Renee M. Pomerance

The offender was convicted of luring and making sexually explicit material available to a child after communicating with an undercover police officer posing as a 15-year-old girl on Craigslist.

The court sentenced the offender to 18 months' imprisonment and 3 years' probation for the luring offence, finding that the aggravating factors, including the offender's persistence and attendance at a meeting place, warranted a sentence above the mandatory minimum.

The court applied the Kienapple principle to conditionally stay the charge of making sexually explicit material available to a child, finding it was an alternate form of the same criminal harm.

The offender, an immigration lawyer, was convicted of fabricating a fraudulent refugee claim for an undercover police officer posing as a client.

The Crown sought a penitentiary sentence of three to five years, while the defence requested a conditional sentence.

The court emphasized the paramount principles of denunciation and general deterrence, noting that the offender's status as a lawyer and the systemic impact of immigration fraud aggravated the offences.

Despite mitigating factors including the offender's mental health struggles and loss of her legal career, the court found a conditional sentence inappropriate and imposed a concurrent sentence of 12 months' incarceration on each count.

The Crown sought to introduce three categories of bad character evidence at the accused's trial for first-degree murder and indignity to a human body: statements made to a psychiatric nurse about killing and cannibalism, handwritten rap lyrics, and a photograph of a fictional serial killer.

The court first ruled that the Crown's allegation of cannibalism was too speculative to be placed before the jury.

However, the court admitted the statements to the nurse and the rap lyrics, finding that their probative value regarding motive, intent, and planning outweighed their prejudicial effect, provided a limiting instruction is given.

The photograph was excluded due to its low probative value and high potential for prejudice.

In a murder trial where self-defence was the central issue, the Crown removed four witnesses from its list shortly before trial because they possessed reliable exculpatory evidence.

The defence brought a motion to compel the Crown to call these witnesses.

The court held that while the Crown generally has discretion over which witnesses to call, the decision to exclude witnesses solely to withhold exculpatory evidence is a trial tactic reviewable under the court's trial management authority.

Finding that the Crown's strategy would adversely affect trial fairness, the court ordered the Crown to call the witnesses during its case.

The accused pleaded guilty to assault with a weapon (a truck) against his domestic partner, assault causing bodily harm against a fellow inmate, and driving over 80.

The Crown and defence jointly proposed a sentence of 46.5 months (including pre-sentence custody credit) followed by three years of probation.

The court accepted the joint submission but had to decide two contested issues: whether to impose a no-contact order with the domestic partner despite her wish to maintain the relationship, and whether to order restitution to insurance companies.

The court imposed the no-contact order to protect the victim and her children, prioritizing public safety over her autonomy, but declined to order restitution due to the accused's inability to pay and the uncertainty of the amounts.

The applicant, convicted of first degree murder, brought a constitutional challenge against the retrospective application of the amended s. 745.61 of the Criminal Code.

The amendment changed the screening standard for faint hope applications from a 'reasonable prospect of success' to a 'substantial likelihood of success'.

The applicant argued this violated his s. 11(h) Charter right against double punishment by potentially increasing his time in custody.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while the amendment concerns punishment, it does not increase it.

The change was procedural in nature and did not thwart the applicant's settled expectations of liberty.

During a jury trial for sexual assault, defence counsel sought to use Sandro Boticelli's painting 'Calumny of Apelles' as a visual prop during his closing address to illustrate the theme of false accusation.

The trial judge ruled that the painting could not be used, finding that its depiction of women as symbolic representations of slander, ignorance, suspicion, fraud, and conspiracy risked resurrecting offensive myths and stereotypes about female complainants.

The court concluded that the potential for prejudice and distortion of the fact-finding process substantially outweighed any legitimate persuasive impact.

The accused was charged with importing cocaine and possession for the purpose of trafficking after 45 kilograms of cocaine were found in his transport truck at the border.

He brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing that the delay of nearly three years from the time of the charge to the trial was unreasonable.

The court analyzed the periods of delay, attributing some to late disclosure by the Crown and institutional delay, but also noting delay caused by the defence and a co-accused.

The court concluded that the state-attributable delay of 18.5 months did not meaningfully offend the Morin guidelines and was outweighed by the strong public interest in trying a serious offence on its merits.

The application was dismissed.

The Aboriginal offender pleaded guilty to sexual assault and robbery after breaking into a 62-year-old victim's home.

The sentencing judge addressed systemic issues regarding the availability of Gladue reports in Windsor, Ontario, noting the offender had to be transferred to Sarnia to obtain one.

Applying Gladue principles and considering the offender's severe background of trauma and systemic disadvantage, alongside the extreme gravity of the home invasion and sexual violence, the court imposed a sentence of 9 years in the penitentiary.

The Crown's request to delay parole eligibility under s. 743.6(1) was denied.