O'Brien

The plaintiffs' home was severely damaged by a fire while undergoing renovations.

The plaintiffs alleged the fire was caused by the spontaneous combustion of stain-soaked rags left by the defendant painting subcontractor, and sought to hold the general contractor vicariously liable.

The court found that the plaintiffs failed to prove the cause of the fire on a balance of probabilities, accepting the painter's evidence that he did not leave rags in the home and noting that electrical arcing could not be ruled out as a cause.

The court declined to draw an adverse inference against the defendants for failing to call another fire investigator.

The action was dismissed, though damages were assessed at $1,348,939.91 in the alternative.

The plaintiff brought a motion in writing for default judgment against his former employer for wrongful dismissal.

The court first determined that the action was not statute-barred because the limitation period was suspended under the Emergency Management and Civil Protection Act due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court noted the defendant in default and found the plaintiff was entitled to damages in lieu of reasonable notice.

Applying the Bardal factors, the court awarded a 20-month notice period, resulting in damages of $91,667.00, without deductions for mitigation income as the employer failed to meet its burden of proof.

The plaintiffs brought a motion requesting the court to exercise its inherent jurisdiction to reconsider a previous decision that stayed their action in favour of arbitration.

The plaintiffs argued that the Consumer Protection Act, 2002 invalidated the arbitration clause.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the failure to consider the Consumer Protection Act was not a clear error that would have changed the outcome, as it was not obvious the plaintiffs were protected consumers or that their claims fell within the scope of the Act's protections.

Furthermore, the interests of justice did not compel reconsideration because the defendants had no notice of the statutory argument during the original motion.

The plaintiff franchisee brought a motion for summary judgment seeking rescission of a franchise agreement under the Arthur Wishart Act due to inadequate disclosure.

The franchisor's disclosure document failed to include recent financial statements, providing only unaudited statements from over two years prior.

The court found this deficiency amounted to a complete lack of disclosure, entitling the plaintiff to rescind the agreement under s. 6(2) of the Act.

The court also found the individual defendants to be 'franchisor's associates' and dismissed the defendants' counterclaim.

The plaintiffs commenced an action against the supplier and local dealer of materials and design for a cottage, alleging negligence and breach of warranty due to significant wood rot.

The defendant supplier brought a motion to stay the action, relying on an arbitration clause in its standard form Purchase and Sale Agreement.

The court applied the competence-competence principle and the analytical framework from Haas v. Gunasekaram, finding an arguable case that the arbitration agreement existed, bound the parties, and covered the dispute.

The court rejected arguments that the arbitration clause was unconscionable or that the local dealer's filing of a defence precluded a stay.

The motion was granted and the action was stayed in favour of arbitration.

The statutory third party insurer brought a motion for summary judgment, arguing the defendant driver was excluded from coverage because he was engaged in a 'race' or 'speed test' when he caused a fatal collision while driving up to 215 km/h.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that excessive speed alone does not constitute a race or speed test under the Insurance Act.

The court held that the driver lacked the intention to test the speed of the vehicle or engage in a contest, and therefore the insurer remained liable to compensate the plaintiffs.

The respondents brought a motion to set aside an order granted to the applicant during a telephone case conference that the respondents failed to attend.

The underlying dispute involved a commercial sublease and a $350,000 payment.

The court applied the factors under Rule 38.11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and found that the respondents failed to attend due to insufficient notice during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court also found that the respondents moved forthwith to set aside the order and had an arguable defence on the merits.

The motion was granted and the order was set aside.

The parties made written submissions regarding the form of the Order following a judgment on an appeal and a costs endorsement.

The self-represented respondents approved the form of the Order but raised other concerns, including a schedule for the payment of costs.

The court found that the respondents' concerns did not relate to the form or content of the Order and signed the Order as drafted by the appellant, adding a provision that it is enforceable without formal entry.

The applicant sought to add the respondent's former counsel as parties to an application and compel them to disclose information regarding ongoing litigation pursuant to an assignment agreement.

The respondent had previously breached a court order to provide this information.

The court allowed the motion to add the law firms as parties, finding it legally tenable and necessary to adjudicate effectively.

The court ordered the law firms to disclose the factual information required by the assignment agreement, exercising its equitable jurisdiction to make orders against non-parties to prevent the facilitation of a party's defiance of a court order.

However, the court refused to order the disclosure of broader information protected by solicitor-client privilege, finding no implicit waiver of privilege in the assignment agreement.

The defendants requested a review of the plaintiff's Statement of Claim under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found the claim, which alleged the defendants attempted to sell land to the plaintiff that the plaintiff had already purchased, appeared frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process on its face.

The court directed the registrar to give notice to the plaintiff that it is considering dismissing the action and stayed the proceeding pending the outcome of the written hearing.

The defendants brought a motion to strike the plaintiffs' Statement of Claim as an abuse of process.

The plaintiffs, two cancer researchers, had previously been investigated by the hospital for research misconduct, resulting in the closure of their lab.

They challenged these decisions through multiple administrative appeals and judicial reviews.

The court found that the civil claim, which alleged bad faith, conspiracy, and breach of contract, raised the same factual and substantive issues that were or could have been litigated in the administrative proceedings.

The motion was granted and the action was dismissed as an abuse of process.

The moving defendants sought partial summary judgment to dismiss the action against them regarding a three-vehicle intersection collision.

The collision occurred when a northbound driver made a left turn in front of a southbound driver (the moving defendant), causing a collision that subsequently struck the plaintiff's stopped vehicle.

The court found partial summary judgment appropriate and used its fact-finding powers to determine liability.

The court apportioned 90% liability to the left-turning driver and 10% liability to the moving defendant for failing to slow down when approaching the intersection with an obstructed view.

The appellants appealed a Master's decision allowing the respondents to select the appellants' in-house counsel as their representative for examination for discovery.

The in-house counsel also had carriage of the fraud action on behalf of the appellants.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding that while in-house counsel are not shielded from discovery, requiring counsel of record to attend would be oppressive as it would inevitably prevent him from continuing as counsel, thereby interfering with the appellants' choice of counsel.

The respondents were ordered to select another representative.

The plaintiff, an 83-year-old woman, brought an ex parte motion for a Mareva injunction to freeze the contents of a safe deposit box held by her daughter-in-law.

The plaintiff had loaned her son and daughter-in-law over $300,000, of which approximately $205,000 remained unpaid.

The plaintiff sought to prevent the daughter-in-law from selling a valuable diamond ring located in the safe deposit box before returning to California.

The court found a strong prima facie case and satisfied the five-part test for a Mareva injunction, granting the order on an interim basis.