Rosenberg

The appellants appealed their convictions for first and second degree murder arising from a firebombing that killed two children.

The Crown's theory was that the primary appellant orchestrated the arson to silence the children's mother, who had accused him of sexual assault, and hired the other appellants to execute the plan.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's admission of bad character evidence, Vetrovec caution regarding an unsavoury witness, instructions on unlawful object murder, or instructions on post-offence conduct.

The court also upheld the 23-year parole ineligibility period for the appellant convicted of second degree murder.

The accused appealed his convictions for drug and firearms offences, arguing arbitrary detention and racial profiling.

The Crown appealed the sentence, challenging the trial judge's finding that s. 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code, which limits pre-sentence custody credit to 1:1 when bail is denied primarily due to a previous conviction, violates s. 7 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals.

The Court upheld the conviction, finding no arbitrary detention or racial profiling.

On the sentence appeal, the Court held that s. 719(3.1) violates the principle of proportionality in sentencing under s. 7 of the Charter by subjecting identically placed offenders to different periods of incarceration based on bail outcomes, and is not saved by s. 1.

The provision was declared of no force and effect.

The defendants in a personal injury action appealed a costs award of $578,742.28 following a jury trial where the plaintiffs were awarded $144,013.07 in damages.

The defendants had made an offer to settle for $145,000 plus prejudgment interest.

The Court of Appeal found that while the offer was timely, the defendants failed to prove it exceeded the judgment due to uncertainty regarding the prejudgment interest rate.

However, the Court held that the trial judge erred by failing to consider the offer under Rule 49.13 and by ignoring the vast disparity between the amount claimed ($1.9 million) and the amount recovered.

The costs award was wholly disproportionate and was reduced to $100,000.

The appellant, a young person, was convicted of numerous firearms offences after police found loaded firearms in his bedroom.

He appealed his convictions, arguing that the trial judge erred in refusing to grant a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter due to a 12-day delay in holding his bail hearing, which violated his s. 11(e) rights.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge properly applied the residual category of abuse of process and reasonably concluded that the community's interest in seeing the serious charges disposed of on their merits outweighed the need for a stay.

The Court also found that the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant possessed the firearms was reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The appellants appealed their sentences after their aggravated assault convictions were set aside, leaving only convictions for common assault.

The Court of Appeal found that deference to the trial judge was not warranted given the changed circumstances.

Noting the appellants' youth, first-offender status, lack of serious injury to the victim, and the time elapsed since the offence, the Court granted leave to appeal, allowed the appeals, and imposed conditional discharges with two years of probation and 200 hours of community service.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on charges of sexual assault and sexual interference, arguing the trial judge erred in excluding the accused's police statement.

The trial judge found the statement involuntary because the police offered an improper inducement, suggesting the complainant would only get psychiatric help if the accused confessed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge applied the correct contextual test for voluntariness under Oickle and Spencer, and his factual findings were entitled to deference.

The appellant appealed his conviction for a drug-related offence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge failed to adequately apply the W.(D.) framework to assess the appellant's credibility regarding his knowledge of the presence of cocaine.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their claim for specific performance requiring the transfer of property pursuant to a first right of refusal and an agreement of purchase and sale.

They also sought leave to appeal the costs order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's factual findings that there was no first right of refusal and that the agreement of purchase and sale was unenforceable due to the improbability of obtaining severance.

Leave to appeal costs was also refused.

The appellant, a former bookkeeper, appealed her conviction for fraud involving four company cheques made payable to and cashed by her.

She argued the conviction was unreasonable, the trial judge failed to address inconsistencies in Crown witness testimony, and the trial judge improperly shifted the burden of proof by noting the lack of a meaningful explanation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Crown's documentary evidence was uncontradicted, the defence theories were speculative, and the conviction did not rely on witness credibility.

The trial judge's comment on the lack of explanation did not shift the burden of proof but merely observed the uncontradicted nature of the evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for possession of a large amount of heroin.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's finding of wilful blindness based on admissible evidence of earlier shipments.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge properly considered the parity principle and mitigating factors.

Applying the principle from R. v. Sidhu, the court held that the appellant's mistaken belief in the nature of the substance seized could not be treated as a mitigating factor.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their application to set aside the dismissal of their action.

