Kendra A. Naidoo

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board upholding her treating physician's finding that she was incapable of consenting to treatment with antipsychotic medication and benzodiazepines.

The appellant argued the Board made palpable and overriding errors in its assessment of her capacity and the causes of her symptoms.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board's conclusions were firmly anchored in the evidentiary record and that the appellant failed to demonstrate any palpable and overriding error.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming his attending physician's finding that he was incapable of consenting to treatment with antipsychotic medication.

The appellant argued the Board failed to consider evidence that his psychosis was drug-induced, ignored family dynamics, and failed to address a prior Board decision finding him capable.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board applied the correct legal test under the Health Care Consent Act and had ample cogent evidence to conclude the appellant lacked the capacity to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of a treatment decision.

The appellant appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision confirming his incapacity to consent to antipsychotic medication.

The appellant argued the Board exceeded its jurisdiction by conducting a 'new hearing' to assess his capacity as of the rehearing date, rather than reassessing his capacity as of the original 2018 hearing date as ordered by the court.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, holding that a 'rehearing' under s. 80(10)(c) of the Health Care Consent Act requires a contemporaneous assessment of capacity, and admitting new evidence for that purpose was appropriate.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board continuing his detention and a decision that a temporary hold on his indirectly supervised community passes did not constitute a significant restriction of liberty requiring a mandatory hearing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board reasonably concluded the appellant's continued detention was the least onerous and least restrictive disposition given his recent decompensation.

The Court also upheld the Board's application of the Campbell framework, agreeing that the temporary restriction on privileges was a day-to-day clinical management decision that did not meet the threshold of a significant increase in liberty restrictions.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible, appealed a decision of the Ontario Review Board (ORB) to continue his detention at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health (CAMH), rejecting a joint submission for transfer to Waypoint Centre for Mental Health.

The appellant argued the ORB breached procedural fairness by not giving express notice of its intent to reject the joint submission and that its decision was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal found that the ORB's "significantly probing" questions during the hearing provided sufficient implicit notice and that its decision to reject the transfer was reasonable, as the evidence did not support the claimed benefits of transfer or a treatment impasse at CAMH.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming her treating physician's finding that she was incapable of consenting to electro-convulsive therapy (ECT).

The appellant also sought a declaration that ECT amounts to cruel and unusual punishment under section 12 of the Charter.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the Charter claim exceeded the scope of the appeal and should be brought as a separate application.

The court upheld the Board's decision on capacity, concluding it was reasonable and supported by evidence that the appellant's mental condition rendered her unable to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of consenting to or refusing ECT.

The appellant appealed the Ontario Review Board's December 27, 2018 disposition ordering his detention on a forensic unit at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health with specified privileges.

The appellant contended that the Board departed from a joint submission of the parties by rejecting his request for community privileges accompanied by an approved person, and that he was denied procedural fairness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that no joint submission was made and that the Board's decision requiring staff accompaniment was amply supported by evidence of the appellant's history of violence, hallucinations, and medication non-compliance, as well as the opinion of his treating psychiatrist.

The self-represented appellant appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision confirming her incapacity to consent to treatment with antipsychotic medication.

The respondent requested the appointment of amicus curiae because the appellant had not taken steps to perfect the appeal.

The court directed Legal Aid Ontario to investigate the appellant's legal aid status and ordered the appointment of amicus curiae if a certificate could not be issued expeditiously.

This is an appeal from a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board which found the appellant incapable of consenting to treatment with antipsychotic medication, specifically under the second branch of s. 4(1) of the Health Care Consent Act, focusing on the ability to appreciate reasonably foreseeable consequences.

The appellant argued the Board failed to consider his desire to enlist in the Canadian military as a reason for refusing medication.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board's decision was reasonable, as it properly concluded the appellant was unable to appreciate the manifestations of his mental condition, rendering him incapable of weighing the benefits and risks of treatment, consistent with Supreme Court jurisprudence.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming his incapacity to consent to or refuse treatment with antipsychotic medication.

The appellant remained unrepresented and untreated pending the appeal.

The respondent requested the appointment of amicus curiae to assist the appellant.

The court ordered that if the appellant did not retain counsel within 15 days, Legal Aid Ontario was to issue an amicus curiae appointment certificate and amicus would be appointed.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board upholding her attending psychiatrist's finding that she was incapable of consenting to antipsychotic medication.

The appellant, who had a long-standing diagnosis of schizoaffective disorders and schizophrenia, did not believe she had a mental condition and maintained that the medication was harming her.

The Superior Court of Justice applied the reasonableness standard of review and found that the Board reasonably concluded the appellant was unable to apply relevant information to her circumstances or appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of a decision regarding her treatment.

