Abuse of process

The applicant commenced a proceeding that was substantially identical to a prior proceeding dismissed by the Divisional Court as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The court issued a notice under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure indicating its intention to dismiss the proceeding and restrict the applicant's access to the courts.

Finding that the applicant's allegations were not grounded in objective reality and that the litigation was the product of mental illness, the court dismissed the proceeding under Rule 2.1.

The court also ordered that the applicant may not commence or continue any legal proceedings in the Superior Court of Justice without prior written permission from a judge.

The landlord moved to quash the tenant's appeal of a Landlord and Tenant Board eviction order.

The tenant had accumulated over $50,000 in rent arrears and filed an appeal alleging evidentiary and procedural errors by the Board.

The Divisional Court quashed the appeal, finding it was manifestly devoid of merit as it failed to raise any extricable question of law.

The court also found the appeal was an abuse of process brought solely to delay the eviction, as evidenced by the tenant's correspondence boasting about using the appeal process to halt enforcement.

The landlord brought a motion to lift the statutory stay of a Landlord and Tenant Board eviction order pending the tenant's appeal.

The tenant had not paid rent for 16 months, accumulating over $30,000 in arrears, and failed to comply with a court direction to pay ongoing rent.

The court found that it would be an abuse of process to allow the tenant to continue living in the unit rent-free pending the appeal.

The motion was granted and the stay was lifted.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an interlocutory procedural order regarding amendments to a statement of claim.

The court issued a notice under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, considering whether to dismiss the motion as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

Noting the moving party's history of numerous dismissed proceedings and the fundamental flaws in the current motion, the court dismissed the proceeding under Rule 2.1.

The court also imposed terms requiring the moving party to obtain permission before commencing further proceedings or seeking fee waivers in the Divisional Court.

The tenant appealed orders of the Landlord and Tenant Board, resulting in an automatic stay of eviction.

The court directed the tenant to pay ongoing rent and a portion of arrears as a condition of continuing the appeal.

The tenant failed to make any payments and failed to perfect the appeal.

The landlords brought a motion to quash the appeal.

The court found the tenant's failure to pay rent or move forward with the appeal constituted an abuse of process, quashed the appeal, and lifted the stay.

The appellant tenants appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board (LTB) order terminating their 24-year tenancy and evicting them so the landlord husband could occupy the unit following a marriage breakdown.

The respondent landlords brought a motion to quash the appeal.

The Divisional Court granted the motion, finding the appeal was manifestly devoid of merit because it raised questions of fact and mixed fact and law, rather than questions of law alone as required by s. 210(1) of the Residential Tenancies Act.

The court quashed the appeal but exercised its discretion to delay the eviction date to allow the tenants time to find new accommodations.

The court held a case management conference to address five appeals brought by a tenant against eviction orders for five different rental units.

The tenant had a history of seeking adjournments due to alleged illness while subletting the units for profit and accumulating substantial rent arrears.

The court ordered that two appeals would be dismissed as abandoned if not perfected, scheduled motions to quash the remaining three appeals, and ordered the tenant to pay all arrears in full as a condition of maintaining the stays of eviction.

The moving party, who was not a party to the main application, brought a motion under s. 21(5) of the Courts of Justice Act to review directions that declined to schedule his motion to stay the application.

The court initiated a Rule 2.1 process to consider dismissing the review motion as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process, because the underlying application had already been dismissed on consent.

The moving party challenged the Rule 2.1 process and sought the judge's recusal.

The court declined to recuse itself and dismissed the review motion under Rule 2.1, finding it was a clear case of abuse of process as the motion sought to stay a proceeding that no longer existed.

The applicant, a crypto asset trading platform, sought judicial review of an investigation order and summons issued by the Ontario Securities Commission.

The applicant argued the investigation was precluded by a prior undertaking and constituted an abuse of process, and that the summons violated section 8 of the Charter.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the undertaking contained an express reservation of rights that permitted the investigation.

The court declined to decide the Charter issue, holding it should first be raised before the Commission.

The applicant commenced an application for judicial review to challenge the quantum of a costs order made against it on a jurisdiction motion.

The applicant had previously appealed the jurisdiction decision to the Court of Appeal, which dismissed the appeal and rejected allegations of bias against the motion judge.