The action had been dismissed in May 2012, but the appellants subsequently brought two motions for default judgment without disclosing the dismissal or complying with the Registrar's directions.

The motion to set aside the dismissal was brought over a year later.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the application judge's conclusion that the appellants failed to move promptly and lacked a valid explanation for the delay.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed his conviction on the basis that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on wilful blindness.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding there was no air of reality to wilful blindness and the trial judge failed to refer to any evidence supporting it.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his total sentence of 4.5 years, comprising 3 years for a 10-year child abduction and 18 months consecutive for failing to appear.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence was not excessive, noting the seriousness of the abduction and the aggravating circumstances of the failure to appear, which involved breaching an undertaking to the court to return the children.

The appeal was dismissed.

The self-represented appellant applied to review two orders: one fixing the date for his appeals and another dismissing his application for the appointment of specific counsel under s. 684 of the Criminal Code.

The appellant had previously dismissed or refused to cooperate with three appointed counsel, leading to the appointment of amicus curiae.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the applications, finding that the appointment of amicus was appropriate to control the court's process and prevent further frustration of the proceedings, consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Ontario v. Criminal Lawyers' Association.

The appellant was convicted of theft and fraud-related offences for stealing computer source code from his former employer and using it to sell competing software.

He appealed his convictions and 30-month sentence, arguing that his Charter rights under ss. 11(a) and 11(b) were violated due to an eight-year delay between the laying of charges and his arrest, and subsequent delays in bringing him to trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no actual or inferred prejudice to his fair trial rights under s. 11(a), and concluding that the post-arrest delay under s. 11(b) was largely attributable to the appellant's own actions and waivers.

The court also upheld the sentence, noting the massive scale of the fraud.

The 15-year-old appellant was convicted of first-degree murder for counselling and encouraging her boyfriend to kill the victim.

She appealed her conviction, arguing that two videotaped statements to police were inadmissible under s. 146 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act, and appealed her adult sentence of life imprisonment without parole for seven years.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the appellant was not detained during the first interview and had validly waived her right to counsel in the second.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge correctly concluded that a youth sentence would not provide sufficient long-term supervision to protect the public given the appellant's psychological profile and risk of reoffending.

The appellant appealed his four-year global sentence for gun and drug offences.

Relying on the recent decision in R. v. Nur, the Court of Appeal reconsidered the sentence but concluded that the four-year term remained fit, noting that the combination of gun and drug offences poses a pernicious threat to public safety.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was stopped for speeding and arrested for breaching his recognizance curfew.

During a search of the vehicle incident to that arrest, the officer smelled raw marihuana, leading to a second arrest for possession and a further search of the trunk, which revealed 18.1 pounds of marihuana.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession for the purpose of trafficking, arguing the search violated his s. 8 Charter rights.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the officer had reasonable and probable grounds for the initial arrest, the search of the front of the car was justified for officer safety, and the officer's testimony regarding the smell of marihuana was credible, making the subsequent search of the trunk lawful.

The young person appealed a Superior Court judgment granting the Crown's application for certiorari and mandamus, which quashed a preliminary inquiry discharge on first degree murder and directed committal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the preliminary inquiry judge committed jurisdictional error by weighing competing inferences regarding the knowledge of the likelihood of death.

The Court affirmed that mandamus was appropriate because committal for the full offence was legally inevitable given the evidence.

The respondent, an elderly woman, was involved in a motor vehicle accident in Florida while driving with a driver's licence that had expired four months prior.

Her automobile insurer denied coverage on the basis that she breached statutory condition 4(1) by driving without authorization.

The application judge found the respondent exercised due diligence and declared the insurer had a duty to defend and indemnify.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the due diligence defence was not made out, as the respondent failed to take reasonable care regarding her licence renewal.

However, the Court held that the breach constituted imperfect compliance rather than non-compliance with a condition precedent, making relief from forfeiture available under s. 98 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The Court granted relief from forfeiture, noting the respondent's good faith, the minor nature of the breach, and the massive disparity between the loss of $1 million in coverage and the lack of prejudice to the insurer.