The appeal was dismissed.

This is a supplementary endorsement addressing Rocco Capano's appeal from two decisions of the Consent and Capacity Board.

The Board had confirmed Dr. Geagea's finding that Capano was incapable with respect to antipsychotic medication and confirmed Capano's involuntary status.

The court dismissed the appeal regarding involuntary status as moot, given Capano's discharge from CAMH.

The appeal concerning incapacity for antipsychotic medication was also dismissed, as the Board's decision was found to be reasonable and fully supported by the evidence.

The appellant, Brian Alta, appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board that confirmed his involuntary status at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health under section 20(5) of the Mental Health Act.

The Board found that Alta suffered from a mental disorder likely to result in serious physical impairment unless he remained in custody, and that he was not suitable for voluntary admission.

The Superior Court reviewed the Board's decision on a standard of reasonableness for questions of fact and mixed law and fact.

The court upheld the Board's findings, concluding that the Board reasonably considered Alta's difficulties with daily living, risk of retaliation due to aggressive behaviours, and medication mismanagement as factors contributing to serious physical impairment.

The court also found no error in the Board's assessment of Alta's unsuitability for voluntary admission, dismissing the appeal.

The Appellant, Rocco Capano, appealed decisions of the Consent and Capacity Board that confirmed a Community Treatment Order (CTO) and a finding of incapacity regarding a Community Treatment Plan (CTP).

The Respondent, Dr. Justin Geagea, sought to uphold the decisions and dismiss the appeals as moot.

The court found that since Capano was no longer subject to the CTO or CTP, the tangible dispute had disappeared, rendering the issues academic.

The court declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot appeals, dismissing them.

This appeal concerned the mootness of a Consent and Capacity Board decision confirming the appellant's involuntary admission to the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health (CAMH) and her incapacity for treatment.

The appellant was discharged from CAMH, rendering the involuntary admission decision moot.

The court declined to exercise its discretion to hear the constitutional questions related to the 'Box B' provisions of the Mental Health Act and the Charter, citing the lack of a live controversy, the availability of a new procedural route for constitutional challenges, and the recent upholding of the 'Box B' criteria by the Court of Appeal.

The appeal of the involuntary admission decision was dismissed without costs, though the treatment capacity decision remained in force.

The appellant, an involuntary psychiatric patient, sought to appeal an order authorizing a change in her anti-psychotic medication.

After Legal Aid refused to fund the motion for leave to appeal, the appellant brought a motion to appoint her former counsel as amicus curiae.

The Divisional Court granted the motion, appointing the counsel as amicus curiae to represent unrepresented interests and act tantamount to counsel for the appellant in the leave motion and related proceedings, with costs to be paid by the Attorney General.

The moving party physician sought an order under s. 19 of the Health Care Consent Act to authorize treatment of the respondent with clozapine pending her appeal of a Consent and Capacity Board decision.

The respondent, who suffers from treatment-resistant schizophrenia and exhibits violent and hyper-sexual behaviour, opposed the motion.

The court addressed evidentiary issues, admitting some hearsay in medical records and accepting the treating psychiatrist as a participant expert.

The court found that the statutory criteria were met, as clozapine was likely to substantially improve her condition, the benefits outweighed the risks, it was the least restrictive option, and her deteriorating condition made treatment necessary before the appeal.

The appellant appealed a decision upholding a Consent and Capacity Board finding that she was incapable of consenting to psychiatric treatment.

The appellant argued that her symptoms were caused by physical ailments rather than a mental condition, and that the Board misapplied the test for capacity from Starson v. Swayze.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board applied the correct legal test and reasonably concluded that the appellant was unable to appreciate the consequences of refusing treatment because she could not recognize the possibility that she was affected by a mental condition.

Mr. Paspalovski appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision confirming a Community Treatment Order (CTO) issued by Dr. Agrawal.

The appeal raised three issues: whether the Board erred in applying the test for incapacity, whether it misapprehended the evidence, and whether the CTO was invalid due to the 72-hour rule for Community Treatment Plans (CTPs).

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board correctly applied the test for capacity, did not make a palpable and overriding error in assessing evidence, and that the 72-hour rule in the Mental Health Act does not require all parties to sign the CTP within that timeframe, only that the physician be satisfied the criteria are met and treatment is available.

Stephen Doherty appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision finding him incapable of consenting to psychiatric treatment, specifically antipsychotic medication.

The court addressed the mootness doctrine, determining the appeal was not moot due to the potential impact on future substitute decision-making.

Applying a reasonableness standard to the Board's factual findings, the court upheld the Board's determination that Doherty lacked the ability to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of his treatment decisions, despite some symptomatic improvement.

The appeal was dismissed.