Abuse of process

The moving party brought a second motion under Rule 59.06 to reopen a 2016 decision of the Divisional Court that dismissed her appeal from a professional discipline decision.

The court issued a notice under Rule 2.1, noting the motion appeared contrary to the finality principle and res judicata.

Finding the moving party's response asserting undisclosed 'new evidence' to be frivolous, the court dismissed the motion as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, and ordered that she be prohibited from bringing further steps without prior judicial permission.

The landlord brought a motion to quash the tenants' appeal of a Landlord and Tenant Board eviction order and to lift the automatic stay.

The tenants had persistently failed to pay rent and their notice of appeal did not state any grounds of appeal.

The Divisional Court granted the motion, finding that the appeal was manifestly devoid of merit as it raised no questions of law, and constituted an abuse of process designed solely to delay eviction.

The appellant, a defendant in a defamation action, appealed a motions judge's decision refusing her leave to amend her statement of defence.

The motions judge had found the proposed amendments were properly pleaded and caused no prejudice, but concluded the motion itself was an abuse of process because the appellant had previously sought broad disclosure without particularizing her defence.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that Rule 26 is broadly permissive and the motion to amend was not an abuse of process, as the amendments were integral to the defence and caused no prejudice.

The court permitted the amendments but upheld the motions judge's adverse costs award against the appellant for her prior litigation conduct.

The appellant, a lawyer acting on his own behalf, sought to appeal orders made in two family law proceedings involving different mothers and children.

The respondents and intervenors requested that the appeal be dismissed under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The Divisional Court found that the appeal was a clear attempt to relitigate matters that had already been determined years prior and contained scandalous allegations against a judicial officer and opposing counsel.

The court dismissed the appeal proceedings as an abuse of process.

The landlord appealed a decision of the Landlord and Tenant Board dismissing his application to terminate a 40-year tenancy for his son's use.

The Board had found the application was a collateral attack on previous orders and an abuse of process.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Board has residual discretion to apply res judicata and properly found the new application, which relied on the son's willingness to testify in person as a 'new circumstance', was an abuse of process.

The applicant commenced two applications for judicial review of decisions made by the Social Benefits Tribunal.

The Tribunal requested that the applications be dismissed under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing the applicant failed to exhaust his statutory appeal rights.

The Divisional Court directed the registrar to issue a notice to the applicant under Rule 2.1.01, giving him an opportunity to explain why the applications should not be dismissed as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process, and stayed the proceedings in the interim.

The landlord appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision which found the Board had exclusive jurisdiction over the tenants' application for rent abatement.

The landlord had previously commenced a Superior Court application for unpaid occupancy fees, and the tenants subsequently applied to the Board for rent abatement due to alleged lack of heat.

The Divisional Court held that the Board erred in law by concluding it could not decline jurisdiction and by failing to consider whether the tenants' application was an abuse of process.

The Court found that allowing the Board application to proceed would lead to duplicative proceedings and inconsistent findings, as the tenants were raising the exact same issues as a set-off defense in the Superior Court action.

The appeal was allowed and the tenants' Board application was dismissed as an abuse of process.

The tenants appealed two orders of the Landlord and Tenant Board, including a consent eviction order and a refusal to extend the time to pay rent arrears.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law in the Board's orders and noting that the appeal was filed out of time.

The Court concluded that the appeal was an abuse of process intended solely to obtain an automatic stay of eviction and allow the tenants to remain in the property without paying rent.

The self-represented applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision dismissing her complaint against two Children's Aid Societies.

The court issued a notice under Rule 2.1.01, noting the complaint appeared to be a collateral attack on Superior Court child protection decisions.

After providing the applicant two opportunities to respond, the court found her responses failed to address the collateral attack issue and dismissed the application as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The applicant appealed a decision of the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board (HPARB), which had upheld the dismissal of his complaints against certain doctors.

The tribunal had found the complaints incapable of proof and likely related to delusions.

The court issued a notice under Rule 2.1.01 to determine if the appeal should be dismissed as frivolous or vexatious.

After reviewing the applicant's response, the court concluded that the appeal should not be dismissed at this stage due to the opacity of the tribunal's reasons.

