Kendra A. Naidoo

The appellant, who has a long history of schizophrenia, appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming her treating physician's finding that she was incapable of consenting to anti-psychotic medication.

The appellant argued the Board failed to consider her preference for homeopathic treatments and her views on the traditional medical model.

The Superior Court of Justice applied a reasonableness standard of review and upheld the Board's decision, finding ample evidence that the appellant's mental illness prevented her from recognizing her condition and appreciating the reasonably foreseeable consequences of refusing treatment.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a Superior Court decision upholding a Consent and Capacity Board finding that he was incapable of consenting to treatment for a schizoaffective disorder.

The appellant argued the Board's reasons were insufficient, unreasonable, and failed to properly consider his refusal of medication due to side effects.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's chain of analysis clear, its decision reasonable, and noting the appellant's inability to recognize his illness rendered him incapable with respect to all proposed medication.

The appellant appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision finding him incapable of consenting to psychiatric treatment under the Health Care Consent Act.

The Board concluded that although the appellant understood the information relevant to treatment decisions, he was unable to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of refusing treatment.

The appellant argued that the Board misapprehended evidence, lacked proof of treatment benefits, and failed to properly address risks and benefits of the medication.

The court held that the Board’s findings were entitled to deference and were supported by the evidence, including the appellant’s persistent denial of mental illness and inability to appreciate the purpose and consequences of treatment.

The Board’s decision fell within a range of reasonable outcomes.

Appeal from a Consent and Capacity Board decision finding the appellant incapable of consenting to psychiatric treatment while detained after an NCR finding.

The court held that the Board properly applied the governing capacity test under the Health Care Consent Act, including the requirement that a patient recognize the possibility of being affected by the manifestations of a mental condition, without impermissibly equating mental disorder with incapacity.

The court further held that the Board’s findings were supported by corroborated documentary and viva voce evidence of paranoid delusions, auditory hallucinations, and lack of insight.

Although the Board’s reasons were imperfect, they were sufficient when read in light of the evidentiary record, submissions, and process.

Appeal from two Consent and Capacity Board decisions finding the appellant incapable of consenting to psychiatric treatment and incapable of managing property.

The court held that the Board reasonably applied the statutory tests under the Health Care Consent Act and the Substitute Decisions Act, and did not improperly substitute a best interests analysis for the legal test for capacity.

The court also upheld the Board’s finding that the Mental Health Act transmission requirements for the certificate of incapacity and financial statement had been met.

Both appeals were dismissed.

The appellant appealed two Consent and Capacity Board decisions confirming incapacity to consent to treatment and renewing a Community Treatment Order.

Applying the reasonableness standard to the predominantly factual issues, the court held that the Board reasonably found the appellant could understand treatment information but could not appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of refusing treatment.

The court also held that the Board reasonably found compliance with the statutory requirements for CTO renewal under the Mental Health Act, including the provision of required documents, consultation on the treatment plan, physician assessment, and substitute decision-maker consent.

Both appeals were dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board finding him incapable of consenting to treatment with antipsychotic medication under the Health Care Consent Act, 1996.

The court considered whether the Board lacked jurisdiction due to panel composition, the proper legal test for capacity under s. 4(1) of the Act, the applicable standard of review, and whether the Board’s application of the test was reasonable.

The court held that tribunal expertise justified deference regardless of the individual qualifications of panel members and that the standard of review for the Board’s application of law to facts was reasonableness.

The Board reasonably concluded that although the appellant could understand relevant information, symptoms described as perseveration and grandiosity prevented him from appreciating the reasonably foreseeable consequences of refusing treatment.

The Board’s decision fell within a range of defensible outcomes and was upheld.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible for assault and attempted kidnapping, was detained at a mental health facility.

His treating physician found him incapable of consenting to antipsychotic medication for his delusional disorder, a finding confirmed by the Consent and Capacity Board and upheld by the Superior Court.

