Julie K. Hannaford

The applicant brought an urgent ex parte motion seeking a temporary order to restrain the respondent from depleting his assets.

The parties had previously agreed to submit all issues to mediation-arbitration.

The applicant discovered the respondent had unilaterally withdrawn $1.25 million from an account that required dual signatures.

The court granted the temporary preservation order under the Arbitration Act, noting that an arbitration award would likely not be enforced by financial institutions without a court order, and scheduled a return date for the motion.

The applicant husband brought a motion for interim spousal support and shared use of a Florida condominium following the breakdown of a 31-year marriage.

The core dispute involved determining the respondent wife's income from her corporation.

The court imputed the wife's income at $720,000 and the husband's at $180,000, ordering the wife to pay $20,000 per month in interim spousal support.

The husband's request for shared use of the Florida condominium was dismissed as he had alternative housing and timeshares available.

The applicant mother brought a motion under Rule 1(8) of the Family Law Rules to strike the respondent father's pleadings and impose a daily penalty of $3,500 for his ongoing failure to comply with multiple financial disclosure orders.

The court found the respondent in breach of numerous obligations, including the failure to deliver an income and business valuation report.

The court ordered that the respondent's pleadings (except regarding parenting) would be struck if he failed to deliver the required reports by a final deadline.

However, the court dismissed the request for a daily monetary penalty, holding that such a penalty cannot be imposed under Rule 1(8) absent a formal finding of civil contempt under Rule 31.

The moving party in a family law proceeding brought a Form 14B motion seeking financial disclosure from the responding party to support a claim for a reduction in spousal support based on a material change in circumstances.

The responding party opposed the motion, arguing that a Form 14B motion was inappropriate for this request.

The court held that the motion was procedural and appropriate for a Form 14B motion, and ordered the responding party to provide the requested financial disclosure, including bank statements and property documentation.

No costs were awarded as the motion might have been avoided with better communication between counsel.

The applicant mother brought an urgent motion seeking sole decision-making responsibility to have the parties' 7-year-old child vaccinated against COVID-19 and to ensure the child wears a mask to attend school in-person.

The respondent father vehemently opposed the vaccine and mask mandates, threatening to withdraw the child from school and making threatening statements to the mother and school staff.

The court found it was in the child's best interests to be vaccinated and to attend school in-person wearing a mask.

The court granted the mother temporary sole decision-making responsibility for medical and educational issues, primary residence, and the ability to renew the child's passport.

Due to the father's threatening behaviour and refusal to follow public health guidelines, his parenting time was ordered to be supervised and a restraining order was issued.

The applicant father brought a motion seeking an order that the parties' three-year-old child be enrolled in public school for September 2022, rather than the private Jewish day school he currently attended.

The respondent mother argued the court should order the parties to attend a family dispute resolution process before deciding the issue.

The court declined to make a determination on school placement at this time, finding no urgency.

Instead, applying the new provisions of the Divorce Act, the court ordered the parties to attend a family dispute resolution process pursuant to s. 16.1(6) to attempt to design a comprehensive parenting plan.

The applicant mother brought a motion for temporary orders in a high-net-worth family law proceeding.

The parties separated after a traditional marriage where the applicant was the primary caregiver and the respondent was an entrepreneur with complex, international business interests.

The respondent failed to provide meaningful financial disclosure, claiming his finances were complex and he had lost everything, despite evidence of lavish spending.

The court ordered the respondent to provide comprehensive financial disclosure and serve expert valuation reports within 20 days.

The court also appointed an independent supervising solicitor to review quarantined documents found in the matrimonial home for relevance and privilege.

Given the respondent's lack of disclosure and unilateral financial actions, the court granted a preservation order restraining him from depleting his assets, subject to ordinary business exceptions.

The court granted the applicant primary residence and decision-making responsibility for the children, noting the respondent's frequent travel and lack of day-to-day involvement.

Finally, the court imputed an income of $1,200,000 to the respondent and ordered him to pay a lump sum of $1,700,000 for interim child and spousal support, citing the real risk of non-payment of periodic support.

The moving party sought to vary a 1999 divorce judgment that ordered him to pay $388,000 in spousal support, of which he had paid only $160,000 before defaulting in 2001.

He argued that the failure of his business, his health issues, and his new family constituted a material change in circumstances.

The court dismissed the motion to change the support amount, finding that the business failure was foreseeable and his health issues did not impact his earning capacity.

However, the court granted his request to strike a default provision in the judgment that doubled the outstanding support plus $50,000, finding it to be an unenforceable penalty clause.

This endorsement addresses a procedural case conference concerning ongoing litigation between separated spouses.

The applicant, Mr. Hrvoic, initiated an application for Ms. Hrvoic to sell her shares in a family business.

Following Mr. Hrvoic's termination of Ms. Hrvoic's employment, Ms. Hrvoic "borrowed" $600,000 from a line of credit.

Dow J. subsequently ordered Ms. Hrvoic to repay $500,000 of this amount.

Ms. Hrvoic now seeks leave to appeal this term and an urgent stay pending appeal.

The court noted the parties' contentious approach and set a schedule for the motion for a stay pending appeal, declining to grant an interim stay.

The applicant sought the release of $2,750,000 from her share of the net proceeds of sale of the matrimonial home.

The respondent brought a cross-motion, agreeing to release $500,000 to the applicant and $100,000 to himself, but sought to impose a condition that a further $2,000,000 be released to the applicant only upon her entering into an agreement to purchase a home in Toronto, citing concerns about her financial management and the children's future housing.

The court found no legal basis to impose such conditions on the applicant's share of property proceeds, distinguishing it from child support cases where such interference is rare and only in exceptional circumstances.

