Jennifer A. Mealey

The Children's Aid Society of Algoma brought a motion under section 98 of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act for a psychosexual assessment of the respondent father, A.L.-S., due to his history of sexual assault convictions and concerns about risk to the child.

The maternal grandmother supported the motion, while the father opposed it, arguing it was unnecessary, invasive, and infringed his Charter rights.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the Society failed to demonstrate the assessment was "necessary" as required by section 98, noting that the father's criminal record was already before the court and his insight could be tested via cross-examination.

The court also expressed uncertainty about the assessment's methodology, particularly the reliance solely on phallometric testing, and its relevance given the existing evidence.

The father (P.W.) appealed a trial judge's decision finding his children in need of protection under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, and placing them in the mother's custody with supervised access for the father.

The father argued the trial judge erred in applying the Act, misapprehended evidence, and erred in judicial notice and risk assessment.

The Children's Aid Society and the Office of the Children's Lawyer supported the trial judge's flexible approach to evidence and findings.

The appellate court dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's finding of need for protection and the disposition, upholding the flexible approach to evidence in child protection cases and deferring to the trial judge's factual findings and assessment of the children's best interests.

The appellant, G.C., appealed a lower court's dismissal of his appeal from a summary judgment motion that found his children in need of protection due to a risk of sexual harm by him under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017.

The primary issue on appeal was whether the summary judgment procedure was suitable given the significant consequences and the appellant's inability to cross-examine affiants.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the motion judge and appeal judge correctly applied the summary judgment test in child protection cases, including the principles from Kawartha-Haliburton, and properly weighed the evidence.

The Children's Aid Society brought a status review application regarding a six-year-old child who had been apprehended at birth and placed with his paternal grandmother.

The mother and the paternal grandmother both sought custody.

The court applied the two-part test for status reviews, finding that the child would still be in need of protection if returned to the mother due to her unresolved mental health and substance abuse issues.

Applying the best interests of the child factors, the court noted the child's strong attachment to the paternal grandmother, who had cared for him throughout his treatment for leukemia, and the disruption a move to the mother's home in Alberta would cause.

The court granted a deemed custody order to the paternal grandmother.

The court issued an evidentiary ruling regarding the proper use and interpretation of Requests to Admit and Responses to Requests to Admit under Rule 22 of the Family Law Rules in a child protection status review case.

The ruling clarified that a Request to Admit should be tailored to each party's knowledge, and that gratuitous corrections or qualifications in responses are not permitted.

The court held that a fact or document is only deemed admitted if all served parties admit it or fail to respond; if even one party denies or refuses to admit with a reason, the fact or document is not deemed admitted and must be proven otherwise.

In a status review trial under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, the Children's Aid Society sought to admit affidavits from a prior child protection proceeding as exhibits.

The respondent mother opposed this, citing hearsay and lack of cross-examination opportunity.

The court ruled against formally admitting the affidavits as exhibits, stating it would be tantamount to re-litigating a judicially decided matter.

However, the court affirmed its inherent authority and mandate to access and consider the entire prior child protection file to determine the continuing need for protection, especially in the absence of specific findings of fact from the original protection order.

This is a ruling on a voir dire held during a child protection status review application.

The Children's Aid Society sought to qualify Mr. John Dahl as an expert witness in parental risk assessment and child development.

The court declined to qualify Mr. Dahl, citing concerns regarding his academic and professional qualifications (Master's degree, clinical/counselling psychology background rather than forensic, lack of professional publications, and limited formal training in parenting capacity assessments).

More significantly, the court found Mr. Dahl's understanding of his duty as an expert to be flawed, as he believed he was working for the applicant society rather than the court, and his impartiality was questioned due to receiving materials predominantly from one litigant.

The ruling clarifies that while Mr. Dahl was not qualified as an expert, his parenting capacity assessment report remains part of the court record and may be cross-examined.

The appellant father appealed a summary judgment decision finding that his three children were in need of protection due to a risk of sexual harm.

The father argued that the motion judge applied the wrong test for summary judgment, failed to apply the principles for child protection cases set out in Kawartha, and erred in admitting and weighing evidence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the motion judge correctly applied the summary judgment test, properly considered the children's Indigenous status and best interests, and made no palpable and overriding errors in his credibility assessments or evidentiary rulings.

The respondent mother in a child protection proceeding brought a motion to strike portions of the society's and paternal grandmother's trial affidavits, arguing they contained inadmissible hearsay and non-expert opinion.

Before the motion was heard, the society and grandmother served revised affidavits removing some of the objectionable content.

Because the mother did not identify which parts of the revised affidavits she still objected to, the court dismissed the motion.

However, the court awarded the mother $1 in costs against the society, finding that the society acted unreasonably by including clearly inadmissible hearsay in its initial affidavits.

The appellant father appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing his motion to strike affidavit evidence filed by the Children's Aid Society on a summary judgment motion.

The father argued that under recent appellate jurisprudence, the court was required to automatically vet and excise non-trial-worthy evidence before responding parties filed their materials.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the responsibility remains on the parties to file trial-worthy evidence and to raise specific objections via a motion to strike, rather than imposing an automatic initial vetting process on the court.

This is a summary judgment motion in a child protection case involving three children and allegations of risk of sexual harm by their father.

