Kenneth G. Hood

This trial concerned the ownership of a jointly held house (Brookdale) and a joint investment account following the separation of the applicant, Victoria Chechui, and the respondent, Ian Jamieson Nieman.

Victoria claimed 50% ownership in both, while Ian argued Victoria held her interests in trust for him, or alternatively, made an unjust enrichment claim.

Ian also sought damages for breach of trust, fiduciary duty, or contract.

The court found for Victoria regarding the Brookdale property, determining it was a joint gift and jointly owned.

However, the court found for Ian regarding the joint investment account, concluding that Victoria held her interest in trust for Ian, as his intention was only to grant a right of survivorship, not an immediate gift of half the funds.

All of Ian's damage claims were dismissed due to lack of proof and absence of a fiduciary relationship or contract.

The moving party father brought a motion to find the responding party mother in contempt of a 2011 British Columbia consent order regarding access and Skype communication with their child.

At the hearing, the court first recognized the BC order under the Children's Law Reform Act.

The court dismissed the contempt motion, holding that the mother could not be found in contempt in Ontario for conduct that occurred before the BC order was recognized as an Ontario order.

Furthermore, the court found that even if jurisdiction existed, the father failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the mother wilfully and deliberately disobeyed the order, as her actions regarding missed access and Skype calls were either misunderstandings or taken in the child's best interests.

This costs endorsement followed unsuccessful motions by the defendants to dismiss the plaintiff's claims.

The plaintiff sought $17,673.81 in costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The defendants argued that the costs were excessive and that certain steps taken by the plaintiff were not directly related to the abuse of process argument raised in their motions.

The court declined to parse costs by specific issues within the motion, finding the plaintiff's response reasonable.

However, it found some time spent excessive and fixed the costs at $13,000, inclusive of HST and disbursements, to be paid by the defendants within thirty days.

The mother brought a motion to enforce child support and section 7 expenses under a separation agreement.

The father brought a cross-motion to change the agreement to terminate or reduce his support obligations.

The court held that because the separation agreement had not been filed under section 35 of the Family Law Act, it lacked jurisdiction to vary the agreement under Rule 15, but retained jurisdiction to enforce it under Rule 14.

The court enforced the agreement, ordering the father to pay child support and section 7 expenses for the son attending college, but found the obligation for the daughter ceased when she completed her degree.

The applicant father brought a motion to change a final child support order, seeking to reduce his monthly payments from $856 to $514 on the basis that he had shared custody (over 40% parenting time) under s. 9 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines.

The court dismissed the motion, finding a significant income disparity between the parties and no evidence of increased costs attributable to the shared custody arrangement, which was already in place when the original order was made.

The court also ordered the applicant to pay 50% of the cost of a laptop computer for the child as a s. 7 expense.

The applicant wife sought interim spousal support following the breakdown of a long-term traditional marriage.

The parties disputed the income to be imputed to the wife and the husband's income for support purposes.

The court imputed a minimum wage income of $22,000 to the wife and determined the husband's income to be $224,922, adding back amounts paid to the wife by his medical corporation for income splitting.

Considering the compensatory and non-compensatory basis for support, the court awarded interim spousal support of $8,000 per month, near the high range of the guidelines.

The plaintiffs sought a declaration of ownership over a portion of the defendant's adjacent property through adverse possession.

The disputed lands were converted to Land Titles in 2001, requiring the plaintiffs to prove their predecessors in title established adverse possession for a continuous ten-year period prior to that date.

The court dismissed the claim, finding that the predecessors' use of the land was seasonal and intermittent, failing the requirement for constant and continuous actual possession.

Furthermore, the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the predecessors' use was inconsistent with the intended use of the true owner or that they had the intention to exclude the true owner.

The respondent wife brought a motion for interim child and spousal support.

The applicant husband had been voluntarily paying $430 per month in child support based on a declared income of $46,538.

The wife sought to impute an income of $75,000 to the husband, arguing his lifestyle and business interests indicated higher earnings.

The court found a prima facie case for support, imputed the husband's income at $75,000 for the purpose of the interim motion, and ordered him to pay $682 per month in child support and $471 per month in spousal support.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's claim, the defendants requested an order to amend the title of proceedings to correct the corporate defendant's name.

The plaintiff consented to the amendment.

The court granted leave to amend the title of proceedings pursuant to Rule 26.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's claim on a summary judgment motion brought by the defendants, the court determined the quantum of costs.

The self-represented plaintiff opposed the costs sought, raising various arguments including her intention to seek a rehearing.

The court rejected the plaintiff's arguments, applied the factors under Rule 57.01, and fixed the defendants' costs at $22,500 on a partial indemnity basis.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s claim for unpaid professional invoices as statute‑barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiff argued the limitation period was extended by a written acknowledgment of the debt under s. 13 of the Act and alternatively that promissory estoppel prevented the defendants from relying on the limitation defence.

The court held that the plaintiff discovered the claim no later than the date of the final invoice and commenced the action outside the two‑year limitation period.