The court granted the applicant's motion for the release of funds without preconditions and denied the respondent's cross-motion.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision enforcing a Separation Agreement dated October 30, 2012, between the parties.

The appellant sought to set aside the agreement, alleging non-disclosure of assets by the respondent and arguing he did not understand the nature or consequences of the agreement.

The motion judge found no basis to set aside the agreement under section 56(4) of the Family Law Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding that the motion judge properly applied the legal test, made findings open to him, and that the parties were sophisticated individuals who had received independent legal advice.

The court noted that both parties had failed to fully disclose assets, making the appellant's claim disingenuous, and that the agreement itself contained acknowledgments of sufficient disclosure.

The appellant appealed from a contempt order under which he was ordered jailed.

On the eve of the expedited appeal hearing, the appellant accepted an offer to settle under which he agreed to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal on a full indemnity scale.

The court found the costs claimed to be wholly disproportionate and far beyond the range of anything that could be considered reasonable, even on a full indemnity basis.

The court fixed costs of the appeal at $30,000 inclusive of disbursements and applicable taxes on a full indemnity basis.

Additionally, the appellant sought an extension of time to appeal the order underlying the contempt finding and several other orders, but was largely unsuccessful.

Costs of the motions were fixed at $7,500 on a partial indemnity scale.

No order was made as to costs in relation to the respondent's motion to deny audience to the appellant.

The parties cohabited for over thirteen years and jointly operated motel properties.

Following their separation, the trial judge awarded the respondent a half interest in the properties based on a joint family venture and unjust enrichment, as well as compensation for unaccounted joint account withdrawals.

The appellant appealed, arguing the properties were held on a resulting trust and disputing the financial contributions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence supported the trial judge's conclusions regarding the joint family venture, equal contributions, and the accounting of joint funds.

Appeal from a master's ruling on a refusals motion arising during examinations conducted under rule 39.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure in connection with a motion for particulars.

The plaintiff argued that the defendants waived solicitor‑client privilege over their entire litigation file by filing an affidavit from counsel stating that the defendants lacked knowledge necessary to plead.

The court held that filing a solicitor’s affidavit results only in a limited waiver of privilege confined to matters directly placed in issue by the affidavit.

Solicitor‑client privilege remains fundamental and must be interpreted narrowly when assessing waiver.

The master correctly concluded that only documents connected to the affidavit’s subject matter were producible and that broader disclosure of the law firm’s entire file was not required.

Following dismissal of a discovery motion seeking answers to refused questions on examinations related to a motion for particulars, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The successful defendants sought partial indemnity costs exceeding $13,000, while the plaintiff argued for a significantly reduced amount.

Applying the discretionary framework under the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court emphasized proportionality and fairness.

Considering the extensive materials, length of the hearing, and the importance of the issues, the court found the defendants largely entitled to their claimed costs but applied a modest reduction for unspecified time responding to undertakings.

Costs were fixed at $12,000 inclusive of HST and disbursements.

The plaintiff brought a refusals motion seeking answers to numerous questions refused on examinations conducted in connection with a pending motion for particulars in a professional negligence and breach of contract action against former lawyers.

The plaintiff argued that the defendants’ affidavit asserting lack of knowledge regarding certain particulars waived solicitor-client privilege over the defendants’ files and related information.

The court held that any waiver of privilege was limited to the knowledge addressed in the affidavit at the time it was sworn and did not extend to the entirety of counsel’s files.

The requested questions and document production exceeded the scope of the limited waiver and intruded upon solicitor-client privilege.

The court dismissed the refusals motion and confirmed the propriety of the defendants’ redactions and document production.

The plaintiff brought a motion under Rule 39.02(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking leave to examine opposing litigation counsel under Rule 39.03 in connection with a forthcoming motion for particulars.

The motion arose after cross‑examination revealed that the affiant, a lawyer at the plaintiff’s firm, lacked personal knowledge of key factual assertions in her affidavit and had relied on information prepared by counsel.

Applying the factors articulated in First Capital Realty Inc. v. Centrecorp Management Services Ltd., the court held the proposed examination was relevant, arose from matters uncovered during cross‑examination, would not cause non‑compensable prejudice, and could not reasonably have been sought earlier.

The court further held that proportionality and a contextual approach supported allowing the examination where the relevant information was uniquely within counsel’s knowledge.

Leave to examine the lawyer was therefore granted, with costs reserved.

The applicant and respondent separated after a 20-year marriage.

The court determined the validity of a marriage contract that excluded the respondent's interest in a family trust, finding it valid and enforceable.

The court also addressed the tracing of trust funds into the matrimonial home, finding the respondent entitled to exclude a portion of the home's value.

The court ordered a set-off of child support obligations due to a shared custody arrangement, and awarded the applicant a lump sum of $432,000 for spousal support.

The respondent's third-party claims against a family friend for invasion of privacy and interference with parental access were dismissed.

The appellant sought to appeal an interim spousal support order made under the Divorce Act as of right, arguing that section 21(1) of the Divorce Act provides a direct right of appeal that is paramount over the leave requirement in section 19(1)(b) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal held that section 21(6) of the Divorce Act requires appeals to be asserted according to the ordinary procedure of the province, which in Ontario includes the leave requirement.

The court found no conflict between the federal and provincial legislation, concluding that the doctrine of paramountcy was not engaged and leave to appeal was required.

The parties executed a handwritten Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) following collaborative family law negotiations.

The husband subsequently paid the wife $250,000 as agreed, but the wife later refused to finalize the formal separation agreement.

The trial judge declared the MOA invalid, finding it was merely an outline and that further financial disclosure was required.

The Court of Appeal allowed the husband's appeal, holding that the MOA contained all essential terms and the parties' conduct demonstrated an intention to be bound.

The MOA was declared a valid and binding domestic contract.