Judith MacDonald

Sentencing decision following jury convictions for multiple serious sexual offences committed against three young complainants, including sexual assault, sexual exploitation, and sexual interference in a parental or trust context.

The court considered Gladue principles because the offender asserted Aboriginal ancestry, but found the evidentiary record insufficient to identify meaningful background factors or culturally appropriate sanctions.

Given the aggravated, repeated, and highly invasive nature of the offences, the court held that denunciation, deterrence, and separation from society predominated.

A total sentence of eight years was imposed, reduced by pre-sentence custody credit to 6 years and 326 days, together with multiple ancillary orders and victim surcharges.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The trial proceeded as a blended voir dire.

The defendant brought applications alleging violations of sections 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the defendant was arrested for public intoxication but never formally arrested for impaired driving, despite reasonable grounds existing after the defendant's statements to police.

The investigating officer failed to provide the defendant with rights to counsel when the nature of the investigation changed to a more serious criminal offence.

The breathalyzer technician proceeded on the basis of an arrest for a provincial offence and left the caution section blank on the alcohol influence report.

The court found violations of sections 10(a) and 10(b) of the Charter and excluded the breathalyzer evidence under section 24(2).

This endorsement addresses the costs arising from a successful motion brought by the Defendant to set aside an ex-parte injunction and Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) previously granted to the Plaintiffs.

The Defendant sought costs of $12,943.07, while the Plaintiffs argued for no costs, citing the necessity of the injunction, original harm, and a reasonable offer to settle.

The court found the Defendant was entirely successful in the underlying motion and was entitled to costs.

However, the court deemed the Defendant's requested costs excessive for a straightforward motion and awarded $7,500.00 inclusive of HST and disbursements, rejecting the Plaintiffs' arguments against costs and their offer to settle as insufficient to reduce the award.

The Defendant brought a motion to set aside an ex-parte injunction and a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) that the Plaintiffs had obtained against a property.

The Plaintiffs alleged an agreement to purchase the property from the Defendant, which the Defendant denied.

The court, conducting a de novo hearing, dissolved the injunction and ordered the removal of the CPL.

The court found that the Plaintiffs failed to meet the three-part test for an injunction, particularly regarding irreparable harm and the balance of convenience.

For the CPL, the court determined that the Plaintiffs' claim for specific performance lacked merit, as there was insufficient evidence of a written agreement under the Statute of Frauds and no demonstration of the property's uniqueness to warrant specific performance over damages.

The Crown brought an application under s. 486.2 of the Criminal Code seeking an order to allow two adult witnesses (the accused's ex-wives) to testify outside the courtroom by closed-circuit television or behind a screen during a preliminary inquiry.

The Crown also sought to have counsel appointed to cross-examine the witnesses rather than allowing the self-represented accused to do so.

The judge granted the application for appointed counsel but dismissed the application for the witnesses to testify outside the courtroom.

The judge found that the witnesses, despite their stated emotional distress, were able to testify effectively in open court without accommodation.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for an over .80 offence after pleading guilty while represented by counsel.

He alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel, including failure to advise on consequential penalties and pending changes in the law.

After supplementary affidavit evidence from trial counsel confirmed there was no dispute with the appellant's account, the appeal court allowed the appeal.

The guilty plea was set aside and a new trial was ordered before a differently constituted summary conviction trial court.

The accused pleaded guilty to multiple sexual offences against several young persons, including sexual interference, sexual assault, internet luring, and making and possessing child pornography.

The Crown applied for a long‑term offender designation under s. 753.1 of the Criminal Code.

The court reviewed psychiatric risk assessment evidence and found the offender presented a moderate risk of sexual reoffending, with a pattern of grooming behaviour toward vulnerable adolescents.

The court concluded that the statutory criteria for a long‑term offender designation were satisfied and that risk could be managed in the community through supervision.

A global penitentiary sentence of seven years and one month was imposed along with a five‑year long‑term supervision order and several ancillary orders.

During long‑term offender sentencing proceedings, the defence sought to qualify a psychotherapist as an expert in the risk assessment of sexual offenders.

The proposed expert had administered certain assessment tools and prepared reports concerning the accused’s treatment and recidivism risk.

The court applied the admissibility criteria for expert evidence from R. v. Mohan and examined the witness’s qualifications, training, and professional background.

The judge concluded that the witness lacked sufficient training and expertise in risk assessment methodology to qualify as an expert in that field.

The witness was permitted to testify about treatment methods and testing used in therapy but was prohibited from providing opinion evidence on the accused’s risk of sexual recidivism.

The accused pleaded guilty to attempted murder of his wife on October 28, 2012.

The victim was stabbed multiple times in bed, pursued through the residence, and the accused subsequently set fires throughout the home and disconnected the propane line, endangering first responders.

The victim escaped through a bathroom window onto the roof.

The court imposed a sentence of nine years imprisonment with credit for 22 months of pre-trial custody, resulting in seven years and two months remaining to be served.

The sentencing considered aggravating factors including the brutal nature of the attack, breach of trust, and violation of a no-contact order, balanced against mitigating factors including the accused's advanced age (78 at time of offence), genuine remorse, guilty plea, and otherwise exemplary character.

At a preliminary inquiry, the accused was charged with first degree murder in the death of Xhuljeta Vlashi on August 27, 2012.

The Crown sought to establish that the killing was planned and deliberate.

The court heard evidence over five days from approximately thirty witnesses, reviewed agreed statements of fact, forensic reports, and eleven exhibits.

The accused suffered from documented schizophrenia and killed the one person in his life who was caring for him while she was on a video call with her niece.

The court found that while the evidence clearly established the accused killed the victim intentionally, there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction for first degree murder.

The killing appeared impulsive, rash, and irrational, with no prior animosity, threats, or rational motive.

The court committed the accused to stand trial on the lesser charge of second degree murder.

The applicants sought approval under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act for a sale of substantially all of their assets following a court‑approved sales and investor solicitation process.

The court considered the statutory factors in s. 36 of the CCAA, including the fairness and reasonableness of the process, the role of the monitor, consultation with creditors, and the adequacy of the consideration.

A late competing bid was rejected to preserve the integrity of the court‑approved sales process.

The court also addressed priority issues involving a DIP lender, secured creditors, and potential claims to HST refunds under the Financial Administration Act.

The proposed transaction and distribution scheme were approved as fair and reasonable in the circumstances.