Aoife Quinn

The appellant landlord appealed the dismissal of its application for a declaration that a long-term commercial lease had expired and for ancillary relief on the basis that the tenant was overholding.

The appellant argued that the tenant's failure to obtain timely Planning Act approval brought the lease to an end and precluded further renewals.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the application judge's analysis, holding that the tenant had continued to take appropriate steps to obtain the necessary approval and that the renewals were permitted subject to such approval.

Fresh evidence motions were dismissed as irrelevant to the appeal outcome, and leave to appeal the $225,000 costs award was denied.

The plaintiff, a 54-year-old investment advisor with 24 years of service, was dismissed without cause.

During discovery, the defendant learned the plaintiff had copied confidential client emails to a personal USB key and alleged after-acquired cause.

The court found the misconduct was a lapse in judgment that did not warrant dismissal.

The court awarded a 24-month notice period and damages for lost commissions.

However, the court dismissed the plaintiff's claims for damages for the lost opportunity to sell her book of business, finding she failed to prove she would have retired and sold it during the notice period, and dismissed her claim for bad faith damages.

The plaintiff, an investment banker, sued his former employer for wrongful dismissal and unpaid compensation.

The employer counterclaimed, alleging the plaintiff breached non-competition and non-solicitation clauses by joining a competitor.

The court found that the parties entered into two successive binding employment contracts.

The court made specific findings on how the plaintiff's variable compensation should be calculated under the second contract.

The court awarded the plaintiff $10,000 in punitive damages because the employer improperly withheld amounts admittedly owed to him.

The employer's counterclaim was dismissed in its entirety, as the restrictive covenants were found to be overly broad, unreasonable, and unenforceable.

The defendants moved to strike the plaintiff's 60-paragraph statement of claim, which alleged a broad conspiracy of mortgage fraud involving numerous parties and properties.

The court struck the claim in its entirety under Rule 25.11, finding it unduly prolix, confusing, and likely to prejudice a fair trial.

However, the court granted the plaintiff leave to re-plead specific, legally viable claims related to her own property, while denying leave to re-plead claims that constituted a collateral attack on a prior judgment or sought relief on behalf of third parties.

The plaintiff, a former managing director at the defendant bank, brought a motion to amend his statement of claim in a wrongful dismissal action.

He sought to add claims for unjust enrichment and disgorgement of profits, alleging the bank earned investment income on his withheld incentive compensation.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the proposed amendments disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

The court held that the unjust enrichment claim failed because there was no corresponding deprivation to the plaintiff, and the disgorgement claim failed because damages for breach of contract were an adequate remedy.

The plaintiff sought an order to discontinue a putative class action alleging secondary market misrepresentations under the Securities Act.

Due to developments in jurisprudence regarding limitation periods and the inability to find a representative plaintiff for the remaining viable primary market claims, the plaintiff concluded the action was no longer viable.

The court granted leave to discontinue the action on a without-costs basis and approved the proposed notice plan.

The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment seeking specific performance of an Agreement of Purchase and Sale for a cottage property.

The defendants failed to close the transaction, arguing the agreement was void due to unfulfilled conditions regarding severance under the Planning Act and uncertainty over rights of way.

The court found the agreement valid and binding, noting the defendants could not rely on their own failure to obtain the necessary severances to terminate the contract.

Finding the property uniquely suited to the plaintiffs' needs, the court granted summary judgment and ordered specific performance.

The applicants subscribed for flow-through shares in mining companies, which renounced Canadian exploration expenses to them.

The CRA later reassessed the companies and the applicants, disallowing the expenses.

The applicants sought immediate indemnification from the respondent under their subscription agreements for the taxes paid under the reassessments.

The court dismissed the applications, finding that the indemnities were not payable until the amount of taxes was 'definitively determined' or 'determined', which had not yet occurred as the respondent's appeal of the CRA reassessment was still pending.

The plaintiff, a shareholder of the corporate defendant, sought leave to commence a secondary market misrepresentation claim under the Securities Act following the collapse of a tailings storage facility at the defendant's mine.

The plaintiff alleged that the defendant knew or ought to have known of the facility's compromised structural stability and failed to disclose it.

The court dismissed the motion for leave, finding that the plaintiff failed to establish a public correction of the alleged misrepresentation.

The press release issued by the defendant merely stated that the facility had breached and the cause was unknown, which did not indicate that any previous disclosure was untrue or misleading.

At a case conference, the Varone Parties sought compliance with a previous discovery plan order made by Master Muir, which the Concord Adex Parties had failed to meet.

The court ordered the Concord Adex Parties to serve their Affidavit of Documents within 10 days and varied the litigation timetable accordingly.

The court also provided directions on how to address an undetermined costs issue from the previous motion, as Master Muir had passed away before rendering his decision on costs.

The applicant licensor sought declarations that the respondent licensee breached a License Agreement, Sublease, and Loan Agreement for a cannabis retail store, justifying termination.

The respondent counter-applied for a $2,000,000 Branding Fee and damages for wrongful termination.

The court found that the applicant's termination was invalid and breached the duty of good faith, as it was based on a mere expression of frustration by the respondent after being given incorrect information about loan funding.

The court ordered the applicant to pay the Branding Fee, net of certain deductions, and awarded costs to the respondent.

The plaintiffs brought a class action alleging that the defendant financial institutions breached their trust and fiduciary duties by failing to disclose markup fees charged on foreign currency conversions in registered accounts.

The parties brought cross-motions for summary judgment on the common issues, and the defendants moved for decertification.

The court found that the defendants breached the trust agreements by failing to disclose the amount of the markup fees.

The court ordered an accounting of profits to be determined at a reference, emphasizing the need to deter fiduciary misconduct.

The court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims for an elevated interest rate and punitive damages, and dismissed the defendants' motion to decertify the class action.

The appellants appealed a Master's decision allowing the respondents to select the appellants' in-house counsel as their representative for examination for discovery.

The in-house counsel also had carriage of the fraud action on behalf of the appellants.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding that while in-house counsel are not shielded from discovery, requiring counsel of record to attend would be oppressive as it would inevitably prevent him from continuing as counsel, thereby interfering with the appellants' choice of counsel.

The respondents were ordered to select another representative.