Julie K. Hannaford

The respondent appealed a motion judge's ruling that leave was required to appeal a temporary spousal support order made under the Divorce Act.

The respondent argued that the Divorce Act provided an unfettered right of appeal that superseded the leave requirements of the Courts of Justice Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Divorce Act's appeal provisions must be read in conjunction with provincial procedural rules, meaning leave to appeal an interlocutory order is still required.

The applicant sought costs of $61,486.11 on a full indemnity basis following the respondent's unsuccessful motion for a stay.

The respondent argued for no costs due to divided success.

The court found the applicant was entitled to costs as the successful party under rule 24(1) of the Family Law Rules, but declined to award full indemnity costs.

Finding the amount sought excessive for a non-complex motion, the court awarded costs fixed at $7,500 inclusive.

The moving party husband sought leave to appeal an interim spousal support order made under the Divorce Act.

He argued that the Divorce Act provided an appeal as of right, rendering the provincial requirement for leave inoperative due to paramountcy.

The Divisional Court rejected this argument, finding that the Divorce Act itself incorporates provincial appellate procedures.

Applying the test for leave to appeal an interlocutory order, the court found no conflicting decisions and no good reason to doubt the correctness of the interim support order, which appropriately considered the parties' lavish lifestyle and the husband's high income.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed.

The moving party, Mr. Elgner, sought leave to appeal an interim spousal support order made under the Divorce Act.

He argued that the Divorce Act provided an appeal as of right, rendering the provincial requirement for leave inoperative under the doctrine of paramountcy.

The Divisional Court rejected this argument, finding that s. 21(6) of the Divorce Act incorporates ordinary provincial appellate procedures, meaning leave is required.

Applying the test for leave under Rule 62.02(4), the court found no conflicting decisions and no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's order, which appropriately considered the high income of the payor and the needs of the recipient.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed.

The husband sought leave to appeal a costs order granted against him following the dismissal of his motion for interim support and other relief in a family law proceeding.

The motions judge had reduced the partial indemnity costs awarded to the wife to account for the husband's alleged impecuniosity.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the discretionary costs decision and no issues of public importance or conflicting cases requiring clarification.

The appellant appealed orders dismissing his claims for invasion of privacy and under s. 35 of the Children's Law Reform Act, and restraining him from commencing other proceedings.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, amending the order to clarify that the dismissal of claims was without prejudice to the appellant's right to move to add the respondent as a party in the ongoing matrimonial proceeding.

The court also deleted the restraining order on consent, but upheld the motion judge's award of substantial indemnity costs.

No costs were awarded for the appeal.

The appellant brought a motion for leave to appeal.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the motion and fixed costs in the amount of $750, inclusive of disbursements and GST.

The appellant appealed a trial decision ordering him to pay $2,000 per month in spousal support and to secure the payments with life insurance.

The parties' separation agreement had set spousal support at $1.00 per month but allowed for variation in the event of a material change in circumstances.

The trial judge found that the cessation of child support constituted a material change.

The Divisional Court upheld the trial judge's finding, concluding that the agreement implicitly gave priority to child support and that the cessation of child support was a material change warranting variation.

However, the court allowed the appeal in part to set aside the requirement for life insurance, finding no evidence that the appellant had a history of failing to meet support obligations.

The appellant husband appealed a motion judge's finding that a binding settlement had been reached in a divorce proceeding.

The parties had exchanged correspondence regarding an equalization payment, the payment of the children's lawyer's fees, and the handling of life insurance policies.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the parties had reached a consensus ad idem on all essential terms, noting that the husband's self-serving affidavit did not raise a triable issue.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent wife.

The appellant appealed a decision regarding the variation of spousal support in the face of a settlement agreement.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the facts of the case did not warrant a fresh consideration of the causal connection principle established in previous case law.