The alleged acknowledgment did not clearly and unequivocally admit liability for any amount owing, and the evidence did not establish the elements of promissory estoppel.

The claim was therefore dismissed as statute‑barred.

The defendants brought summary judgment motions seeking dismissal of two actions as an abuse of process.

The actions arose from a motor vehicle accident involving an uninsured driver, after the plaintiff obtained a default judgment against the tortfeasor and pursued recovery through various insurers and entities associated with the rental vehicle.

The defendants argued the repeated proceedings constituted abusive relitigation.

The court held that the doctrine of abuse of process was not engaged because the earlier proceedings involved different entities and were not adjudicated on the merits, and no manifest unfairness or prejudice was established.

The motions were dismissed, without prejudice to the defendants bringing other procedural motions.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for summary judgment seeking the return of a $30,000 deposit and $20,000 in damages following the defendant's repudiation of a real estate agreement of purchase and sale.

The defendant had repudiated the agreement three days after acceptance when her financial situation unexpectedly improved, and she offered to return the deposit immediately.

The plaintiffs refused the deposit to maintain a claim for specific performance, which they later abandoned.

The court found no evidence of actual damages or out-of-pocket expenses incurred by the plaintiffs.

The court granted a declaration of repudiation, ordered the return of the deposit, awarded nominal damages of $1, and ordered the plaintiffs to pay costs to the defendant.

The defendants sought costs following the plaintiff’s agreement to vacate certificates of pending litigation (CPLs) that had been obtained ex parte against their properties.

The court found that the plaintiff failed to make full and frank disclosure when obtaining the CPLs and that the defendants were therefore entitled to costs of the motion to vacate.

While the defendants requested full indemnity costs exceeding $74,000, the court held that the plaintiff’s conduct did not reach the egregious level required for full indemnity and instead justified substantial indemnity costs.

Applying the factors under Rule 57.01 and the indemnity principle, the court fixed reasonable fees at $35,000 plus HST and disbursements.

Costs were ordered payable within 30 days.

The plaintiff bank brought a motion for summary judgment against two guarantors of a commercial loan after the borrowers defaulted.

The guarantors raised numerous defences, including alleged inducement, alleged oral representations that the guarantee would be removed after certain payments, discovery complaints, and arguments relating to receivership proceedings and an alleged forbearance agreement.

The court held that none of the defences raised a genuine issue requiring a trial and that the plaintiff had established its claim on a balance of probabilities.

Applying the principles from Hryniak v. Mauldin, the court concluded that summary judgment was appropriate and granted judgment against the guarantors for their 30% liability under the guarantee together with contractual interest.

Costs were awarded to the plaintiff.

The plaintiff advanced $90,000 to his daughter and son‑in‑law following the sale of his home.

The court held that equity presumes bargains rather than gifts and found the defendant failed to rebut the presumption that the advance was a loan.

However, the court determined that the loan constituted a demand obligation created prior to January 1, 2004, making the former six‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act applicable.

Because the claim was issued more than six years after the date of advancement and there had been no acknowledgment of the debt or payment to extend the limitation period, the claim was statute‑barred.

The action was dismissed and costs were awarded to the defendant.

Following a successful summary judgment motion dismissing the action against one defendant, the court addressed costs of both the motion and the underlying action.

The successful defendant sought full indemnity costs alleging delay and unreasonable conduct by the plaintiff during the litigation and costs process.

The court held that while some conduct was questionable, it did not reach the exceptional threshold required for full indemnity costs.

Exercising discretion under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and applying the factors in Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court fixed costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The court reduced the amount claimed and ordered a lump sum costs award covering both the motion and the action.

Self‑represented plaintiffs sued the federal government for negligence and negligent investigation, alleging Canadian officials spread false information that caused foreign authorities to detain the plaintiff at the U.S. border and delay an Australian visa.

The court accepted that the detention and visa delay occurred but found no evidence that Canadian officials provided misinformation or were involved in the actions of U.S. or Australian authorities.

The plaintiffs relied largely on speculation and correspondence rather than proof of wrongdoing.

The court held that the elements of negligent investigation were not established and that the plaintiffs failed to prove causation or any actionable conduct by the defendant.

The derivative claim under the Family Law Act also failed.

The action was dismissed and costs awarded to the defendant.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim on a Rule 21 motion, the successful defendants sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The self-represented plaintiff failed to deliver costs submissions despite extensions granted by the court.

The court held that there was no basis for substantial indemnity costs and exercised its discretion under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Balancing fairness, compensation, and access to justice, the court reduced the defendants’ requested costs and fixed partial indemnity costs payable by the plaintiff.

Following a motion concerning the enforceability of an employment agreement, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The plaintiff succeeded on the principal issue of enforceability, while the defendant succeeded on inducement and the dismissal of punitive damages.

The court considered the divided success, the principle of indemnity, and the factors under Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act.

Although the plaintiff sought $16,505 in partial indemnity costs, the court found the amount somewhat high and adjusted the award to reflect the mixed success of the parties.

Costs were fixed at $10,000 inclusive of HST and disbursements.