The Children's Aid Society sought a finding that the children are in need of protection under section 74(2)(d) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act based on risk of sexual abuse or sexual exploitation.

The case involved complex evidentiary issues, including the admissibility of hearsay evidence, police interview recordings, and expert assessments.

The court conducted a careful screening of evidence and made specific rulings on admissibility, ultimately finding that sufficient admissible evidence existed to conclude there was no genuine issue requiring a trial on the risk of sexual harm ground.

The Children's Aid Society brought a summary judgment motion seeking a finding that two children were in need of protection on grounds of risk of physical harm and risk of emotional harm, a disposition order of deemed sole custody to the mother, and an order for supervised access to the father.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the Society had not established a genuine issue requiring trial on either ground for finding.

The court noted that while the father exhibited difficult behaviour, there was no credible evidence of a mental health disorder causally connected to risk of physical harm, and no evidence of emotional harm to the children.

The court also expressed concerns about the disposition sought and the practical feasibility of the proposed access arrangement.

A child protection proceeding involving three children, commenced in 2013, in which the Children's Aid Society sought a finding that the children were in need of protection based on risk of sexual harm.

The Society brought a motion to re-open a summary judgment motion that had been argued and was on reserve, to file additional evidence regarding a psychosexual assessment of the father.

The motion to re-open was opposed by the father.

The court dismissed the motion to re-open, finding that the Society had failed to exercise due diligence in obtaining the additional evidence, that the evidence was not decisive, and that the Society had alternative remedies available if the summary judgment motion was unsuccessful.

This is a child protection matter involving a motion to strike evidence filed by the respondent father in a summary judgment motion brought by the Children's Aid Society.

The society sought deemed custody to the mother and restricted access to the father of two children, ages 7 and 6.

The father moved to strike affidavit material and documentary evidence that he contended would not be admissible at trial, relying on guidance from the Kawartha decision.

The court addressed procedural issues including late-filed motions, the scope of the motion to strike, and the proper application of evidentiary rules on summary judgment motions in child protection cases.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion to add the paternal grandparents as party respondents in a status review application under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act.

The grandparents had been caring for the two children for seventeen months under a child protection order.

The father consented to adding the grandparents as parties and sought a deemed custody order in their favour.

The mother opposed the motion and sought return of the children.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the grandparents had sufficient participatory rights under the statute without requiring party status.

This is a child protection motion for summary judgment under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017.

The Children's Aid Society sought a finding that a one-year-old child (T.) is in need of protection, a disposition order, and a determination regarding parental access.

The court found the child in need of protection based on risk of physical harm from the mother's chronic drug addiction, domestic violence involvement, and inability to provide stable care.

The court declined to make a finding on emotional harm grounds due to insufficient evidence.

For disposition, the court ordered the child remain in the care and custody of the paternal grandmother (B.D.) subject to a supervision order by the society for nine months, rather than granting the deemed custody order sought by B.D. The court adjourned the access issue for trial, finding a genuine issue requiring adjudication regarding the scope and conditions of parental access.

This is a decision under section 90(2)(b) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act (CYFSA) regarding the identification of a child's First Nations status and band affiliation in a Status Review Application.

The child, age 6, was previously identified under the Child and Family Services Act (CFSA) as not being an Indian or native child.

The court determined that the child is a First Nations child based on the mother's identification of the child as such, and identified the child's band as Michipicoten Band based on the mother's indication that the child identifies with that band through maternal family ties.

The Children's Aid Society of Algoma brought a motion seeking a determination under s.90(2)(b) and s.2(4) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act (CYFSA) as to whether a one-year-old child (L.A.) is a First Nation child and, if so, whether Batchewana First Nation should be added as a party respondent.

The child's mother stated the child was not Native and not eligible for band registration.

The father indicated he was pursuing Native Status for himself and had a paternal grandfather who was a member of Batchewana band.

The court initially found the child was not a First Nation child but reopened the motion for additional evidence.

The court ultimately found the child was a First Nation child under the CYFSA based on information demonstrating a connection to Batchewana band through the father's eligibility for membership and the paternal grandfather's band membership.

Batchewana First Nation band representative was added as a party respondent.

A motion by the Children's Aid Society of Algoma for production of records from the Sault Ste.

Marie Police Service, Ontario Provincial Police, and Ministry of Community Safety and Corrections regarding the respondent parents in a child protection proceeding.

The mother did not oppose production; the father opposed.

The court granted production from the Sault Ste.

Marie Police Service for the period following a prior production order, finding the relevance test under section 130 of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act was met.

The court declined to order production from the other two record holders due to insufficient evidence of relevance.

The Children's Aid Society of Algoma brought a motion seeking three orders: (1) withdrawal of a prior motion dated June 8, 2018; (2) variation of temporary care and custody of three children from the society to their maternal grandmother; and (3) continuation of existing interim parental access orders.

The court found that the applicant society did not require a court order to withdraw its motion, as parties have the right to withdraw applications subject to cost consequences.

The court granted the variation of temporary care and custody from the society to the maternal grandmother under section 94(2)(c) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, as this placement with kin was preferable to placement with the society and would remove a legal impediment to the grandmother obtaining a deemed custody order.

The court found the claim regarding continuation of access orders to be unnecessary as existing orders continue until varied or superseded.