Justice G. F. Hearn

Appeal from convictions under section 28(16) of the Conservation Authorities Act for undertaking development without authorization from the Grand River Conservation Authority on property in the Township of North Dumfries.

The appellants were convicted of creating a laneway and berm through protected wetland without obtaining the required permit.

The appellants challenged the trial court's jurisdiction, the conservation authority's jurisdiction over private property, and alleged incompetence of trial counsel.

The appellate court upheld the convictions and sentences, finding the trial judge's findings of fact were reasonable, the jurisdiction issues were properly addressed, and there was no merit to allegations of counsel incompetence or conflict.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown relied on breath samples taken at the detachment to establish the offence.

The sole issue at trial was whether the breath samples were taken "as soon as practicable" as required by section 258(1)(c) of the Criminal Code to invoke the presumption of identity.

The defence challenged an unexplained 28-minute delay between the first and second breath samples.

The court found that the entire chain of events from the time of the offence to the taking of the first sample was reasonable, and that the Crown was not required to provide a detailed explanation for every minute of custody.

The court convicted the accused.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The defence brought a Charter application alleging breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Crown sought to admit breath sample results obtained following a roadside screening device demand.

The court found that although the officer unnecessarily provided rights to counsel at a time when none were legally required, this did not constitute a Charter breach.

The "forthwith" requirement under section 254(2) of the Criminal Code was satisfied, as there was no reasonable opportunity for the accused to consult with counsel before providing the sample.

The application was dismissed and the evidence was admitted.

The accused pleaded guilty to two counts of sexual assault against two young sisters occurring in 1986.

The offences involved inappropriate touching of the victims' genital areas and buttocks during social visits.

The court considered whether a conditional sentence was available given that such sentences were not available at the time of the offence (1986) or at the time of sentencing (2012), but were available between 1996 and 2007.

The court held that section 11(i) of the Charter entitled the accused to the benefit of the lesser punishment available during the intervening period.

The court imposed a 12-month conditional sentence with strict conditions including house arrest for eight months and electronic monitoring, followed by one year of probation, finding that denunciation and deterrence could be adequately addressed through community-based sentencing given the accused's lack of criminal record, genuine remorse, and 25-year history without incident.

A young person pleaded guilty to second-degree murder arising from events on March 29, 2010.

The Crown sought to introduce two statements made by the accused to police—one during transport to the detachment and one at the detachment—for use in sentencing and in a psychiatric assessment ordered under section 34 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The defence challenged the admissibility of both statements under section 146 of the YCJA, which provides enhanced procedural protections for statements made by young persons to persons in authority.

The court conducted a voir dire to determine whether the statements complied with section 146 requirements.

The accused pleaded guilty to two counts of sexual assault involving two separate young victims in 1983 and 1984.

The accused was a parish priest who abused his position of trust.

The court imposed a sentence of 15 months imprisonment with a concurrent 6-month sentence, rejecting the defence submission for a conditional sentence.

The court found that general deterrence and denunciation required incarceration in a traditional setting despite mitigating factors including the accused's first-offender status, genuine remorse, guilty plea, and exemplary conduct as a priest since the offences.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood on June 19, 2010.

The defence challenged the validity of the approved screening device demand under section 8 of the Charter and sought exclusion of the breath test results under section 24(2).

The defence also argued that evidence of late consumption of alcohol (bolus drinking) immediately before the RIDE stop raised a reasonable doubt regarding the accused's blood alcohol concentration at the time of driving.

The court found the officer had reasonable suspicion to make the demand and dismissed the Charter application.

On the trial issue, the court accepted the accused's evidence regarding his consumption pattern but found that "straddle evidence" (evidence showing blood alcohol concentration could have been either above or below the legal limit) was insufficient to rebut the statutory presumption of identity under section 258(1)(d.1) of the Criminal Code.

The accused was convicted.

The appellant appealed his conviction for disobeying a "No Heavy Trucks" sign contrary to section 182(2) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The trial justice convicted the appellant after finding that the dump truck he was operating fell within the plain and ordinary meaning of "heavy truck" despite the absence of a statutory definition in the Highway Traffic Act.

The appeal court upheld the conviction, finding that the trial justice properly applied principles of statutory interpretation and that the evidence clearly established the vehicle was a heavy truck based on its characteristics and the context of the regulation.

The appellant appealed his conviction for failure to properly wear a seatbelt contrary to section 106(2) of the Highway Traffic Act.

A police officer observed the appellant driving a dump truck without an apparent shoulder restraint during a brief observation of approximately 20 to 30 seconds at a traffic light intersection.

The trial justice convicted the appellant based on the officer's evidence.

On appeal, the court found that the appellant's evidence, though not explicitly stating he was wearing a seatbelt, logically conveyed that he was wearing one at all times.

The court determined the trial justice misapplied the burden of proof and failed to properly apply the W.(D.) test for assessing credibility and reasonable doubt.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction was set aside, and an acquittal was entered.