evidence of control over the firearm and ammunition located in another residence.

The accused was convicted only on the count to which he pleaded guilty and acquitted on the remaining counts.

The appellant appealed a conviction for failing to appear under s. 145 of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge rejected the appellant’s explanation that he mistakenly attended the wrong courthouse and then attempted to travel to the correct location.

The appeal court held that the trial judge erred by assessing the appellant’s evidence in isolation and by failing to consider corroborating evidence from the appellant’s mother, whose credibility was acknowledged by the Crown.

This omission constituted both a misapprehension of evidence and a failure to consider relevant evidence on a material issue.

The conviction was set aside and an acquittal entered.

The accused brought an application under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms alleging breach of the right to be tried within a reasonable time on charges of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of heroin, and dangerous driving.

The overall delay from charge to trial was approximately 40½ months, with almost 16 months of institutional delay following committal to trial in the Superior Court.

Applying the framework from Morin and related authorities, the court considered the length of delay, reasons for delay, lack of defence waiver, and inferred prejudice.

The court found that the institutional delay significantly exceeded the constitutional guidelines and that the Crown failed to prioritize the matter after an earlier trial date was not reached.

Balancing the interests of the accused and society, the court concluded that the delay was unreasonable and infringed s. 11(b).