On appeal, the appellant argued the physician's evidence was uncorroborated and the incapacity finding was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the physician's evidence was corroborated by the appellant's own testimony and documentary evidence, and the board's conclusion that the appellant could not appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of refusing medication was reasonable.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination based on perceived disability during his involuntary admission to the respondent facility.

The application was filed more than two and a half years after the events in question.

The Tribunal granted the applicant's request for anonymization but dismissed the application as untimely.

The Tribunal found that the applicant failed to demonstrate that the delay was incurred in good faith, noting a four-month period where he was capable of pursuing his claim but chose to explore internal resolution instead.

A physician brought a motion under s. 19(2) of the Health Care Consent Act, 1996 seeking authorization to administer antipsychotic and related medications to a psychiatric patient pending the disposition of an appeal from a Consent and Capacity Board decision finding the patient incapable of consenting to treatment.

The patient opposed treatment and had appealed the Board’s incapacity determination.

The court considered whether the statutory criteria for interim treatment were satisfied, including whether the treatment would substantially improve the patient’s condition, whether deterioration would occur without treatment, whether the benefits outweighed the risks, and whether the proposed plan was the least restrictive alternative.

Based on medical evidence of severe deterioration, violent incidents, and the likelihood of improvement with medication, the court found all criteria met.

The physician was authorized to administer the proposed medications pending the final determination of the appeal.

The defendants sought to dismiss the plaintiffs' medical malpractice action for delay at a status hearing under Rule 48.14.

The action was commenced in 2007, but the plaintiffs failed to advance the litigation, missing deadlines for documentary discovery and examinations for discovery.

The court found a complete lack of communication between the plaintiffs and their counsel, and no acceptable explanation for the delay.

The court also found that the defendants would suffer prejudice due to the passage of time, as the events occurred in 2005.

The action was dismissed for delay.

A physician brought a motion under s. 19 of the Health Care Consent Act seeking authorization to administer psychiatric medication to a patient pending the final disposition of her appeal from a Consent and Capacity Board finding of incapacity to consent to treatment.

Evidence from treating psychiatrists indicated the patient suffered from schizoaffective disorder, had historically improved with antipsychotic medication, and continued to exhibit severe symptoms, aggression, and behavioural dyscontrol while untreated.

The court found the proposed treatment was likely to substantially improve the patient’s condition, that benefits outweighed risks, that the treatment was the least restrictive option, and that treatment was necessary before the appeal’s final determination.

The statutory criteria under s. 19(2) were therefore satisfied.

The court authorized treatment pending the outcome of the appeal but declined to impose a conditional order dismissing the appeal for failure to meet procedural timelines.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming a physician’s finding that she was incapable of consenting to psychiatric medication.

The appeal alleged that the Board misapplied the statutory test for capacity under the Health Care Consent Act and that its findings lacked evidentiary support.

The court applied the standards of correctness for legal questions and reasonableness for factual or mixed questions.

It held that the Board properly applied the two‑part capacity test and reasonably concluded that the appellant could understand information about the treatment but could not appreciate the foreseeable consequences of refusing medication.

The evidentiary record, including physician testimony and clinical progress notes, supported the Board’s conclusion.

The appeal was dismissed.

A treating psychiatrist brought an interim motion under s. 19 of the Health Care Consent Act, 1996 seeking authorization to administer treatment pending the patient’s appeal from a Consent and Capacity Board decision finding her incapable of consenting to treatment.

Evidence showed the patient had ceased taking prescribed medications, resulting in escalating aggressive behaviour, seclusion, and clinical deterioration.

The court considered the statutory criteria for treatment pending appeal, including whether the treatment would substantially improve the patient’s condition, whether the benefits outweighed the risks, and whether the treatment was the least intrusive option.

The court found the statutory test met for administration of a mood stabilizing medication but declined to authorize antipsychotic medication pending the expedited appeal hearing.

An interim order was granted requiring administration of the mood stabilizing drug until the appeal was determined.