Associate Judge Jay Josefo

The defendants moved for security for costs under Rule 56.01(1)(e), arguing the plaintiff's claim for a one-half interest in their property based on proprietary estoppel was frivolous and vexatious.

The plaintiff cross-moved to strike the defendants' affidavits and opposed their motion to amend their pleadings to add a limitations defence.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's cross-motions, allowed the defendants to amend their pleadings, and granted the motion for security for costs, finding the plaintiff's claim lacked practical merit and her conduct in the litigation was vexatious.

The parties engaged in a long-running dispute over two oil field joint ventures in Egypt.

Following multiple prior court decisions across Canada, a reference was held to conduct an accounting and valuation of the applicants' interest in the joint venture.

Relying on a joint neutral expert, the court determined the financial calculations.

The court also held that a 500% penalty clause for failing to make a cash call, drafted by the applicant, was an enforceable genuine pre-estimate of damages rather than an unenforceable penalty.

Ultimately, the applicants were ordered to pay the respondents $331,087.33.

The plaintiffs hired the defendant moving companies for a household move from Ontario to New Brunswick.

After loading the goods, the defendants demanded a flat rate significantly higher than the initial estimate and refused to deliver the goods until paid.

The plaintiffs brought an urgent motion under Rule 44 of the Rules of Civil Procedure for the return of their personal property.

The court found substantial grounds that the goods were unlawfully detained, noting the defendants' actions breached the Consumer Protection Act.

The motion was granted, with the plaintiffs ordered to pay $1,850 for the partial move, which was entirely set off by a $1,850 costs award against the defendants.

The plaintiff set the action down for trial.

The defendant subsequently brought a motion to compel answers to undertakings and refusals from discovery.

The plaintiff raised a preliminary objection that the defendant required leave under Rule 48.04(1) because defense counsel had completed a Certification Form, allegedly consenting to the action being placed on the trial list.

The Master dismissed the preliminary objection, finding that completing the Certification Form did not constitute consent under Rule 48.06(1), and therefore the defendant did not require leave to bring the motion.

The moving defendants (controlled by the husband) sought leave to intervene in an action brought by the wife's parents against both the husband's and wife's companies for unpaid promissory notes.

The husband argued the wife was wrongfully refusing to defend the action on behalf of her companies.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the wife had a reasonable basis for not defending the claim and the husband failed to establish he was a complainant under the OBCA or acting in good faith.

The defendants brought a motion for security for costs against the plaintiff, a Malaysian citizen and former international student at the University of Toronto.

The plaintiff sued the defendants for defamation regarding allegations of sexual harassment.

The court found that the plaintiff was ordinarily resident outside of Ontario, as he had no family, property, or ongoing employment in the province and spent most of his time in Malaysia.

Applying a holistic approach, the court ordered the plaintiff to post $20,000 in security for costs.

The plaintiff, who was rendered paraplegic following spinal surgery, brought a motion to amend his statement of claim to add his former family doctor and chiropractor as defendants, and to add new allegations against the defendant surgeon.

The surgeon brought a cross-motion to dismiss the action for delay.

The court dismissed the cross-motion, finding the delay was not contumelious and caused no actual prejudice.

The court denied the plaintiff's request to add new allegations against the surgeon, ruling they were statute-barred new causes of action.

However, the court allowed the addition of the family doctor and chiropractor, finding the claims against them were not reasonably discoverable until the plaintiff's counsel obtained and reviewed the family doctor's medical chart.

The plaintiff brought a motion to strike several paragraphs of the defendant's Statement of Defence under Rule 25.11.

The impugned paragraphs referred to 'without prejudice' correspondence and settlement offers made by the defendant regarding the plaintiff's return to work following an alleged constructive dismissal.

The court found that the communications met the three-part test for settlement privilege, as litigation was on the horizon, the communications were intended not to be disclosed, and their purpose was to settle the dispute.

Consequently, the court struck the offending paragraphs, noting that pleading settlement-privileged communications is scandalous, frivolous, or vexatious.

In a motor vehicle accident tort action, the defendants brought a motion to amend their statement of defence, remove the plaintiff's counsel from the record, compel the plaintiff to attend independent medical examinations (IMEs), and stop the plaintiff's counsel from communicating with the IME evaluators.

The court allowed the factual amendments to the statement of defence but struck proposed paragraphs alleging the plaintiff was using her legal training to exaggerate her claims, finding them scandalous.

The court refused to remove the plaintiff's counsel, noting his potential evidence as her former law professor was tangential.

Finally, the court ordered the plaintiff to attend the IMEs without conditions and directed her counsel to cease imposing terms on the defendants' medical experts.

The plaintiff towing company sought to amend its Statement of Claim to add claims for an interim and permanent mandatory order compelling the Ontario Provincial Police to adhere to a 'First On Scene' tow policy.

The Crown opposed the amendments, arguing that statutory provisions prohibit injunctive and mandatory relief against the Crown.

The Master confirmed jurisdiction to assess the legal tenability of proposed pleadings and held that mandatory orders are a form of injunctive relief prohibited against the Crown.

The Master denied the amendments seeking mandatory orders but permitted amendments pleading irreparable harm and intimidation, as they were tenable claims relevant to damages.

The plaintiff brought a motion under Rule 60.12 to strike the defendants' Statement of Defence for failing to comply with a prior court order to pay costs forthwith.