The respondent requested that the application be dismissed under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application as an abuse of process, finding that the applicant failed to pursue its statutory right to seek leave to appeal the costs order and was attempting to re-litigate bias allegations already decided by the Court of Appeal.

The appellant sought to appeal a Superior Court decision that dismissed his application as an abuse of process.

The Divisional Court directed the parties to provide submissions on whether the appeal should be dismissed under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal under the Courts of Justice Act, as the order appealed from was final and should have been directed to the Court of Appeal.

Alternatively, the court found the appeal to be frivolous and vexatious on its face, as it sought to relitigate matters already adjudicated in prior proceedings.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant sought judicial review of an interim order by the Animal Care Review Board regarding the removal of 41 cats from her home.

The court issued a notice under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, considering whether to dismiss the application as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The court found the application was moot because the Board had already decided not to dismiss the applicant's appeals and had scheduled further hearings to address her constitutional issues.

The court also found the application premature, as it challenged an interim order before the administrative proceedings were completed.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The appellant landlord appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision finding that the respondent tenant's lease was residential, not commercial.

The landlord had locked the tenant out for non-payment of rent, claiming the Commercial Tenancies Act applied.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the landlord could not oust the Board's jurisdiction by unilaterally locking the tenant out.

The court further found no error of law in the Board's application of section 202 of the Residential Tenancies Act to ascertain the real substance of the transaction, despite the lease being labeled commercial.

The responding party filed an application for judicial review challenging the policies and procedures of the moving party police service, following an access to information request for police records.

The moving party brought a requisition under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss the application.

The court found the application was frivolous on its face because it sought to review an Information and Privacy Commissioner decision rather than a decision of the police service, and because unspecified policies and procedures cannot be judicially reviewed.

The request was granted and the application against the police service was dismissed.

The appellant corporation, represented by a non-lawyer, sought to appeal a costs order and a merits order dismissing its claim.

The Divisional Court issued a notice under Rule 2.1.01 considering dismissing the appeal as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process because the appellant failed to seek leave to appeal the costs order and the merits order exceeded the court's monetary jurisdiction.

The appellant declined to provide substantive submissions in response to the notice.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant consistently disregarded the applicable rules.

Following the dismissal of her application as frivolous and vexatious under Rule 2.1, the self-represented applicant repeatedly emailed the court and the judge directly, demanding explanations and information on how to appeal or complain.

The court issued an endorsement clarifying that the decision was a final disposition appealable with leave to the Court of Appeal.

Due to the applicant's repeated vexatious communications, the court directed that all future communications from her be sent to a judge and that ordinarily no response will be provided.

The moving party brought a motion to quash an application for judicial review of an interlocutory disclosure decision made by the Capital Markets Tribunal.

The applicants sought to review the Tribunal's dismissal of their motion for additional disclosure, which they argued was necessary for their upcoming stay motions.

The Divisional Court granted the motion to quash, finding that the application was premature and that the applicants failed to demonstrate exceptional circumstances warranting early intervention in the ongoing administrative proceedings.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision dismissing her discrimination and reprisal application against her former employer.

The HRTO had found that the applicant signed a full and final release during a mediation, and that allowing the application to proceed would be an abuse of process.

The Divisional Court dismissed the judicial review, finding that the HRTO's procedural rulings were fair, its credibility assessments were entitled to deference, and its overall decision was reasonable.

The appellant, a licensed professional engineer, appealed a Discipline Committee decision finding him guilty of professional misconduct for providing engineering services to the public without a certificate of authorization and for breaching an agreement not to provide outside services while employed by the respondent.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Discipline Committee made no palpable and overriding errors in its factual findings.

The Court also confirmed that under the Professional Engineers Act, all licensed professional engineers require a certificate of authorization to offer or provide services to the public.

Finally, the Court rejected the appellant's arguments regarding procedural unfairness, bias, and abuse of process.

The applicant, previously declared a vexatious litigant, sought leave under s. 140(3) of the Courts of Justice Act to proceed with an application against the respondent municipality.

The applicant sought an order allowing him to construct a religious memorial on his mother's grave that exceeded the municipality's by-law size limits.

The court found that the application was an abuse of process, as it attempted to relitigate the exact same issues and claims that had been dismissed in multiple previous proceedings.

The application for leave to proceed was dismissed.