A case management teleconference was ordered, and the individual respondents were excused from participating at this stage.

The landlord brought a motion to dismiss the tenants' application for judicial review under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The tenants had a history of failing to pay rent, breaching a consent order, and commencing multiple proceedings to delay eviction without appearing at hearings.

The court found the application was frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, as the Divisional Court lacks jurisdiction to judicially review an order of a Superior Court Judge or the Landlord and Tenant Board.

The application was dismissed, and no costs were ordered.

The self-represented applicant sought judicial review of WSIAT decisions regarding claims previously pursued through multiple appellate courts.

WSIAT sought to be added as a party and to move to quash or dismiss the application as an abuse of process.

The court scheduled a motion for WSIAT to be added as a party and to seek dismissal of the application.

The self-represented plaintiff persisted in pursuing two appeals despite the underlying dismissal order having been set aside.

The Divisional Court directed the Registrar to issue a notice under Rule 2.1.01 requiring the plaintiff to show cause why his appeals should not be dismissed as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The court also required the plaintiff to explain why he should not be precluded from further access to the courts without prior permission, noting his abusive communications and an action commenced against a Superior Court judge.

The applicant, a self-represented litigant, was given notice that the court was considering dismissing his application under Rule 2.1.01.

Despite directions to provide a list of decisions he sought to review, the applicant responded with voluminous documents, abusive emails, and failed to state a case within the court's jurisdiction.

The court dismissed the application as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, without prejudice to the applicant filing a properly drafted notice.

The self-represented appellant appealed a decision of the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board (HPARB), which had dismissed his appeal from the Inquiries, Complaints and Reports Committee (ICRC) regarding complaints against several doctors.

The ICRC and HPARB had dismissed the claims summarily as frivolous, vexatious, and related to faulty perceptions.

The Divisional Court directed the Registrar to issue a notice under Rule 2.1.01, giving the appellant 15 days to provide written submissions as to why the appeal should not be dismissed for the same reasons.

The moving defendants sought an extension of time to seek leave to appeal an order that quashed their motion to set aside a Mareva injunction.

The defendants had initially appealed to the Court of Appeal, which quashed the appeal on the basis that the order was interlocutory.

The Divisional Court applied the four-factor test for extending time and found that the delay was significant, the proposed appeal lacked merit due to issue estoppel and abuse of process, and there was a risk of prejudice to the plaintiff.

The motion for an extension of time was dismissed.

The appellant massage therapist appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee revoking his certificate of registration for professional misconduct, including sexual abuse of a patient.

The appellant argued the investigation was procedurally unfair, there was undue delay, and the Committee erred in its credibility assessments.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that any initial procedural unfairness was cured, there was no evidence of prejudice from delay, and the Committee's credibility findings were reasonable and entitled to deference.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal refusing to reconsider his appeals, claiming $101 million in damages.

The respondent requested the application be dismissed under Rule 2.1.01.

The court noted the applicant had previously exhausted all appeals and judicial reviews regarding these decisions, and that claiming damages on judicial review is outside the court's jurisdiction.

The court directed the registrar to issue a notice to the applicant that it is considering dismissing the application as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process, and stayed the proceeding pending the outcome.

The landlord brought a motion to quash the tenant's appeal of an eviction order granted by the Landlord and Tenant Board for the landlord's own use.

The tenant raised several grounds of appeal, including denial of legal representation, lack of jurisdiction, and bad faith.

The Divisional Court found that the appeal raised issues of fact rather than law, attempted to introduce new issues not raised before the Board, and was brought solely for the purpose of delay.

The motion was granted, the appeal was quashed, and the tenant was ordered to vacate the premises.

The appellant, previously declared a vexatious litigant, appealed a decision dismissing his application for permission to proceed and to set aside the vexatious litigant order.

The Divisional Court quashed the appeal, noting that section 140(4)(e) of the Courts of Justice Act explicitly bars appeals from a refusal to grant such relief.

Additionally, due to the appellant's serial abuse of the court process, the court ordered that he may not apply for or accept a fee waiver in any future proceeding without first obtaining a judge's order.