The defendants claimed they intended to appeal the prior order but failed to file the notice of appeal or take concrete steps for months, citing health issues and the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court found the defendants' explanations unconvincing and their delay deliberate.

Applying the principles for striking pleadings, the court granted a 'last chance' order, giving the defendants 30 days to comply with the prior order or obtain a stay, failing which their Statement of Defence would be struck.

The defendants Tavasys Telecom Inc. and Danny Tavares brought a motion to set aside a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) registered against their property by the plaintiff 2676547 Ontario Inc. The CPL was initially obtained ex parte.

The court considered the plaintiff's lack of full disclosure, delay in asserting rights, its nature as a shell corporation without assets, and the moving defendants' status as bona fide third-party purchasers without actual notice of a prior sale.

Balancing the equities and applying the Dhunna Factors, the court found in favor of the moving defendants, granting the motion to discharge the CPL.

The plaintiff brought a motion to amend her statement of claim to add Ford Credit Canada Company as a defendant, the owner of a leased vehicle involved in a motor vehicle accident.

Ford resisted, arguing the claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court found the plaintiff failed to exercise reasonable diligence in identifying Ford as a potential defendant within the two-year limitation period, despite having received information about Ford's ownership before the period expired.

The plaintiff's reliance on an erroneous police report and failure to conduct a routine MTO search, coupled with counsel's inadvertence, did not rebut the presumption of discoverability.

The motion to add Ford as a defendant was dismissed.

The plaintiff moved to stay or dismiss a counterclaim brought by five entities, arguing it was unauthorized under Rule 15.02(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found that Rule 15.02(4) applies to counterclaims, which are defined as "proceedings" under the Rules.

Given that both the previous and current controlling parties of the five entities did not authorize the counterclaim, the court stayed the counterclaim for those five entities.

The plaintiff in a solicitors' negligence action brought a motion to remove the defendants' counsel, alleging a conflict of interest.

The plaintiff claimed the defendants' lawyer obtained confidential information about him during a prior, allegedly related action where the lawyer represented a different party.

The Master dismissed the motion, finding no factual nexus between the prior action and the current negligence claim, and concluding that a fair-minded, reasonably informed member of the public would not find removal necessary for the proper administration of justice.

The plaintiff law firm brought a motion to reinstate its action against the defendants, which had been administratively dismissed for delay under Rule 48.14.

The delay was primarily caused by the plaintiff's principal failing to provide necessary documents to his various lawyers, as well as a dispute over a pleading of improvident settlement.

The court found that while the plaintiff was a 'sojourner' for a period, he had regained the will to litigate before the dismissal.

Applying the Reid factors and emphasizing the preference for deciding cases on their merits, the court found the delay was not undue, the motion was brought promptly, and the defendants did not suffer significant prejudice.

The motion to reinstate the action was granted.

The defendant brought a motion to set aside a default judgment obtained by the plaintiff.

The plaintiff sought an adjournment because its counsel was unable to obtain instructions and intended to bring a motion to be removed from the record.

The court denied the adjournment, finding the defendant would suffer greater prejudice from delay.

On the merits, the court set aside the default judgment, finding the defendant had an arguable defence, moved promptly upon learning of the judgment, and had a reasonable excuse for the default due to internal processing errors and confusing correspondence from plaintiff's counsel.

The court awarded costs to the defendant.

The plaintiff moved to issue a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) on a commercial property following a failed real estate transaction.

The defendant opposed the motion.

The court applied the test for CPLs, considering factors such as the uniqueness of the land, the adequacy of damages as a remedy, and the harm to each party.

The court found that the property was not unique, damages were a viable alternative remedy, and the plaintiff's use of a shell corporation was not a factor.

The motion for a CPL was denied, and the existing Caution on Title was ordered to be removed.

The defendant, Lisa Snowball, brought a motion to discharge a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) on her property and release funds held in trust, which the plaintiff, The Regional Municipality of Halton, opposed.

Halton alleged the property and funds were connected to a multi-million dollar fraud scheme involving Snowball's former boyfriend and Halton employees.

Snowball argued that Halton failed to make full disclosure when obtaining the CPL, acted in bad faith during negotiations, and that the plaintiff's expert evidence should be struck for non-compliance with Rule 53.03.

The Master rejected Snowball's preliminary arguments, finding Halton had presented "better evidence" for the CPL, did not act in bad faith, and had substantially complied with expert disclosure rules.

Applying the CPL discharge test, the Master found a triable issue regarding Halton's interest in the land, given the complex financial transactions and Snowball's inability to credibly explain her financial capacity.

Balancing the equities, the Master concluded that justice was better served by preserving the status quo, as the property was not unique and there was no evidence of an intended sale.

Snowball's motion was denied.

The defendant brought a motion to strike various paragraphs of the plaintiff's Statement of Claim, arguing they failed to disclose material facts, constituted argument, or were prejudicial.

The court applied Rule 25.11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, emphasizing a generous reading of pleadings.

While the defendant made concessions during the hearing, the court ultimately struck only paragraph 53 and the second sentences of paragraphs 51 and 52, finding them argumentative and conclusory.

The majority of the plaintiff's pleading, including sections detailing the Ontario New Home Warranties Plan Act and factual narrative, was upheld as proper.