Joseph Markin

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their Small Claims Court action against a hospital.

The appellants had sued the hospital for failing to provide a reasonable explanation for the death of their family member, claiming emotional harm.

The Divisional Court upheld the dismissal, finding the action was an abuse of process because the claims could have been raised in a prior, time-barred Superior Court action.

The Court also held the action was statute-barred, rejecting the argument that the hospital's ongoing failure to provide information constituted a continuing contravention that extended the limitation period.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action against the police and his former wife's lawyer for negligent investigation and conspiracy to bring false criminal charges.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's findings of fact and credibility.

The court also upheld the trial judge's refusal to draw an adverse inference for the failure to call the former wife as a witness.

Substantial indemnity costs were awarded against the appellant due to his persistence in making serious, unfounded allegations against a lawyer.

The appellant, a private citizen, sought to lay an information before a justice of the peace in Toronto for offences allegedly committed in another administrative region.

The justice refused to receive the information, citing a lack of territorial jurisdiction.

The appellant's application to compel the justice to receive the information was dismissed by the Superior Court.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that 'territorial jurisdiction' in section 504 of the Criminal Code refers to the entire Province of Ontario, not administrative regions.

The appeal was allowed, and the justice was ordered to receive the information.

The appellants appealed a Small Claims Court judgment awarding the respondent $6,300 for the cost of building a retaining wall due to the appellants undermining the lateral support of her property.

The appellants also appealed the dismissal of their counterclaim for malicious prosecution.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge applied the correct subjective-objective test for malicious prosecution and that there was sufficient evidence to support the finding that the respondent's land was in its natural state, making the loss of lateral support actionable in nuisance.

The appellant posted $5,000 as security for costs for an appeal.

Because the appeal was allowed in part, the Court of Appeal amended its previous order to direct that the $5,000 security for costs be released and returned to the appellant.

The appellant appealed his conviction for refusing a breath demand.

He argued he mistakenly believed the demand was for an approved instrument and that he did not have to comply because he had not been informed of his right to counsel.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary conviction appeal judge's decision, finding that a violation of section 10(b) of the Charter is not a reasonable excuse to refuse an approved instrument demand, though it may result in exclusion of evidence under section 24(2).

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed an order made by the Superior Court of Justice relating to discipline proceedings.

The respondents conceded that they never sought an order relating to proceedings other than the discipline proceedings and related matters.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, varying the order to include a notice requirement for proposed witnesses and striking out one paragraph, but otherwise upholding the order.

Costs of $4,000 were awarded to the appellant, to be set off against outstanding costs orders.

The plaintiff sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order which found that the first page of a reporting letter written to the defendant was protected by solicitor-client privilege and that the privilege had not been waived.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge's decision and noting that the issue of privilege waiver would be explored at an upcoming summary trial.

Costs were fixed at $2,500 in the cause.

The applicant insurer sought judicial review of a decision by the Director's Delegate of the Financial Services Commission of Ontario, which upheld an arbitrator's order requiring the insurer to pay the claimant approximately $4,350 for attendant care and housekeeping services.

The insurer argued the arbitrator erred by relying on an excerpt from a medical report and by judging the claimant's credibility solely on her demeanour.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the excerpt was properly in evidence as part of a larger report filed by the insurer, and that the arbitrator reasonably weighed credibility in the context of the evidence as a whole.

The standard of review applied was reasonableness.

The appellant sought to lay a private information against a police officer for an offence under the Highway Traffic Act.

The justice of the peace refused to receive the information because the appellant lacked the consent of a police officer required by s. 39.1(9) of the HTA.

The appellant's application for mandamus was dismissed.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that a prosecution is instituted when an information is laid, meaning the justice of the peace correctly refused to receive it without the required consent.

The Court also dismissed the appellant's Charter challenge, finding that differential treatment of informants based on occupation does not violate s. 15(1).

The appellant appealed a Superior Court decision dismissing her application for mandamus with certiorari in aid against a Justice of the Peace who refused to issue process against the respondent doctor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing that there was no jurisdictional error because the consensual medical examination lacked evidence of intent to cause bodily harm.

The Court also agreed that issuing process would be an abuse of process given prior unsuccessful civil and criminal proceedings.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal agreed entirely with the reasons of the motion judge and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondent in the amount of $1,000.

The appellant moved to reinstate his appeal, which had been dismissed as abandoned for failure to post security for costs.

He explained his previous lack of funds, justified the delay, and demonstrated the appeal was not frivolous.

The respondents noted a Superior Court order staying all proceedings by the appellant without leave.

The Court of Appeal exercised its jurisdiction under s. 13(2) of the Courts of Justice Act to grant leave and ordered the appeal reinstated upon the posting of the required security.

The appellant was sought for extradition by the United States to face charges of conspiracy, wire fraud, and securities fraud.

He appealed his committal order and sought judicial review of the Minister's surrender order.

On the committal appeal, the appellant argued the extradition judge failed to weigh the evidence as required by recent Supreme Court jurisprudence; the Court of Appeal held that a limited weighing of the evidence would not have changed the result.

On the judicial review, the appellant argued the Minister lacked jurisdiction to order surrender due to a 'misalignment' between the foreign charges, the committal order, and the alleged conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed this argument, finding that the Extradition Act, the applicable treaty, and the principle of double criminality require only that the alleged conduct constitute an offence in Canada, not that it precisely mirror the foreign charges.

Both the appeal and the application for judicial review were dismissed.

The applicants brought an application for judicial review seeking a declaration and mandamus to compel the Coroners' Council to complete its deliberations on a 1995 complaint.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, noting that the Coroners' Council was abolished in 1998 without grandfathering provisions.

The power to consider the complaint now rests with the Chief Coroner, who had already reviewed and dismissed the complaint in 2000.

The court concluded that the applicants had an adequate alternative remedy which had been exercised, and the requested declaration would have no practical effect.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the order under appeal was not a final order.

No costs were awarded.

The appellant appealed the trial judge's dismissal of his action for damages for breach of contract and wrongful dismissal.

The trial judge had concluded there was no employment relationship between the parties.

The Court of Appeal found no grounds to interfere with the trial judge's reasons or result and dismissed the appeal with costs.

The appellant sought costs of approximately $8,900 for an appeal and a leave motion regarding the timing of payment of costs ordered by the Court of Appeal.

The Divisional Court noted that the appeal was brought for strategic purposes to force the respondents to pay costs before trial or forfeit their right to proceed.

Finding that the appeal was entirely unnecessary from any other perspective, the court declined to award costs to any party.

The applicant doctor brought a motion before the Divisional Court under s. 21(5) of the Courts of Justice Act to set aside or vary a motions judge's order.

The motions judge had dismissed the applicant's entire judicial review application, even though only a motion for an injunction and mandatory order regarding a College investigation was before him.

The Divisional Court agreed that the motions judge was correct to refuse the injunction and mandatory order, but amended the formal order to clarify that only the motion, not the underlying judicial review application, was dismissed.

The appellant appealed an order of a motion judge who held that costs ordered by the Court of Appeal, which did not specify a payment date, were payable at the conclusion of the litigation.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in applying previous case law regarding interlocutory motions to a final disposition of an appeal.

The Court also noted that under Rule 57.03(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the norm is now that costs are payable within 30 days unless otherwise ordered.